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ABSTRACT 
EXPLORING INTERACTIONS DURING MULTIORGANIZATIONAL 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE 
VIRGINIA COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
Madeleine Wright McNamara 
Old Dominion University, 2008 
Director: John C. Morris, Ph.D. 
Organizations face implementation challenges compounded by complex and 
interconnected public problems. In the environmental arena, the inabilities of individual 
organizations to resolve these problems independently are exacerbated by the scope, 
duration, and tremendous diversity of tasks coupled with a lack of funding. As a result, 
multiorganizational arrangements are created as public, private, and nonprofit 
organizations work together to implement policy. These relationships increase 
organizational capacities through the diversification of resources and expertise. 
Multiorganizational implementation is complicated by various legal authorities, 
missions, goals, and operational procedures that guide individual organizations. One way 
to approach these complexities is to expand our understanding of the different types of 
interactions that occur between organizations. The purpose of this study is to explore the 
use of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration between 15 federal/state agencies, 
local governments, and nongovernmental organizations when working together to 
implement the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. 
Inquiry into the empirical presence of different types of multiorganizational 
interactions makes two contributions to theory. First, the Multiorganizational 
Implementation Model is developed and presented as a framework that utilizes the policy 
implementation and interorganizational theory literatures to distinguish between 
cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. A theoretical foundation for comparing 
different types of interactions creates opportunities for consistent theoretical inquiry. 
Second, this is the first time that a model focused on different types of 
multiorganizational interactions is applied to a policy implementation setting. Broadening 
the scope of current inquiry to explore different types of interactions improves our 
theoretical understanding of policy implementation in multiorganizational arrangements. 
A continuum of interaction may help theorists move beyond a narrow reconciliation of 
the top-down/bottom-up approaches towards a fourth generation of implementation 
research. 
Textual data are gathered through document review and 34 semistructured 
interviews. Findings support the utility of the Multiorganizational Implementation Model 
in explaining interactions between organizations in this setting. In addition, 
administrators perceive collaborative interactions to occur within the multiorganizational 
arrangement when implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. Finally, 
interactions during multiorganizational implementation are initiated formally and 
informally in ways other than the current body of literature explores. 
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Organizations often face implementation challenges compounded by inherently 
complex and interconnected policy problems (O'Toole, 2000). Increased demands on 
government, coupled with fewer resources, further exacerbate the inabilities of individual 
organizations to independently implement public policy. As a result, public organizations 
work across bureaucratic boundaries to increase government's capacity for addressing 
complex problems (Kettl, 2003; Mandell, 1999). Partnerships between public, private, 
and nonprofit organizations develop and interdependencies form. Multiorganizational 
arrangements are increasingly used as agencies work together to implement policy by 
diversifying resources and expertise (Hall & O'Toole, 2004; Keast, Mandell, Brown, & 
Woolcock, 2004; O'Toole, 1993). 
Implementation inevitably requires interactions across organizational boundaries 
(Hjern & Porter, 1981; O'Toole, 1993). Therefore, it is important to expand our 
understanding of the interactions that take place between organizations when working 
together to implement policy. This study introduces the Multiorganizational 
Implementation Model (MIM) to explore the use of cooperation, coordination, and 
collaboration during multiorganizational policy implementation. 
The policy implementation literature identifies two theoretical approaches to 
policy implementation: the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach. These two 
approaches address implementation in different ways and emphasize different values 
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(Schofield, 2001). Much of the implementation research focuses on identifying variables 
specific to each approach (see, for example, Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989; O'Toole, 
1986). The circuitous debate comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the top-down 
and bottom-up approaches must be replaced with research identifying the variables most 
critical to policy implementation (O'Toole, 1986; 2000). The number of variables, wide 
variation in their perceived importance, and complexity of interactions are problematic 
for theoretical advancement (Goggin, 1986; O'Toole, 1986; 2000); conceptual clarity 
remains elusive. Although theorists acknowledge the importance of reconciling both 
approaches, a synthesized framework based on the combined strengths of the top-
down/bottom-up approaches is needed (O'Toole, 2000; Saetren, 2005). 
Organizations are often mandated by legislation to implement public policy in 
support of particular policy goals. Some mandates require two or more organizations to 
work together during policy implementation (see, for example, Caruson & MacManus, 
2006; O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984; Raelin, 1982). In these instances, relationships are 
likely to develop between organizations. The importance of interaction across 
organizational boundaries is first acknowledged in Pressman & Wildavsky's (1973) 
Implementation, where ignorance of organizational interdependence in complex decision 
chains ultimately contributes to a mismatch between policy expectations and outcomes. 
Despite this recognition more than three decades ago, little is done to examine 
interactions during multiorganizational implementation empirically. The focus of this 
research is on the different types of interactions that occur when organizations work 
together to implement public policy. 
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Problem Statement 
The policy literature recognizes the importance and complexity of 
multiorganizational implementation (see, for example, O'Toole, 1986; Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1973). However, empirical inquiry emphasizes formalized interactions based 
on policy mandate, agency rulemaking, or organizational procedures (Caruson & 
MacManus, 2006; Raelin, 1982). More specifically, the literature focuses on the extent to 
which policies identify interorganizational partners (Hall & O'Toole, 2004), policy 
characteristics that induce or constrain interdependence (May, 1995; O'Toole, 1995; 
O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984), or the structures used in multiorganizational implementation 
(Mandell, 1994; O'Toole, 1997). Despite a nonhierarchical nature, much of the literature 
involving implementation networks also emphasizes formalized interactions based on 
organized efforts (Hall & O'Toole, 2004; Mandell, 1994). The common thread among 
these different approaches to the literature is that organizations are assumed to work 
together in a formalized arrangement based on a requirement to do so. 
There are three problems with this approach. First, it fails to consider the 
possibility that multiorganizational implementation may occur outside the boundaries of 
operational authority. Informal interactions between organizations are important (Keast et 
al., 2004) and should be empirically examined. Second, legislators are limited in their 
abilities to foresee and specify the interactions required in complex implementation 
settings (O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984). It is highly unlikely that policy mandates account 
for all potential interactions within implementation settings. Third, the literature appears 
not to have progressed beyond the top-down/bottom-up debate even though O'Toole 
(2000) declared its ending nearly a decade ago. Exclusive acknowledgement of 
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formalized arrangements advocates a top-down approach. In the multiorganizational 
implementation literature, this approach is emphasized under the guise of alternative 
nomenclature—coordination. 
Collective action lies at the heart of multiorganizational implementation 
(O'Toole, 1991). Researchers use terms such as cooperation, coordination, or 
collaboration to describe interactions in multiorganizational implementation (Jennings & 
Ewalt, 1998; Lundin, 2007; O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984). While these terms are often used 
within the public administration, organization theory, and education literatures (see, for 
example, Intriligator, 1992; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, 
& Monsey, 2001), there is much that still needs to be done to understand empirically the 
nuances that distinguish these terms from one another. 
A lack of conceptual clarity impacts inquiry in three ways. First, there is a 
tendency to broadly categorize interaction terms with little regard for the definitions that 
distinguish them from one another (Caruson & MacManus, 2006; Keast, Brown, & 
Mandell, 2007; Mandell & Steelman, 2003). Without acknowledging and defining each 
term, theorists cannot properly consider the range of interactions potentially useful in 
multiorganizational implementation settings. Second, the appropriate application of 
cooperation, coordination, and collaboration cannot be acknowledged when they are used 
interchangeably. Misapplication of terms makes it difficult to identify the conditions 
under which it is appropriate to use a particular type of interaction as an implementation 
strategy. Third, researchers often assume an interaction occurs even though its presence is 
not empirically tested (see, for example, Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Imperial, 2001; 
Jennings & Krane, 1994; Kettl, 2003). The collective impact from these problems further 
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perpetuates theoretical inconsistency. A conceptual model pertaining to the use of 
different types of interactions during multiorganizational implementation is nonexistent. 
Study Setting 
The Virginia Coastal Zone Management (VCZM) Program provides the setting 
for this study. Its mission is to protect, restore, and strengthen Virginia's coastal areas by 
managing and overseeing activities that affect coastal resources. The VCZM Program is a 
network of Virginia state agencies and local governments who administer state laws, 
regulations, and policies to protect coastal resources. This network of organizations is 
selected as the setting for this study based on their involvement in implementing a policy 
mandate, a need for them to work collectively to implement this mandate, and a potential 
for a variety of interactions to occur between the government and nongovernmental 
organizations involved in implementing the program. 
Implementing the Virginia Coastal Zone Management Program 
The VCZM Program was established in 1986, by executive order, to protect 
Virginia's coastal zone and in response to the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 
(Kaine, 2006; United States Congress, 1972). The executive order explains the mission of 
the VCZM Program, specifies policy goals, identifies the Virginia Department of 
Environmental Quality (DEQ) as the lead agency, and requires specific state agencies to 
participate in program implementation. Despite its designation as lead agency, the DEQ 
does not have control over other state agencies. 
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State agency involvement in the VCZM Program is specified by executive order 
and classified into two categories: (1) agencies primarily responsible for implementing 
the VCZM Program's enforceable policies, and (2) agencies responsible for assisting 
with the VCZM Program (Kaine, 2006). These agencies are listed in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1 
Virginia State Agencies Designated by Executive Order 
Agencies Primarily Responsible for Agencies Responsible for Assisting with the 
Implementation of Enforceable Policies Program 
Department of Environmental Quality Department of Historic Resources 
Department of Conservation and Recreation Department of Forestry 
Marine Resource Commission Department of Agriculture and Consumer 
Department of Game and Inland Fisheries Services 
Department of Health Virginia Institute of Marine Science 
Department of Transportation 
Virginia Economic Development 
Partnership 
In Virginia's eight coastal areas, local governments are involved in the VCZM 
Program through the Planning District Commissions (PDCs). The PDCs focus on coastal 
management issues of greater than local concern by facilitating relationships, passing 
information, and pooling resources between state and local governments (Office of Ocean 
and Coastal Resource Management [OCRM], 2004). On an annual basis, the VCZM 
Program awards each PDC a grant to provide local governments with technical assistance 
(OCRM, 2004; Virginia Coastal Zone Management Program [VCZMP], 2008a). 
State agencies and PDCs within the VCZM Program partner with 
nongovernmental organizations, such as nonprofits and private businesses, to implement 
coastal programs or policies (see, for example, VCZMP, 2006). Partnerships with 
nonprofit organizations include The Nature Conservancy and Eastern Shorekeeper. 
Partnerships with private organizations include Cherrystone Aquafarms and Southeast 
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Expeditions. Nonprofit organizations and private businesses are not identified in the 
executive order. Typically, nongovernmental organizations do not receive grant funding 
through the VCZM Program. 
The Coastal Policy Team 
The VCZM Program established the Coastal Policy Team (CPT) to provide a 
forum to bring organizations together to develop and implement coastal policies, discuss 
coastal resource issues, and resolve conflicts (OCRM, 2004). It is comprised of 
representatives from key state agencies and each of the eight coastal PDCs. Each member 
of the CPT has voting rights; decisions, such as prioritizing issues and funding strategies, 
are based on consensus. The CPT provides policy recommendations to the VCZM 
Program staff (VCZMP, 2005). 
Members of the CPT have access to the coastal geospatial and educational 
mapping system (GEMS). This web-based planning tool helps them share information 
and align decisions pertaining to land use and resource management. The VCZM 
Program contributes considerable funding to this system in order to facilitate 
communication and informed decision making among partner organizations. The 
accuracy of the system relies on the data quality provided by the members of the CPT. In 
addition to potentially aligning local implementation efforts, another goal of GEMS is to 
better inform policy decision making by strengthening linkages between local land use 
plans and the state's water use policies (OCRM, 2007). Efforts to train representatives 
from key agencies and PDCs on GEMS are currently underway. 
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Grant Funding and the Virginia Coastal Zone Management Program 
The VCZM Program staff administers grant money funded by the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). These funds are used to maintain 
ongoing programs, support a large program identified as a main focal area, or help 
smaller projects get started. The VCZM Program found it beneficial to fund a long-term 
project aligned with their main focal area which is selected every three years (OCRM, 
2004). When identifying long-term projects, input is solicited from organizations within 
the network and other nongovernmental partners (VCZMP, 2005). 
Grant contracts are used to distribute money, define the scope of a particular 
project, and formally identify a single organization's responsibility for meeting the 
requirements in the grant. Funding is available to coastal states with federally approved 
coastal management programs. A lead organization is designated for each project and 
becomes legally responsible for implementing the specifications within the grant 
contract. This organization has discretion to work with other government agencies and 
nongovernmental partners to achieve project goals; these relationships are not specified 
in the grant and may occur more informally. Partnering organizations are often involved 
in project implementation even if they do not receive grant funding from the VCZM 
Program. Each project is assigned a grant coordinator and a project manager from the 
staff of the VCZM Program. The grant coordinator ensures the grant money is used as 
intended. The project manager may act as a facilitator between the program and the lead 
organization responsible for local project implementation. Project management typically 
goes beyond the terms specified in the grant contract. While grant funding is important, it 
is one part of the overall strategy for a particular initiative. 
9 
The Virginia Seaside Heritage Program 
In 2002, the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program became the main focal area for 
the VCZM Program (VCZMP, 2007). As a result, this program receives significant 
funding and coastal management expertise from the VCZM Program; support is 
scheduled to continue through September of 2008. The Virginia Seaside Heritage 
Program, and more specifically the interactions that occur between the organizations 
involved in implementing this program, provide the focus for this study. 
The primary goals of the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program are to restore coastal 
habitats and replenish aquatic resources along Virginia's Eastern Shore while promoting 
sustainable economic activities such as ecotourism and aquaculture (VCZMP, 2007; 
2008c). Aquatic resources include underwater grasses, oysters, scallops, finfish, 
waterfowl, and shorebirds (OCRM, 2007). The presence of these aquatic resources within 
the waters surrounding Virginia's Eastern Shore are dramatically declining due to over-
harvesting, disease, and habitat loss (VCZMP, 2007; 2008c). In addition to habitat 
restoration, aquaculture, and ecotourism, another goal of the Virginia Seaside Heritage 
Program is to draft an agreement between key players promoting management strategies 
for sustaining coastal resources (VCZMP, 2008b). 
A network of federal agencies, Virginia state agencies, local governments, and 
nongovernmental organizations implement the policies associated with the Virginia 
Seaside Heritage Program. These organizations are identified in Table 1.2. It is through 
these partnerships that coastal habitats are restored; aquatic resources are replenished; 
and economic development is managed. 
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Table 1.2 
Network of Organizations in the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program 
Organizational Type Specific Organizations in the Network 
Federal Agencies 
Virginia State Agencies/Programs 
Local Government 
Nongovernmental Organizations 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
Department of Environmental Quality 
Coastal Zone Management Program 
Marine Resources Commission 
Department of Conservation & Recreation 








College of William & Mary3 
Institute of Marine Science3 
Center for Conservation Biology3 
University of Virginia3 
a
 Although these academic institutions are state sponsored, they operate autonomously as individual organizations. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this research is to explore interactions between organizations 
when working together to implement policy. More specifically, this research explores the 
use of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration between government and 
nongovernmental organizations during implementation of the Virginia Seaside Heritage 
Program. This study of multiorganizational implementation is important for two reasons. 
First, a major contribution of this study is the introduction of the Multiorganizational 
Implementation Model (MIM). The strength of the MIM is that it resolves an earlier 
model's ambiguities by clearly distinguishing between operationalizations of 
cooperation, coordination, and collaboration based on application of the policy 
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implementation and interorganizational theory literatures. These distinctions provide 
opportunities for consistent theoretical inquiry and improve the model's transferability 
for future use in alternative settings. 
Second, this is the first time that a model focused on multiorganizational 
interactions is applied to a public policy implementation setting. Broadening the scope of 
current inquiry to explore different types of interactions may improve our theoretical 
understanding of policy implementation in multiorganizational arrangements. A 
continuum of interactions gives researchers a different way of looking at the top-
down/bottom-up debate while moving beyond a narrow reconciliation of the two 
approaches. This application to public policy expands the use of interorganizational 
theory and suggests that both literatures may benefit from collective inquiry. For 
example, empirical research on informal interactions fills a gap in the current policy 
implementation and interorganizational theory literatures which both emphasize formal 
interactions deliberately configured to attain policy or organizational goals. 
Research Questions 
This study examines the following research questions: 
1. Does the Multiorganizational Implementation Model (MIM) help explain interactions 
in a policy implementation setting? 
2. How do administrators perceive the use of cooperation, coordination, or collaboration 
when working in a multiorganizational arrangement to implement policy? 
3. How are multiorganizational interactions initiated? 
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The first two research questions explore the applicability of the MIM and the 
perceived use of different types of interactions in a multiorganizational implementation 
setting. Variables within all four constructs of the model are explored to address these 
two research questions. The third research question explores whether multiorganizational 
interactions are initiated formally through legislative mandate or agency rulemaking, 
informally through street-level experience or common interests, or a combination of both. 
The impetus for collective action variable within the interorganizational policy objective 
construct and the formality of the agreement variable within the interorganizational 
infrastructure construct of the MIM are explored to address this research question. 
Theoretical Framework 
The Multiorganizational Implementation Model (MIM) provides the basis for the 
conceptual framework within this study. A previous version of this model, developed in 
the health education literature, examines multiorganizational arrangements in settings 
such as health and human service delivery, medical and social service provision, and 
education (see, for example, Edmondson, 2006; LaRocco, 1997; Thatcher, 2007). The 
design, assumptions, construct nomenclature, and operationalizations from previous 
versions of the model are transformed in this study to eliminate ambiguities and align 
with the policy implementation and interorganizational theory literatures. This 
transformation results in the development of the MIM. 
The Multiorganizational Implementation Model is a theoretical lens that can be 
used to explore a continuum of interactions between organizations. Cooperation, 
coordination, and collaboration are the interaction terms used to describe this continuum. 
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These terms, and their placement along a continuum, are recognized by some researchers 
in the public administration, organization theory, and education literatures (see, for 
example, Intriligator, 1992; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, 
&Monsey, 2001). 
At one end of the spectrum, cooperation represents an interaction between 
independent organizations who can individually accomplish the task at hand but 
voluntarily and informally work together to build capacity or serve individual interests in 
pursuit of simple goals (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & 
Monsey, 2001; O'Leary & Bingham, 2007b). At the other end of the spectrum, 
collaboration represents an interaction between organizations with collective 
responsibility for interconnected tasks who work together voluntarily or by mandate in 
pursuit of complex goals which cannot be accomplished by a single organization and are 
based on shared interests (Gray, 1989; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, 
Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Coordination is placed in the 
middle of the two end points and represents an interaction between organizations 
requiring some assistance from other organizations to accomplish individual missions in 
which formal linkages are mobilized voluntarily or by mandate in pursuit of multifaceted 
goals that support common objectives (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, 
Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). 
Placement on the continuum of interaction can be viewed through the following 
four constructs: interorganizational policy objective, interorganizational infrastructure, 
interorganizational procedures, and organizational management. These constructs, and 
their relationships with the continuum of interaction, are identified in Figure 1.1. The 
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model's four constructs simultaneously influence interactions within multiorganizational 
arrangements. Therefore, operationalizations of each construct are used to determine an 
arrangement's overall placement along the continuum. 
Figure 1.1 





Continuum of Interaction 






A single case study design is used to address the research questions in this study. 
When focusing on a single case, selection requires careful consideration (Stake, 1995; 
Yin, 2003). The VCZM Program is chosen as the setting for this research through 
criterion purposeful sampling. Case selection is based on the following criteria: (1) the 
program is mandated to implement policy via the Coastal Zone Management Act; (2) the 
program is comprised of a network of organizations which frequently interact to 
implement policy; (3) no organization within the network has formal authority to direct a 
particular type of interaction with other organizations; and (4) a variety of interactions 
potentially occur within the program's multiorganizational arrangement involving federal 
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and state agencies, local governments, and nongovernmental organizations. 
Multiorganizational policy implementation within the VCZM Program represents a 
critical case which meets the conditions needed to explore the MIM in a policy setting. 
Interactions between the organizations involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside 
Heritage Program are the target of this exploratory research. 
Data are collected in two ways: (1) semistructured interviews with individuals 
involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program, and (2) a review of 
organizational documents that provide further insight into interactions during 
multiorganizational policy implementation. These data collection strategies are common 
to qualitative methodology because they help the researcher gather information-rich 
descriptions during inquiry (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003). In addition, these strategies are 
often used in research exploring multiorganizational interactions (see, for example, Hall 
& O'Toole, 2004; Imperial, 2001; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; O'Toole & Montjoy, 
1984). 
Standardized, open-ended interview questions are used to gather in-depth 
information, limit external influences, organize data, and guide analysis (Patton, 2002; 
Stake, 1995). An interview protocol includes predetermined sensitizing themes aligned 
with operationalizations of the MIM. Interview participants are selected using snowball 
sampling. This strategy helps identify information-rich participants and recognizes that 
participants emerge as interviews progress (Patton, 2002). Interviewing begins with 
members of the Coastal Policy Team involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside 
Heritage Program. 
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The researcher uses document review to gather additional data pertaining to 
interactions during multiorganizational policy implementation. Memorandums of 
understanding between organizations and program evaluations represent some of the 
documents reviewed. Data gathered from the review of organizational documents is 
compared to data gathered during interviews. 
As data are collected through interviews and documents, the researcher uses 
content analysis in two ways. First, a deductive approach to data analysis is employed as 
the researcher systematically reduces the data gathered into the categories of a 
predetermined coding scheme. These categories, based on the operationalizations of the 
MIM, ultimately allow the researcher to place each multiorganizational interaction into 
one of the following categories: cooperation, coordination, or collaboration. The 
researcher gains insight into the study's research questions by comparing the model's 
theoretical patterns and the data's empirical patterns. Second, an inductive approach to 
data analysis is employed as the researcher makes a purposeful attempt to find patterns 
that do not fit into the categories of the predetermined coding scheme. Interviewees are 
asked if there are any factors, other than those discussed, that impact interactions between 
organizations. As contradictory data emerges, revisions to the theoretical model are 
considered (Patton, 2002). This single case study design emphasizes theory verification 
by focusing on a critical case (Yin, 2003). 
Methodological triangulation and data source triangulation enhance authenticity 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994; Stake, 1995). Confidence in research findings increases as 
data from interviews and documents are compared. Data remaining in a nonnumerical, 
textual form are used to support numerical aggregation and provide context. 
17 
Significance of the Study 
This research presents a theoretical lens to explore multiorganizational 
arrangements during policy implementation. Development of the Multiorganizational 
Implementation Model is a significant contribution of this research. Its application in this 
study allows for empirical testing of the model's operationalizations. Clarity of 
operationalizations enhances the model's transferability to other settings. 
Broadening the scope of current inquiry to explore different types of interactions 
may improve our understanding of multiorganizational policy implementation. Linkages 
with interorganizational theory can be established to guide the implementation literature 
toward a fourth generation of research. Distinguishing between different types of 
interactions and identifying the conditions which warrant their use may further our 
understanding of how particular interactions can be used as implementation strategies to 
help multiorganizational arrangements fulfill policy goals. 
An approach that considers a continuum of interactions as implementation 
strategies gives researchers a different way of looking at the top-down/bottom-up debate 
while moving beyond a narrow reconciliation of the two approaches. More specifically, a 
continuum of interactions bridges the two approaches by allowing researchers to look at 
the nature of the interaction without having to assume that one approach is more 
important to implementation than the other. The formulation of previous implementation 
models relies considerably on the preconceived notions of their developers and their 
chosen approach to implementation (O'Toole, 1993; Schofield, 2001). 
Since the top-down and bottom-up approaches are often seen to embrace 
competing variables, the selection of one approach over another involves a value 
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judgment based on a limited set of variables considered to be most relevant. These 
assumptions limit the researcher to a narrow view of implementation by allowing them to 
ignore the relative importance of variables associated with the other approach (O' Toole, 
1993). On the other hand, the MIM does not make any presumptions regarding variable 
importance, and each approach is considered equally important in analyzing interactions 
between organizations during implementation. In moving beyond the constraints inherent 
to the top-down and bottom-up approaches, researchers are not restricted to a particular 
set of variables and may be able to see implementation for what it really is. 
Interactions are formed in a variety of ways (Robinson, 2006). Legislation and 
agency rulemaking do not necessarily capture the operational patterns of interaction that 
actually occur during implementation (Hall & O'Toole, 2004). The MIM can be used to 
further research informal interactions between organizations. If informal interactions are 
empirically identified, two assumptions must be reconsidered. The first assumption 
involves the multiorganizational implementation literature. Theorists can no longer 
assume that formal, coordinated strategies are the only way in which organizations 
interact when implementing policy in multiorganizational arrangements. The second 
assumption involves interorganizational theory. Researchers can no longer assume that 
all interactions are deliberately and formally configured by planning personnel to align 
with the type of interaction specified in the interorganizational objective (see, for 
example, Thatcher, 2007). The potential for informal interactions to occur in 
multiorganizational arrangements must be considered. 
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Limitations 
As with all research designs, selecting a case study approach has tradeoffs 
(Marshall & Rossman, 1999). Several limitations pertaining to this case study must be 
acknowledged. First, this research focuses on the network of organizations working 
together to implement the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. Case studies are bounded 
by context (Merriam, 1998). Therefore, the findings from this case study are not intended 
for generalization or representation of other settings (Marshall & Rossman, 1999; Stake, 
1995). Implementation of environmental policy, such as the Coastal Zone Management 
Act, may utilize different types of interactions than those in other policy areas. This 
limitation is addressed by fully describing this study's sample and setting (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). With this information, other researchers can assess the study's 
transferability. 
Second, the data collected in this study is based on the interpretations of the 
interviewer and the perceptions self-reported by those interviewed (Stake, 1995). 
Subjectivity is critical to understanding the context of a particular case (Stake, 1995). 
However, this subjectivity can bias research as interviewees and the interviewer may 
unintentionally filter textual data (Creswell, 2003). This limitation is addressed by 
maintaining a transparent process throughout data analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Each step of the process is revealed to prevent an unintentional filtering of data and 
enhance the study's confirmability. 
Third, this research on interactions during policy implementation is initially 
limited to the variables identified in the MIM. Other factors may influence interactions 
between organizations during policy implementation. This limitation is addressed by 
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offering interviewees an opportunity to provide additional information after completing 
the series of questions aligned with the operationalizations of the theoretical model. A 
search for competing evidence is used to enhance the model's authenticity (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). 
Fourth, all variables within the MIM are initially assumed to influence 
multiorganizational interactions equally and simultaneously. However, some variables 
may influence these interactions more than others. This limitation is addressed through 
the use of qualitative methodology. In addition to looking for the verbal mention of 
elements in interviews and documents, the researcher uses examples and context 
provided by interviewees to give additional meaning to the perceived variation in levels 
of importance. 
Despite the limitations associated with case study research, its use of in-depth 
exploration is well suited for this research. The study's research questions are addressed 
through information-rich descriptions. It is through these efforts that the policy 
implementation and interorganizational theory literatures may advance. 
Subsequent Chapters 
This chapter introduces the problem, provides relevant background information 
highlighting gaps in the current research, identifies the purpose of this research, explains 
the theoretical framework, and gives an overview of the research design. In addition, the 
significance of this research and its limitations are discussed. The following chapter 
discusses the policy implementation and interorganizational theory literatures. This study 
draws from these literatures to present the Multiorganizational Implementation Model. 
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Chapter Three provides details on the single case study research design 
organizing this research. Methods and data collection procedures are discussed in great 
detail in order to enhance the confirmability and dependability of findings. Chapter Four 
focuses on analyzing the data collected from interviews and organizational documents. 
Chapter Five provides an overview of the study and summarizes research findings. 






After numerous policy failures in the 1960s, it became clear that well constructed 
policy could ultimately fail from the complexities of implementation (Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1973). Implementation research is represented by three generations, with 
much emphasis placed on reconciling the top-down and bottom-up approaches (Elmore, 
1985; Goggin, Bowman, Lester, & O'Toole, 1990; Matland, 1990; 1995). Inherent 
differences between these two approaches make reconciliation difficult, and circuitous 
discussions largely prevent identifying the variables most critical to policy 
implementation (Menzel, 1987; O'Toole, 1986; 2000). As a result, conceptual clarity is 
elusive. An emphasis on multiorganizational implementation may refocus the literature 
and move it toward a fourth generation of research (Imperial, 2001). 
Multiorganizational implementation becomes increasingly important as public 
organizations face increasing demands, fewer resources, and complex policy problems 
(O'Toole, 1993; 1997). Despite its importance, empirical inquiry pertaining to 
multiorganizational implementation primarily assumes organizations work together in 
mandated, formalized, or hierarchical arrangements (see, for example, Caruson & 
MacManus, 2006; Hall & O'Toole, 2000; 2004; Mandell, 1994; Raelin, 1982). 
Arrangements that are not mandated, less formal, or nonhierarchical are not considered 
empirically within the policy implementation literature despite their utilization in other 
disciplines. 
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This study links the policy implementation and interorganizational theory 
literatures to explore interactions during multiorganizational policy implementation. The 
first part of this chapter focuses on the policy implementation literature while the second 
part focuses on the interorganizational theory literature. The final section of this chapter 
presents the Multiorganizational Implementation Model (MIM); this theoretical lens 
guides inquiry throughout this research. 
Policy Implementation 
Implementation research is organized into three generations. The first generation, 
roughly the period from 1973 to 1978, focuses on highly descriptive studies 
implementing authoritative mandates regarding a single policy decision (Matland, 1990). 
First generation researchers primarily employ a case study design and routinely focus on 
implementation failures within individual organizations. They often face critique for their 
pessimistic view of implementation success (Goggin, 1986) and their inabilities to 
contribute to a more general theory of implementation (deLeon & deLeon, 2002). Despite 
these shortcomings, it is important to acknowledge that this research generates a variety 
of lessons learned highlighting the complexities inherent in implementation. By 
recognizing difficulties in translating policy into action, researchers became aware of 
gross inaccuracies surrounding their perceptions that implementation occurs 
automatically after policy decisions are made. As a result, researchers widely 
acknowledge the necessity for further study of the implementation process. 
The second generation, roughly the period from 1978 to 1985, focuses on 
comprehensive theoretical models to highlight two approaches to policy implementation: 
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the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach (Matland, 1990). These two 
approaches address implementation in very different ways (Schofield, 2001). An inherent 
emphasis on competing values, such as bureaucratic authority versus local discretion, is 
often referred to as an implementation paradox (Alexander, 1989; Long & Franklin, 
2004; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Stoker, 1991). 
The search for a conceptual framework that synthesizes the top-down and bottom-
up approaches continues throughout the third generation of implementation research. 
However, synthesizing both approaches into an all encompassing conceptual framework 
is significantly complicated by the competing ways in which each approach views 
implementation. In order to appreciate these complications, the specific set of 
assumptions that guide each approach must be understood. 
Top-Down/Bottom-Up Approaches 
The top-down approach focuses on the attainment of centralized objectives. 
Policy designers play a key role in policy implementation and are assumed to have 
abilities to impose policy (Linder & Peters, 1987; Matland, 1990; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 
1989; Sabatier, 1986). Policy characteristics and hierarchical controls are critically 
important to top-down research (McFarlane, 1989; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989). By 
focusing on technical criteria such as statutory clarity, rule promulgation, policy 
specificity, and hierarchical monitoring, theorists assume that implementation problems 
can be minimized through careful planning (see, for example, Edwards & Sharkansky, 
1978; Long & Franklin, 2004; Matland, 1990; Montjoy & O'Toole, 1979; Van Horn, 
1979). Centralized control, clear direction, and authoritative monitoring are needed to 
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ensure local actors implement policy congruent with the goals of policy designers 
(Edwards & Sharkansky, 1978; Long & Franklin, 2004; O'Toole, 1993; Sabatier, 1986). 
The top-down approach may be criticized because it does not recognize differentiation of 
implementation at the local levels based on street-level discretion (Long & Franklin, 
2004; Schofield, 2001). 
On the other hand, the bottom-up approach focuses on policy implementation 
influenced by policy actors, local initiatives, citizen needs, and contextual factors (Linder 
& Peters, 1987; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000). Rather than being centrally 
controlled, actors throughout the lowest levels of an organization are afforded discretion 
to implement policy (Carrington, 2005; Linder & Peters, 1987; Lipsky, 1980; Matland, 
1990; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000). Administrators use personal judgment to 
make decisions at the lowest levels (Carrington, 2005); these decisions cumulatively 
create public policy (Lipsky, 1980). As a result, policy continuously evolves and is 
refined by interactions at various levels (Bovens & Zouridis, 2002; Linder & Peters, 
1987). The bottom-up approach may be criticized because it fails to recognize the 
potential for policy characteristics or hierarchical controls to influence the local policy 
environment (Schofield, 2001). 
While the search for a conceptual framework that synthesizes the top-down and 
bottom-up approaches continues throughout the third generation of implementation 
research, much of this research focuses on identifying variables specific to each approach 
(Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989; O'Toole, 1986). For example, O'Toole (1986) identifies 
over 300 variables discussed within the literature for their potential to impact policy 
implementation. The number of variables identified in implementation research is 
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problematic for three reasons. First, much of the implementation research focuses on case 
studies. When the number of variables significantly overwhelms the number of cases, the 
data may incorrectly appear to support inferences. Too much information is being used to 
explain a small number of cases (Goggin, 1986). Second, it is nearly impossible to 
measure the specific effect each variable has on the implementation process while 
accounting for numerous interactions. Third, the quantity of variables blinds researchers 
from seeing what is truly important. 
The circuitous debate comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the top-
down/bottom-up approaches must be replaced with research identifying the variables 
most critical to policy implementation. This is made more difficult by a lack of 
cumulative research (Hjern, 1982; O'Toole, 1986; 2000). The number of variables, wide 
variation in their perceived importance, and complexity of interactions paralyze 
theoretical advancement (Goggin, 1986; Goggin et al, 1990; O'Toole, 1986; 2000). 
Conceptual clarity remains elusive in the absence of a synthesized framework based on 
the combined strengths of the top-down and bottom-up approaches (Matland, 1995; 
O'Toole, 1991; Saetren, 2005). 
Reconciling Top-Down/Bottom-Up Approaches 
Researchers acknowledge the importance of reconciling the top-down and 
bottom-up implementation approaches (Elmore, 1985; Goggin et al., 1990; Matland, 
1990; 1995; O'Toole, 2000). Some of the more common models are based on the 
contributions of Elmore (1985), Goggin et al. (1990), and Matland (1990; 1995). Elmore 
(1985) applies forward and backward mapping to implementation research. By looking at 
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both ends of the implementation process, policy analysts can explore which approach 
leads to a more advantageous solution (Elmore, 1985). Goggin et al. (1990) uses a 
systems approach to explore how implementers at the state level are influenced by 
inducements and constraints from the top (federal) and bottom (state and local) levels of 
government. Their "Communications Model" is intended to explore the complexities of 
intergovernmental implementation by addressing various components at the federal, state, 
and local levels (Goggin et al., 1990). Matland (1990; 1995) uses a contingency approach 
to explore adaptive implementation. According to this model, an implementation strategy 
is dependent on environmental conflict and statutory ambiguity. By dichotomously 
organizing these variables into a typology, four types of implementation strategies are 
identified (Matland, 1995). 
Their attempts to synthesize the top-down and bottom-up approaches are 
commendable, but these models do not account for the multiorganizational arrangements 
frequently used to implement policy (see, for example, Hjern & Porter, 1981; Keast et al., 
2004; Lundin, 2007; Mandell, 1994; O'Toole, 1995; O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984). In 
addition, an emphasis on competing implementation approaches minimizes efforts placed 
on developing other research areas deserving of inquiry (Schofield, 2001). As 
governments face increasingly interconnected problems, it is inevitable that 
implementation will occur in a pluralistic environment requiring interaction across 
organizational boundaries (Hjern, 1982; Menzel, 1987; O'Toole, 1993; Robinson, 2006). 
Implementation success or failure will rely heavily on the organizations involved in 
policy implementation and the interdependencies between these organizations 
(Alexander, 1989; O'Toole, 1995). 
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Interorganizational Implementation 
O'Toole (1995) defines interorganizational implementation as two or more 
organizations working together to implement public policy. This subset of 
implementation literature, also referred to as multiorganizational implementation, 
conceptually recognizes the importance and complexity of joint action (see, for example, 
Caruson & MacManus, 2006; Elmore, 1985; Menzel, 1987; O'Toole, 1991; Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1973). However, little emphasis is placed on developing a conceptual model 
pertaining to the use of different types of multiorganizational interactions during 
implementation. While interaction terms such as cooperation, coordination, and 
collaboration are clearly defined in the interorganizational theory literature (Gray, 1989; 
Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001), they are arbitrarily used in the 
multiorganizational implementation literature. Furthermore, the nuances that distinguish 
these terms are ignored (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). There is a need to understand 
how these interactions impact policy implementation in a multiorganizational setting. 
Empirical inquiry within the interorganizational implementation literature 
emphasizes formalized interactions based on policy mandate, agency rulemaking, or 
organizational procedures. More specifically, the literature focuses on the extent to which 
policies identify interorganizational partners (Hall & O'Toole, 2000; 2004), policy 
characteristics that induce or constrain interdependence (May, 1995; O'Toole, 1983; 
1988; 1995; O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984), or the structures used in multiorganizational 
implementation (Hall & O'Toole, 2000; 2004; Mandell, 1994; O'Toole, 1989; 1993; 
1995; 1997; Raelin, 1980; 1982). These inquiries may help researchers gain some 
knowledge pertaining to interactions during multiorganizational implementation, but an 
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emphasis on formalized interactions only addresses one portion of the larger picture in 
which informal interactions also occur. 
Despite the nonhierarchical nature of network arrangements, much of the 
literature involving implementation networks also emphasizes formalized interactions 
based on organized efforts (see, for example, Hall & O'Toole, 2004; Keast et al., 2004; 
Mandell, 1994; Raelin, 1982). This emphasis is ironic when considering the definition of 
networks. According to Hall & O'Toole (2004), networks are defined as "two or more 
units in which not all major components are encompassed within a single hierarchical 
array" (p. 187). Although other than formal relationships seem likely to occur when 
organizations work outside their hierarchical boundaries, researchers largely ignore these 
relationships when examining network arrangements. Despite a definition to the contrary, 
implementation networks are treated by researchers as an extension of the organizational 
hierarchy abiding by specifications dictated through policy mandates. The common 
thread among these different approaches to empirical inquiry within the 
interorganizational implementation literature is that organizations are assumed to work 
together in a formalized arrangement based on a requirement to do so. 
There are three problems with these approaches. First, the possibility that 
multiorganizational implementation may occur outside the boundaries of operational 
authority is not considered. An emphasis on formal interactions superficially endorses 
top-down inquiry which is supported under the guise of alternative nomenclature-
coordination. It is assumed that all levels of the organization comply with the type of 
interaction specified in the mandate, that organizations work together because they are 
required to do so, and that local dynamics can be ignored. Researchers fail to consider the 
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relationships that informally develop outside of the organizational hierarchy despite their 
potential impact on multiorganizational implementation. Informal interactions between 
organizations are important (Keast et al., 2004), and the way in which different 
arrangements form should be examined empirically (Robinson, 2006). 
Second, an emphasis on formal interactions incorrectly assumes that relationships 
between organizations can be predetermined, centrally controlled, and monitored to meet 
policy goals. This approach requires the variables most important to multiorganizational 
relationships during policy implementation to be theoretically identified and empirically 
examined. An exclusively top-down approach fails to consider that legislators are limited 
in their abilities to foresee and specify the interactions required in complex 
implementation settings (O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984). Once again, informal interactions 
may play an important role in multiorganizational implementation; it would be difficult to 
accurately capture them in the policy mandate. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that policy 
mandates can account for all potential interactions within implementation settings. 
Third, a formal approach to organizational arrangements within the 
implementation literature perpetuates the top-down/bottom-up debate even though 
O'Toole (2000) declared an ending to this debate nearly a decade ago. It is one thing to 
theoretically support one approach over another after careful consideration, but it is 
entirely different when one approach is supported based on ignorance of the other. 
Resolution of the top-down/bottom-up debate requires equal consideration of both 
approaches. Policy implementation involves more than carrying out a combination of 
statutory clauses (see, for example, Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973); it requires an 
understanding of the linkages that occur between the organizations responsible for 
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implementation (Hjern, 1982). Elements of both approaches are needed to examine fully 
the relationships between organizations because they are impacted by top-down 
characteristics such as mandate characteristics in addition to bottom-up characteristics 
such as interorganizational dynamics within the local implementation environment. 
Therefore, examination of multiorganizational interactions should occur without 
assuming that one approach is more important to implementation than the other. 
Furthermore, resolving the paradoxical nature of the top-down and bottom-up approaches 
requires an acknowledgment of both approaches. 
Collective action lies at the heart of multiorganizational implementation 
(O'Toole, 1991). Researchers often use terms such as cooperation, coordination, or 
collaboration to describe interactions in multiorganizational implementation (see, for 
example, Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Lundin, 2007; 
Mandell & Steelman, 2003; May, 1995; O'Toole, 1983; 1988; 1989; Robinson, 2006). 
While these terms are more clearly defined in the interorganizational theory and 
education literatures (see, for example, Gray, 1985; 1989; Intriligator, 1992; Mattessich, 
Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001), the nuances that distinguish these terms go unnoticed 
when applied in a multiorganizational implementation setting. As a result, interaction 
terms are used arbitrarily and interchangeably to describe relationships within the 
implementation literature. To date, researchers have not linked cooperation, coordination, 
or collaboration collectively to multiorganizational implementation. The development of 
a conceptual model that distinguishes between each type of interaction may broaden our 
understanding of multiorganizational implementation and help identify the appropriate 
application for each type of interaction within this setting. 
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Interorganizational Theory 
Today's public managers often face complex social problems that do not abide by 
bureaucratic boundaries (Kettl, 2003). Interdependencies between government agencies 
and nongovernmental partners can be used to generate a variety of multiorganizational 
arrangements. These arrangements are also referred to as "interorganizational 
innovations" and may increase government's capacity for action (Mandell & Steelman, 
2003). The terms used most commonly in the public administration literature to describe 
multiorganizational interactions are cooperation, coordination, and collaboration (see, for 
example, Agranoff, 2006; Caruson & MacManus, 2006; Keast & Brown, 2002; Thomson 
& Perry, 2006). It is important for practitioners and scholars to understand each of these 
terms and how they differ from one another (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mandell & 
Steelman, 2003). Therefore, the following section broadly describes each of these terms 
and their placement along a continuum of interaction. 
The Continuum of Interaction 
Some public administration theorists describe cooperation, coordination, and 
collaboration as falling along a continuum of increased interaction (Bryson, Crosby, & 
Stone, 2006; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 
2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006). At one end of the spectrum, cooperation is an interaction 
between independent organizations who can individually accomplish the task at hand but 
may voluntarily and informally work together within existing organizational structures 
and policies to build capacity or serve individual interests in pursuit of simple, short-term 
goals (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; 
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O'Leary & Bingham, 2007b). The desire to work together may be triggered by changes in 
external factors and the desire to avoid negative impacts associated with these factors 
(Ospina & Yaroni, 2003). There is no need to define a mission, structure, or planning 
effort common to the organizations within the arrangement (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & 
Monsey, 2001). Cooperation may take place without involving organizational leaders 
(Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). 
While cooperation is identified as an interaction term on the continuum, literature 
pertaining to cooperation is elusive. The few articles that appear to focus solely on 
cooperative interactions are plagued by a lack of definition, misapplication of the term, or 
a tendency to interchange cooperation with other interaction terms such as coordination 
and collaboration (see, for example, Althaus & Yarwood, 1993; Callahan, 2007; 
Lambright, 1997). The research conducted by Ospina & Yaroni (2003) on labor 
management provides one exception to these problems. In studies where cooperation is 
defined and identified as one of three terms on the continuum of interaction, empirical 
research is lacking (see, for example, Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; 
O'Leary & Bingham, 2007b). Efforts to decipher cooperation from other interaction 
terms are addressed in the research conducted by Keast, Brown, & Mandell (2007) 
regarding administrators' perceptions of differences between the terms cooperation, 
coordination, and collaboration. However, research solely focused on cooperative 
interactions and its application to public organizations has yet to develop fully in the 
interorganizational theory literature. 
Coordination is placed in the middle of the two end points. It is an interaction that 
links organizations in specific areas because some assistance from other organizations is 
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needed to accomplish the individual mission (Jennings, 1994; Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; 
Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Agencies typically use this type of interaction to pursue 
longer-term goals based on repeatable tasks (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 
2001). The desire to work together may be voluntary or mandated based on a benefit to 
achieving individual and compatible mission areas that support common objectives. 
Although leaders within the individual organizations retain authority over decision 
making, there may be some overlap in resources, infrastructure, and procedures. 
Therefore, coordination often implies the need for some shared planning where roles and 
responsibilities are formally defined (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). 
Coordination is typically characterized by instrumental processes that rely on 
formally structured relationships and hierarchical control to link the infrastructures of 
individual organizations (see, for example, Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; Mandell, 1994; Van 
de Ven, Delbecq, & Koenig, 1976; Van de Ven & Walker, 1984). As a result, 
coordination is often perceived as a formal approach to interaction based on a 
requirement for organizations to work together (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). 
However, less formal ways to view coordination are acknowledged in the literature 
(Chisholm, 1989; Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; Kettl, 2003; Van de Ven & Walker, 1984; 
Wise, 2006). 
Van de Ven and Walker (1984) use the term "mobilization coordination" to 
describe less formal, ad hoc relationships in their longitudinal study of early childhood 
development organizations. Based on a questionnaire administered to 14 agency 
directors, they conclude that the use of formal or informal approaches to coordination 
largely depends on the types of resources used to create interdependencies between 
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organizations. An interdependence based on financial resources generates a more formal 
approach to coordination; on the other hand a more informal approach to coordination 
occurs when aligning resources pertaining to client referrals (Van de Ven & Walker, 
1984). A less formal approach to coordination is also recognized by Kettl (2003); he uses 
the term "contingent coordination" to describe a flexible and adaptable network approach 
to coordination. Mandell and Steelman (2003) also differentiate between "intermittent 
coordination" and "regular coordination" (p. 203). According to Chisholm (1989), an 
informal approach to coordination may initially be facilitated by more formal 
organizational policies and activities. 
The commonality among this subset of the literature is that interactions other than 
coordination are not considered. Without this consideration, it is difficult to determine the 
existence of an informal approach to coordination. Perhaps the informal approach to 
coordination may be better explained by a different interaction term altogether. 
At the other end of the spectrum, collaboration is based on interdependence 
among multiple organizations that share responsibility for interconnected tasks and work 
together to pursue collectively complex goals that cannot be accomplished by a single 
organization (Gray, 1989; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & 
Monsey, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006). This type of interaction typically requires great 
levels of commitment as stakeholders within a particular problem domain frequently 
interact to develop shared norms, rules, and processes used to make collective decisions 
(Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Thomson & Perry, 2006; Wood & Gray, 1991). 
Collaboration is further characterized by organizations that establish a collective unit in 
which individual organizations relinquish some autonomy to develop new infrastructure 
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and procedures to support mutually beneficial interactions in which decisions are made 
jointly (Intriligator, 1992; 1994; Mandell, 1994; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 
2001). As a result, organizational boundaries are often blurred (Keast, Brown, & 
Mandell, 2007) and significant efforts are needed to align planning efforts (Mattessich, 
Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). This process goes well beyond the instrumental 
approach emphasized by coordination (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). 
Collaboration is not appropriate for use in all situations (Keast, Brown, & 
Mandell, 2007). Collaborative interactions may be most appropriate under certain 
conditions: when other types of interaction have failed; when complex situations of crisis 
occur; when problems are so interconnected that responsibility is shared; or when there is 
a win-win situation based on mutual interest (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Imperial, 
2005; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Keast et al., 2004). Organizations are limited in 
their abilities to exploit their collaborative capacity when faced with different statutory 
responsibilities, different constituencies, competing interests, a lack of slack resources, 
procedural rigidity, institutional or budgetary constraints, power asymmetries, ideological 
differences, power disparities, or a history of conflict (Huxham, 2003; Imperial, 2001). 
It may be particularly difficult for public organizations to sustain collaborative 
relationships because they are often faced with conventional bureaucratic systems that do 
not inherently accommodate shared power and joint decision making (Keast, Brown, & 
Mandell, 2007). Keast, Brown, and Mandell (2007) use interviews and focus groups to 
gather information from 40 practitioners pertaining to their understanding of cooperation, 
coordination, and collaboration. The findings from this research suggest a tendency 
among practitioners to revert to coordinated interactions. A majority of their participants, 
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representing multiple levels of government, indicate that collaborative interactions are 
beneficial but very difficult to sustain within public organizations (Keast, Brown, & 
Mandell, 2007). 
In order to sustain a collaborative relationship, personnel representing each 
organization within the arrangement must have discretion to negotiate rules and make 
organizational decisions based on the evolution of group deliberation (Mattessich, 
Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). According to Lipsky (1980), the theory of discretion 
explains how decisions are made at the lower levels of an organization to cumulatively 
create public policy. Therefore, discretionary judgment is at odds with the command and 
control authority inherent to bureaucratic organizations. An emphasis on stovepipe 
specializations, hierarchical structures, and formal governance mechanisms may make it 
difficult for administrators to obtain the discretion needed to make decisions within the 
collaborative arrangement and sustain horizontal relationships. 
Empirical Differentiation of Terms 
Researchers often ignore the differences between cooperation, coordination, and 
collaboration because empirical inquiry into these interaction terms is largely 
undeveloped within the interorganizational theory literature. In fact, it appears that only 
one article within the literature addresses empirical differences between these terms. In 
the research conducted by Keast, Brown, and Mandell (2007), interaction terms are 
distinguished across five dimensions: time to establish the interaction, goals, structural 
linkages, formality, and risks or rewards. While these dimensions provide a good start, 
much still needs to be done to understand empirically the different elements within each 
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interaction term (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Little else has been done to compare 
these three terms or their relative use within public organizations. A detailed conceptual 
framework does not currently exist. 
A lack of conceptual clarity related to interaction terms impacts the 
interorganizational theory literature in three ways. First, there is a tendency to broadly 
categorize interaction terms with little regard for the definitions that distinguish them 
from other types of interactions (Caruson & MacManus, 2006; Imperial, 2001; Keast, 
Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mandell & Steelman, 2003). Although practitioners seemingly 
understand that these terms have different meanings (Keast, Brown, Mandell, 2007), this 
same level of understanding is not reflected in the literature where definition overlap runs 
rampant. Without acknowledging and defining each of these terms, researchers cannot 
properly consider the relative placement of the interaction on which they are focused. In 
addition, researchers seem to forego conveniently difficult discussions concerning 
definitions of interaction terms. The lack of a common language prevents reliable 
communication and collective understanding (Mandell & Steelman, 2003). Conceptual 
advancement is stunted by definition overlap, ambiguity, and disregard. 
Second, the appropriate application of each term cannot be acknowledged when 
they are used interchangeably. This blurs the boundaries between cooperation, 
coordination, and collaboration research. More specifically, much of the empirical 
research within the interaction literature focuses on preconditions, factors, or triggers that 
influence a particular interaction (see, for example, Jennings, 1994; Kuska, 2005; Ospina 
& Yaroni, 2003; Reilly, 2001). The difficulty with this line of inquiry is that many of the 
same factors are identified as influences to cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. 
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While many of the same factors may influence each type of interaction, it seems likely 
that these factors will influence each type of interaction to different degrees. Since these 
distinctions are not made, there is confusion surrounding the optimal use of each 
interaction term (Keast, Mandell, & Brown, 2007). More needs to be done to better 
understand the contextual factors that help or hinder each type of interaction (Mandell & 
Steelman, 2003). 
Third, researchers often assume that the interaction of interest actually occurs 
(see, for example, Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Imperial, 2001; Jennings & Krane, 
1994; Kettl, 2003). The presence of a particular interaction term is not tested empirically 
in relation to other types of interactions. Grounded theory is used by Imperial (2001) to 
identify factors that help or hinder collaboration during the development and 
implementation of six watershed programs. Collaboration is assumed to exist, and terms 
such as coordination and cooperation are not introduced or defined. It is disconcerting 
that this assumption is common within the interorganizational theory literature but not 
acknowledged. 
Of the three interaction terms, it seems that collaboration is most emphasized 
within the current public administration literature. This emphasis focuses on factors that 
help or hinder collaboration (see, for example, Imperial, 2001; Kuska, 2005; Mattessich, 
Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; Reilly, 2001), collaborative management (see, for 
example, Agranoff, 2006; Bingham, Nabatchi, & O'Leary, 2005; Goldsmith & Eggers, 
2004; McGuire, 2006; Meier & O'Toole, 2003), or the process of collaboration (see, for 
example, Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Reilly, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006). 
However, the literature's emphasis on collaboration between public organizations may 
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not be warranted if public administrators tend to revert to coordinated interactions as 
suggested by Keast, Brown, & Mandell (2007). Needless to say, it is important to 
differentiate empirically between the multiorganizational interactions that occur within 
the public sector. This differentiation requires a conceptual framework to highlight 
differences between cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. 
In order to enhance conceptual clarity and promote empirical progress, 
interorganizational theorists should look outside the literature. Multiorganizational 
interactions are also considered within the education literature (see, for example, Fagan, 
1997; Goldman & Intriligator, 1990; Intriligator, 1994; 1992; LaRocco, 1997; Thatcher, 
2007). The following section of this literature review describes the development of the 
Interorganizational Arrangement Model within the education literature. 
Interorganizational Arrangement Model 
The Interorganizational Arrangement Model (IAM) was originally developed in 
the health education literature (Goldman & Intriligator, 1990; Intriligator, 1992; 1994). It 
is used to examine interorganizational arrangements in settings such as health and human 
service delivery, medical and social service provision, and education (Fagan, 1997; 
Intriligator, 1992; LaRocco, 1997; Thatcher, 2007). More specifically, the IAM is a 
theoretical lens that can be used to explore relationships between organizations. 
These relationships fall along a continuum of increased interdependence; 
cooperation, coordination, and collaboration are the interaction terms used to describe 
this continuum (Intriligator, 1992; 1994). The placement of these terms on the continuum 
is consistent with the interorganization theory literature. At one end of the spectrum, 
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cooperation represents independent organizations who can individually accomplish the 
goals at hand. At the other end of the spectrum, collaboration represents interdependent 
organizations who must work together in order to accomplish the goals collectively 
identified. Coordination is placed in the middle of the two end points and represents 
organizations that require some assistance from other organizations in order to meet their 
individual goals. Placement on the continuum of interaction is measured by variables 
organized into the following four constructs: collective objective, collaborative 
infrastructure, collaborative procedures, and collaborative leadership (Thatcher, 2007). 
The relationships between the constructs of this model are identified in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 







According to the I AM, successful interorganizational efforts require use of the 
same type of interaction in all constructs (Intriligator, 1992; Thatcher, 2007). The type of 
interaction appropriate for the collective effort is determined by the interaction identified 
within the collective objective (Intriligator, 1992; Thatcher, 2007). The IAM assumes that 
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interactions are not self-organizing. Instead, interagency planners must develop 
interactions within multiorganizational arrangements that are consistent with the 
collective objective (Intriligator, 1992; Thatcher, 2007). 
The collective objective represents the goal that agencies work together to achieve 
(Intriligator, 1992; 1994). Four variables characterize the collective objective: time, 
complexity, single agency role, and the impetus for collective action (Thatcher, 2007). 
The level of interaction required by the collective objective drives the level of interaction 
desired throughout the remainder of the conceptual framework (Intriligator, 1992; 1994; 
Thatcher, 2007). Once the level of interaction required by the collective objective is 
identified, the level of interaction within the collaborative infrastructure, collaborative 
procedures, and collaborative leadership constructs are examined in order to categorize 
the type of interaction between organizations (Thatcher, 2007). 
Collaborative infrastructure focuses on the organizational structures used to 
formalize and support relationships between organizations in the arrangement (Thatcher, 
2007). Five variables characterize the construct of collaborative infrastructure: design, 
formality of the agreement, organizational autonomy, policy authority, and key 
personnel. Collaborative procedures are the processes developed to support operations 
within the arrangement (Thatcher, 2007). Five variables characterize the construct of 
collaborative procedures: information sharing, decision making, resolution of turf issues, 
resource allocation, and systems thinking. Collaborative leadership is the ways in which 
behaviors of the member organizations support the arrangement (Thatcher, 2007). Five 
variables characterize the construct of collaborative leadership: incentives, commitment, 
trust, risk taking, and willingness to change. 
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Critique of the Interorganizational Arrangement Model 
While the constructs and variables within the IAM provide a needed structure for 
deciphering between different interaction terms, there are five limitations that must be 
addressed. First, the model assumes that effective achievement of the collective objective 
requires all variables to operate at the same level of interdependence on the continuum 
(see, for example, Thatcher, 2007). Effective designs are those in which the type of 
interaction is aligned throughout all aspects of the arrangement. This assertion is not 
supported by previous research in which variation is prevalent. Based on the findings of 
Thatcher (2007), Fagan (1997), LaRocco (1997), and Olson (1996), it appears to be 
exceedingly difficult, if not unrealistic, to align empirically all variables within the same 
type of interaction. The IAM's assumption fails to consider that there may be differences 
in the relative importance of each variable in terms of achieving the interagency goal. If 
the relative importance of each factor varies then an interagency arrangement may be 
effective even if all factors do not operate within the same type of interaction. 
Second, the IAM assumes interorganizational interactions are formally and 
specifically planned based on the type of interaction necessitated by the collective 
objective (Goldman & Intriligator, 1990; Intriligator, 1994; 1992; LaRocco, 1997; 
Thatcher, 2007). After the type of interaction is determined by the collective objective, 
interagency planners strive to design an interorganizational arrangement aligned with this 
type of interaction. Success is based on the extent to which planners generate the 
conditions and relationships needed to link the appropriate interaction to the desired goal 
(Intriligator, 1992). In assuming that interactions are controlled by an elite group of 
planning personnel in a formal way, the model perpetuates an unwarranted emphasis on 
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top-down implementation. Formal and specific planning may not be the impetus for all 
interactions that occur. The informal interactions that potentially occur in 
interorganizational settings are ignored despite Thatcher's (2007) development of the 
impetus for collective action variable. 
Third, nomenclature within the IAM biases it towards collaborative interactions. 
Thatcher (2007) places unnecessary emphasis on collaborative interactions by adding 
"collaborative" to all construct nomenclature. A model used to explore three different 
types of interaction terms should not exceedingly emphasize one term to the detriment of 
others. By doing so, an inherent bias on collaboration as the desired end is created. While 
the IAM acknowledges that no one interaction is inherently better than another and each 
has the potential to be effective if used in the appropriate circumstance, the model's 
nomenclature defies this assumption. In addition, the leadership construct should be 
renamed entirely. Thatcher's (2007) definition of this construct suggests that a specific 
group of people oversee the arrangement. While oversight may be evident in coordinative 
interactions, it is not a component of cooperative or collaborative arrangements. 
Interorganizational cooperation typically occurs as relationships form between lower 
levels of organizational structures. While leaders can emerge during the early stages of 
interorganizational collaboration, the interaction is sustained by partners holding 
positions of equal authority. Therefore, the definition's emphasis on oversight is 
misplaced. 
Fourth, operationalizations within the IAM are unclear. Ambiguity makes it 
difficult to widely apply the IAM to other research settings, because linking the data 
collected to the model's current operationalizations is challenging. In order to expand the 
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application of this model to other settings, the operationalizations must be further 
clarified and supported by the literature. 
Fifth, the current model inaccurately portrays collaboration as an arrangement in 
which participants align their interests with the new organizational arrangement without 
consideration for the interests of their individual organizations. This is inconsistent with 
the broader collaboration literature, which portrays this type of interaction in a far more 
complicated manner than acknowledged by the model. According to the public 
administration literature, a commitment to the collective objective does not decrease 
stakeholders' commitments to their individual organizations (Keast et al, 2004). 
Organizations often struggle with dual commitments to their individual organizations and 
the multiorganizational arrangement (Mandell & Steelman, 2003; O'Leary & Bingham, 
2007a). In fact, collaboration occurs when stakeholders work together to solve one 
another's interests without giving up any of their own (Wood & Gray, 1991). This 
inconsistency between the education and interorganizational theory literatures is 
addressed in the next section while the complex nature of collaboration is acknowledged. 
Ambiguity in the original model's design, assumptions, construct nomenclature, 
and operationalizations are problematic. Extensive changes to this model improve its 
transferability to other areas. These changes are further explained in the following section 
as the model transforms into the Multiorganizational Implementation Model. 
Multiorganizational Implementation Model 
The Multiorganizational Implementation Model (MIM) provides the theoretical 
basis for this study. This section begins by explaining the transformation leading to the 
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development of this model. Ambiguities from an earlier model are eliminated by 
significantly altering its design, assumptions, construct nomenclature, and 
operationalizations. The terms used to describe interactions within the MIM continue to 
represent a continuum of increased interaction and are identified as cooperation, 
coordination, and collaboration (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Keast, Brown, & 
Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006). 
The definitions of these terms align with the policy implementation and 
interorganizational theory literatures. 
The design of the MIM suggests that all four of the model's constructs 
simultaneously impact the interaction continuum. Placement along the continuum of 
interaction is measured by variables organized into the following four constructs: 
interorganizational policy objective, interorganizational infrastructure, interorganizational 
procedures, and organizational management. Relationships between the model's 
constructs and the continuum are illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 





Continuum of Interaction 





Rather than assuming that the policy objective drives the type of interaction 
present in the other constructs, each construct is assumed to impact the continuum of 
interaction independently and collectively. Implementation of the interorganizational 
policy objective does not require all constructs to operate at the same level of 
interdependence. This eliminates the education literature's assumption that effective 
interactions are formally planned to align with the type of interaction identified in the 
collective objective. By acknowledging that formal planning may not be the impetus for 
all interactions, there is room within the MIM to account for informal interactions. While 
not pictorially expressed, the relative importance of the model's variables may differ in 
their impact on interactions during multiorganizational implementation. Discussion 
during interviews enhances meaning and provides context regarding the impact of the 
model's variables. 
Changes to construct nomenclature eliminate an inherent bias towards 
collaboration. By replacing "collaborative" with "interorganizational" in the construct 
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nomenclature, the MIM acknowledges the potential for one of three interactions to take 
place. This change supports the model's theoretical focus on distinguishing different 
types of interactions. An additional nomenclature change is made to replace the 
collaborative leadership construct with a construct called organizational management. 
Through this change, the MIM acknowledges that arrangements, depending on the type 
of interaction, may be managed in different ways. Therefore, this model does not assume 
that all types of interactions are overseen by formally identified personnel. 
Operationalizations of the MIM constructs are developed through alignment with 
the policy implementation and interorganizational theory literatures. These revisions 
eliminate ambiguity and help the researcher clearly distinguish between the three types of 
interactions. In addition, these operationalizations acknowledge the complexities of 
collaborative interactions expressed in the interorganizational theory literature. 
Operationalizations for each interaction term are used to determine a partnerships overall 
placement along the continuum. The variables used to operationalize the model's 
constructs are identified in Table 2.1. While Thatcher (2007) utilizes the same variable 
nomenclature, construct nomenclature is significantly different. 
The remainder of this section focuses on linking the policy implementation and 
interorganizational theory literatures to the operationalizations of the MIM. Through 
these linkages, constructs are explained and theoretical support for opreationalizations is 
conveyed. Theoretical support is presented during discussion of the model's constructs. 
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Table 2.1 
Constructs and Variables of the Multiorganizational Implementation Model 
Interorganizational Interorganizational Intel-organizational Organizational 
Policy Objective Infrastructure Procedures Management 
Time 
Difficulty 











Information Sharing Incentives 
Decision Making Commitment 
Resolution of Turf Trust 
Issues 
Resource Allocation Risk Taking 
Systems Thinking Willingness to 
Change 
Interorganizational Policy Objective Construct 
The interorganizational policy objective represents a policy mandated goal that 
organizations work together to achieve (Caruson & MacManus, 2006; O'Toole, 1983; 
1991; 1995; O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984; Raelin, 1980; 1982). Four variables characterize 
the construct of interorganizational policy objective: time, difficulty, role of single 
organization, and the impetus for collective action (Thatcher, 2007). Table 2.2 displays 
the operationalizations of each variable within the interorganizational policy objective 
construct and places them along the continuum of interaction. These revisions align with 
the use of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration in the policy implementation and 




Variable Operationalizations: Inter organizational Policy Objective Construct 
Variable Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 
Time Short-term 
Difficulty Simple task 
Role of Single Organizations are independent; 
Organizations it is possible for them to 
accomplish the task 
individually. 
Impetus for Typically voluntary, 
Collective organizations initiate collective 
Action action because it is helpful to 
their world of work and it 
builds capacity that serves the 
individual organization. 
Changes in external factors 
trigger organizations to search 
for new solutions. 
Longer-term 
Multifaceted tasks, repeatable 
Organizations require some 
assistance from other 
organizations to accomplish 
individual goals/missions. 
Voluntary or mandated, 
linkages are mobilized because 
compatible mission areas 
mutually increase abilities to 
achieve individual goals. 
An interagency liaison or 
boundary spanner may forge 
these relationships to meet 
resource needs or shared 
interests. 
Legislative mandate or grant 
contracts may enhance 
cohesion or minimize 
duplication. 
Long-term, evolutionary nature 
Complex tasks that are highly 
varied and diverse; or 
situations of crisis. 
Organizations are 
interdependent; each 
organization is one element of 
the larger system. 
Voluntary or mandated, 
organizations with mutual or 
complementary interests come 
together because they cannot 
achieve the desired goal or 
address the identified problem 
without working together. 
Organizations share 
responsibility for tasks that are 
interconnected or cannot be 
accomplished individually. 
A lead agency or convening 
organization brings relevant 
stakeholders together and 
legitimizes collective action. 
In a cooperative interaction, independent organizations voluntarily work together 
to pursue a short-term goal involving relatively simple tasks (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 
2007; O'Leary & Bingham, 2007b; Thomas, 1997). Although it is possible to achieve 
organizational goals by working alone, personnel within each organization make a 
deliberate decision to work together because it is helpful to their world of work (Keast, 
Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Kuska, 2005; O'Leary & Bingham, 2007b; Rogers & Whetten, 
1982). This decision is informal and based on recognized opportunities to share 
information, build capacity, or generate synergy that serves individual organizations 
(Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, Monsey, 2001; May, 1995; 
Thomas, 1997). The desire to work together may be triggered by changes in external 
factors and the desire to avoid negative impacts (Osparina & Yaroni, 2003). 
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In a coordinated interaction, organizations establish formal relationships to pursue 
longer-term goals aligned with repeatable tasks deemed to be compatible with each 
organization's individual interests (Jennings, 1994; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; 
Mandell, 1994; Mattessich, Murray-Close, and Monsey, 2001; Schlossberg, 2004). 
Organizations are semiautonomous and some outside assistance is needed to accomplish 
organizational goals. This notion is supported by the interviews conducted by Keast, 
Brown, & Mandell (2007), in which a majority of respondents indicate that coordination 
is used to "drive" a particular initiative or outcome. These relationships are typically 
formed for two reasons. First, organizations may be mandated to work together (see, for 
example, Caruson & MacManus, 2006; Hall & O'Toole, 2004; Mandell, 1994; O'Toole, 
1983; 1991; 1995; Raelin, 1980). Coordination can be mandated by government to 
reorganize, minimize duplication, minimize conflict, or promote cohesion (Boston, 1992; 
Jennings, 1994; Jennings & Ewalt, 1998). For example, the Department of Homeland 
Security was established to support coordinated intergovernmental responses to national 
disasters, enhance role clarity, and minimize duplication (Wise & Nader, 2002). 
Second, organizations may work together in a coordinative relationship based on 
increased abilities to achieve individual goals due to compatible mission areas (Jennings, 
1994; Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; Jennings & Krane, 1994; Kettl, 2003; Van de Ven & 
Walker, 1984). In Jennings' (1994) study on state and local level employment and 
training programs, 26% of respondents indicate that shared role definitions are an 
important factor in forming coordination. Domain similarity may facilitate relationships 
between organizations based on complementary resources and shared professional skills 
(Van de Ven & Walker, 1984). Therefore, a coordinative interaction is mutually 
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beneficial (Peters, 1998; Schlossberg, 2004). Linkages of exchange are typically 
established between the organizations (Jennings, 1994; Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; Jennings 
& Krane, 1994; Van de Ven & Walker, 1984); a boundary spanner, interagency liaison, 
or facilitator may help forge these linkages (Jennings, 1994; Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; 
Kapucu, 2006; Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven & Walker, 1984). In their research 
pertaining to the employment and training services under the Job Training Partnership 
Act, Jennings & Ewalt (1998) conclude that 71% of respondents use interdepartmental 
liaisons as a coordination technique. This finding is consistent with Jennings' earlier 
work (1994). 
In a collaborative interaction, organizations establish highly interdependent 
relationships that evolve as organizations interact with one another to attain long-term 
goals (Huxham, 2003; Keast et al., 2004; O'Leary & Bingham, 2007b; Thomson & Perry, 
2006). Interdependence develops as organizations share responsibility for highly complex 
problems or crisis that prevents them from acting alone (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; 
Gray, 1985; Imperial, 2005; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Each organization is 
considered an essential element of the larger interdependent system (Mandell, 1994). 
Collaborative membership can be voluntary or mandated (Agranoff, 2006; 
Imperial, 2005). While a contractual arrangement or statutory action may be used to bring 
participating organizations together, interpersonal relationships must go beyond the terms 
of the contract (Keast et al., 2004; Mandell, 1994). The extent of the relationship can 
change based on the environment or the extent to which collective action is reciprocated 
among partnering organizations (Thomson & Perry, 2006). If multiorganizational 
implementation does not occur as expected, organizations may renegotiate their 
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commitment to the arrangement (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). These 
changes will reshape the dynamics in the interaction (Mandell & Steelman, 2003). Since 
collaboration is time consuming and costly, this interaction should only be used when 
addressing a highly complex problem, in times of crisis, or when other forms of 
interaction will not suffice (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Gray, 1985; Imperial, 2005; 
Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Keast et al, 2004; Thomson & Perry, 2006). 
A convening or referent organization plays a significant role in establishing the 
collaborative (Bryson, Crosby & Stone, 2006; McNamara, Leavitt, & Morris, 2008; 
Wood & Gray, 1991). This organization legitimizes the arrangement by identifying an 
important problem and bringing relevant stakeholders together to address a particular 
purpose (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Wood & Gray, 1991). Through resource and 
information exchange, a referent organization facilitates interactions between 
organizations and generates stability within the organizational environment (Morris & 
Burns, 1997). According to Gray (1989), a referent organization must have the following: 
power to persuade stakeholder participation, credibility among stakeholders, abilities to 
establish collaborative processes, and capabilities to identify relevant stakeholders. Since 
personnel within the convening organization do not have formal authority over other 
organizations within the collaborative network, informal influence must be generated 
through expertise and credibility (Gray, 1989; Keast et al., 2004; Wood & Gray, 1991). It 
is essential that all members of the collaboration perceive the convener to hold legitimate 
authority to organize the arrangement (Gray, 1985). 
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Interorganizational Infrastructure Construct 
Interorganizational infrastructure focuses on the ways in which organizations 
within the multiorganizational arrangement generate and structure relationships. Five 
variables characterize the construct of interorganizational infrastructure: design, formality 
of the agreement, organizational autonomy, policy authority, and key personnel 
(Thatcher, 2007). Table 2.3 displays the revised operationalizations of each variable 
within the interorganizational infrastructure construct and places them along the 
continuum of interaction. These revisions are aligned with the use of cooperation, 
coordination, and collaboration within the public administration and organization theory 
literatures. Theoretical support for these operationalizations is provided. 
In a cooperative interaction, a commonly defined structure does not exist because 
organizations work within their existing organizational structures (Keast, Brown, & 
Mandell, 2007). The simplicity of tasks does not require an interagency staff, a 
multiorganizational structure, or a collective planning effort (Reilly, 2001). Organizations 
informally work together based on a mutual benefit where individual organizational 
interests are emphasized (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Therefore, organizations 
retain separate entities, maintain individual control of resources, and make independent 
policy decisions (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Pre-existing policies, established by 
the individual organizations are utilized and remain unchanged (Keast, Brown, & 
Mandell, 2007). Since cooperative interactions usually occur at the lower levels of an 
organization and involve few resources (2007), leaders from individual organizations are 
not typically involved in decisions to work together. 
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Table 2.3 
Variable Operationalizations: Interorganizational Infrastructure Construct 
Variable Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 
Design Individuals work independently 
within existing organizational 
structures; an interagency staff 
is unnecessary. 
Each organization's hierarchical 
structure is used to centrally 
manage specialized roles and 
responsibilities. 
Centralization may involve 
reorganization or consolidation 
of programs/activities. 
Partner organizations jointly 
develop shared power 
arrangements to support 
mutually beneficial interests. 
New program structures are 
developed based on the needs of 
a specific policy/goal. 
An administrative staff is 









informally agree to work 
together to achieve individual 
goals. 
Organizations are fully 
autonomous. 
No multiorganizational policy 
decisions are made. 
Preexisting policies, established 
by the individual organizations, 
are followed. 
Key Personnel Organizational leadership is not 
involved in decisions to work 
together. 
Mechanisms, such as 




Agreements, clearly identifying 
each organization's roles and 
responsibilities, are often 




organizations require some 
assistance from other 
organizations to achieve goals. 
Organizations maintain 
individual authority over the 
policies that govern their 
respective organizations. 
Policies pertaining to 
coordinated efforts may be 
developed, but they are 
compatible with the policies 
already established within the 
individual organizations. 
There is a distinction between 
leaders and managers; leaders 
make decisions while managers 
implement and administer these 
decisions. 
A facilitator may be identified 
to coordinate actions at the local 
level. 
Key stakeholders jointly draft a 
shared purpose and develop a 
course of action based on 
mutually agreed upon roles and 
responsibilities, rules, goals, and 
organizational boundaries. 
Organizations are not 
autonomous; operations within 
organizations are intertwined. 
Partner organizations jointly 
develop policies and procedures 
that govern the collective group. 
Multiorganizational policies and 
procedures include working 
rules that specify which 
stakeholders can make 
decisions, who will guide 
collective actions, and the 
distribution of costs/benefits. 
Although no one is typically in 
charge, a lead organization may 
propose policies/rules to which 
the collective group must 
mutually agree to implement. 
Membership, role definitions, 
and responsibilities adapt to the 
task at hand. 
Each role is considered equally 
important. 
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In a coordinated interaction, formal relationships are emphasized within a 
hierarchical structure to specialize roles and responsibilities between otherwise 
independent organizations (Jennings, 1994; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Reilly, 
2001; Mandell, 1994). Administrative efforts are centrally controlled and local level 
planning is minimized to maintain control over organizational components (Jennings & 
Ewalt, 1998; Jennings & Krane, 1994). Centralization may involve reorganization or 
consolidation to minimize duplication (Boston, 1992; Jennings, 1994). Relationships 
between organizations are often formalized through contractual or nonfinancial 
agreements (Jennings & Krane, 1994). In their research of the Job Opportunities and 
Basic Skills Program, Jennings & Krane (1994) conclude that organizations enter into 
contractual or nonfinancial agreements to leverage resources and maximize the number 
of clients receiving services. Contractual agreements between local agencies establish 
areas for joint action and outline roles and responsibilities; these contracts are reviewed 
by a regional authority representative of local organizations (Jennings & Krane, 1994). 
Organizations participating in coordinated activities are considered 
semiautonomous (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). They maintain individual authority 
over the policies that govern their respective organizations, but they agree to participate 
in some specific collective activity (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Since 
organizations focus on their individual missions (Jennings, 1994), policies established for 
the collective arrangement must be congruent with those of the individual organizations. 
The leaders within each organization make their own policy decisions and managers are 
expected to implement these decisions (Thomson & Perry, 2006). A liaison may be 
designated to facilitate and guide interactions between organizations at the local level 
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(Jennings, 1994; Jennings & Ewalt. 1998; Mandell & Steelman, 2003; Schlossberg, 
2004). These boundary spanners can be used to broker relationships and identify areas of 
interdependence (Keast et al., 2004; Thomson & Perry, 2006). 
In a collaborative interaction, organizations jointly develop a structure of shared 
power to address collective interests (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). 
While this structure can take many forms, it is important to recognize that individual 
organizations coexist within a new program structure (Mandell, 1994; Mattessich, 
Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). Administrative staff may be used to bring organizations 
together and implement collective policies (Thomson & Perry, 2006). In Agranoff s 
(2006) research on public management networks, a staff element is present in all of the 
networks analyzed. These personnel are involved in all operations of the collaboration. 
It is important for partnering organizations to understand their roles and 
responsibilities (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; Reilly, 2001; Thomson & 
Perry, 2006). In order for this to occur, key stakeholders must establish shared rules, 
develop a collective purpose, and jointly decide on a course of action (Bryson, Crosby, & 
Stone, 2006; Imperial, 2000; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). As a result, 
organizations relinquish some autonomy to the collective unit. Formal and informal 
agreements can be used among partnering organizations, and the benefits of both should 
be considered (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Imperial 2005; Thomson & Perry, 2006). 
Informal agreements may easily support the evolutionary nature of collaborations; 
changes are made as the arrangement grows, partners change, or the problem domain 
shifts (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006). On the other hand, stability can be created by 
formalizing the social norms and agreements that establish over time (Imperial, 2005). 
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Multiorganizational policies generate working rules to specify which stakeholders can 
make decisions, who will guide collective actions, and the distribution of costs or 
benefits. 
While no one is typically in charge of a collaborative arrangement, this does not 
mean that all organizations are always of equal status (Keast et al., 2004; Mandell, 1994). 
Often, policy mandates or agency rules identify a lead organization responsible for 
implementation. While other organizations are not under the control of the lead agency, 
this organization can propose formal rules for the collective group to consider (Keast et 
al., 2004). Even when certain organizations are more influential than others, they 
recognize that combined efforts are needed to accomplish the objective (Mandell, 1994). 
Dynamics surrounding the collaborative arrangement are in constant flux 
(Huxham, 2003; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; Reilly, 2001). Therefore, 
changes to membership may be required and personnel must develop competencies for 
multiple roles (Gray, 1985; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Despite the needed flexibility 
among personnel, it is important for the collaborative group to identify sponsors and 
champions among its formal and informal leaders. Sponsors provide authority and 
resources to legitimize the collaboration while champions have the expertise to sustain 
daily operations (Agranoff, 2006; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Mandell, 1999; 
Mandell & Steelman, 2003). In Agranoff s (2006) research on public management 
networks, champions play a significant role in encouraging other organizations to support 
the collaborative arrangement. 
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Interorganizational Procedures Construct 
Interorganizational procedures are the processes developed to support operations 
or sustain relationships within the multiorganizational arrangement. Five variables 
characterize the construct of interorganizational procedures: information sharing, 
decision making, resolution of turf issues, resource allocation, and systems thinking 
(Thatcher, 2007). Table 2.4 displays the revised operationalizations of each variable 
within the interorganizational procedures construct and places them along the continuum 
of interaction. These revisions are aligned with the use of cooperation, coordination, and 
collaboration within the public administration and organization theory literatures. 
Theoretical support for these operationalizations is provided. 
In a cooperative interaction, communication is an important factor in developing 
and sustaining the arrangement. An emphasis is placed on sharing information to create 
harmonized efforts (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Nylen, 2007). Dialogue is 
maintained through informal communication channels to allow information sharing 
among participants (Ospina & Yaroni, 2003). While basic information is initially shared, 
continuous dialogue creates opportunities for discussing a wider range of topics (2003). 
Since each organization retains their autonomy (Keast, Brown, Mandell, 2007), joint 
decision making processes are not developed. Instead, organizational systems remain 
unchanged and operational decisions are independently made by each organization. Turf 
issues are avoided, and organizational systems remain independent. Discretionary funds 
may be used in pursuit of individual goals; resources are not pooled. Units of exchange 
are determined at the lowest possible level. 
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Table 2.4 
Variable Operationalizations: Inter organizational Procedures Construct 











Dialogue is maintained through 
informal relationships between 
participants. 
Basic information is initially 
shared. Continuous dialogue 
creates opportunities for 
discussing a wider range of 
topics. 
Decisions are made 
independently; rules that guide 
collective decision making are 
not necessary. 
Turf issues between 
participating organizations are 
avoided based on 
organizational tendencies to 
function independently 
Discretionary funds may be 
used in the pursuit of 
individual goals. 
Resources are not pooled. 
Units of exchange are 
determined at the lowest 
possible level. 
Organizational systems remain 
unchanged. 
Formal and informal 
communication channels are 
used to link vertical and 
horizontal organizational 
levels. 
Emphasize open and frequent 
communications between 
partners to reduce information 
asymmetries. 
Formal and informal channels 
are used to widely disseminate 
information concerning the 
collective group. 
Understanding enhanced by a 
willingness to share 
information about individual 
organizations and what 
can/cannot be offered to the 
collective group. 
Centralized decision making is Participative decision making 
practiced; a lead 
organization(s) dominates the 
decision making process. 
A neutral facilitator, outside 
convener, or full-time 
coordinator is employed to 
resolve turf issues. 
Organizations exchange 
resources to increase each 
organization's abilities to 
achieve individual goals. 
Mandates or grant 
arrangements may provide 
resources. 
Resource needs may be 
satisfied by a preexisting 
program within an individual 
organization. 
Compatible information 
systems can enhance 
coordination. 
based on consensus and 
compromise, generates rules to 
govern activities and 
relationships between 
organizations. 
Representatives have latitude 
to negotiate rules and 
deliberate agreements to 
identify common ground. 
Conflicting roles based on 
incongruent demands from 
individual organization and 
group. 
Consider adjusting policies and 
procedures to reduce conflict 
while maximizing common 
ground. 
Pooled resources; allocation is 
based on balancing evolving 
needs of the collective group 
with individual constraints. 
Individual organizations have 
resources, skills, or knowledge 
needed to achieve collective 
goal. 
Organizational resources are 
allocated to support the 
activities of the collective unit. 
Databases are integrated to 
create linkages and share 
information between multiple 
layers of partner organizations. 
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In a coordinated interaction, formal and informal communication channels are 
used to exchange information within and across organizational boundaries (Boston, 1992; 
Jennings, 1994). In Jennings' (1994) study of employment and training activities in the 
Job Training Partnership Act, the following formal information channels are identified: 
working partnerships, regular meetings of staff from different units, and 
interdepartmental liaisons. Sixty percent of respondents indicate that working 
partnerships and regular meetings of staff from different units contribute very much to 
coordination; more than 50% of respondents indicate that interdepartmental liaisons 
contribute very much to coordination (Jennings, 1994). 
Some of the informal information channels identified include workshops or 
common geographical boundaries. Seventy-eight percent of respondents indicate that 
they use workshops as a coordination technique (Jennings & Ewalt, 1998). Based on 
increased opportunities for interaction and information sharing, Jennings & Krane (1994) 
determine that collocation enhances coordination. Interorganizational interactions can 
occur between the top and lower levels of multiple organizations (Kapucu, 2006). 
Therefore, formal and informal communication channels are important to linking vertical 
and horizontal organizational levels. Organizational systems can be designed to facilitate 
increased communication between organizations. Incompatible organizational systems 
may prevent coordination (Jennings & Krane, 1994). 
The decision making process is highly centralized and dominated by the lead 
agency (Jennings & Krane, 1994). Issues related to turf can be barriers to coordination 
(Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; Jennings & Krane, 1994). A neutral facilitator, separate from a 
boundary spanner or convener, can be used to help organizations recognize that they may 
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have different goals that should be respected by the collective group (Schlossberg, 2004). 
This coordinator, whether full-time or part-time, should be dedicated to resolving 
conflicts (Schlossberg, 2004). In studies conducted by Jennings & Ewalt (1998) and 
Jennings & Krane (1994), resource limitations are also identified as a potential barrier to 
coordination. Resources are the physical property and financial assets used to achieve the 
organization's missions (Jennings, 1994; Jennings & Krane, 1994). For example, 
Jennings (1994) concludes that more than 50% of respondents indicate that joint program 
funding contribute very much to coordination. Resource exchange is often an important 
element of coordination (Jennings, 1994; Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; Jennings & Krane, 
1994; Van de Ven & Walker, 1984). Organizations may combine complementary 
resources to create mutually beneficial relationships that enhance each organization's 
abilities to achieve individual goals (Peters, 1998; Schlossberg, 2004; Van de Ven & 
Walker, 1984). Although it is unlikely, policy mandates may include a provision for joint 
resources (O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984). 
In collaborative interactions, an emphasis is placed on open and frequent 
communications between partners (Thomson & Perry, 2006). Information pertaining to 
individual organizations and the collective arrangement can be passed through formal 
channels or informally through personnel interactions (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & 
Monsey, 2001). When information is shared amongst all partners, a common knowledge 
base is built to promote understanding (Imperial, 2001; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). 
In addition, sharing information can reduce information asymmetries provided that 
organizations clearly state what they can and cannot offer the multiorganizational 
arrangement. 
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Decisions regarding the arrangement's direction and operations are made 
collectively (Mandell, 1994). Joint decision making relies on consensus and compromise 
to bridge differences among individual organizations (Agranoff, 2006; Mandell, 1999; 
Mandell & Steelman, 2003; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; Reilly, 2001; 
Thomson & Perry, 2006). In order to identify common ground, representatives of 
individual organizations must have discretion to negotiate rules and make organizational 
decisions based on group deliberation (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). 
Discretion involves the use of personal judgment to make a decision between multiple 
alternatives (Carrington, 2005). Turf issues may arise as each organization is placed in 
conflicting roles based on incongruent demands from the individual and collective 
organizations (Thomson & Perry, 2006). Considerations are given to adjusting policies 
and procedures to reduce conflict (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). In 
Agranoff s (2006) research on 14 collaborative networks involving managers in federal, 
state, and local governments, problems related to turf do not significantly impact the 
network. 
An organization's abilities to collaborate can be hindered by a lack of staffing, 
funding, or expertise. Therefore, the presence of consistent financial and personnel 
support is important (Imperial, 2001; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). To 
overcome these limitations, organizations often pool their resources (Gray, 1985; Keast et 
al., 2004; Nylen, 2007). For example, Imperial's (2005) research indicates that resources 
are pooled in various ways ranging from informal sharing of equipment to more formal 
methods of combining financial resources and collocating staffing units. In addition, 
Agranoff s (2006) research on collaborative networks indicates that government 
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managers are willing to pool resources. However, decisions are difficult to make when 
some agencies are unwilling to contribute to the pool of resources (Agranoff, 2006). 
Interorganizational systems are developed to involve personnel from multiple 
layers within partnering organizations (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). It is 
important to involve people representing a variety of organizational positions. In his 
study of watersheds, Imperial (2005) finds that interagency databases, joint research, and 
joint technical information are used to share knowledge during collaborative activities. 
Organizational Management Construct 
Organizational management pertains to the way in which behaviors within and 
between member organizations support the multiorganizational arrangement. Five 
variables characterize the construct of organizational management: incentives, 
commitment, trust, risk taking, and willingness to change (Thatcher, 2007). Table 2.5 
displays the revised operationalizations of each variable within the organizational 
management construct and places them along the continuum of interaction. These 
revisions are aligned with the use of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration within 
the public administration and organization theory literatures. Theoretical support for 
these operationalizations is provided. 
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Table 2.5 
Variable Operationalizations: Organizational Management Construct 
Variable Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 
Incentives Opportunities for synergistic Statutes or grant contracts may Incentives are provided by the 
benefits are realized based on 
the desire to avoid negative 
impacts resulting from changes 
in external factors. 
provide funding or resource 
incentives to support the 
collective effort. 
Leaders identify benefits in 
working together and 
emphasize the importance of 
these benefits to subordinates. 
collective group and individual 
organizations to encourage 
individuals to stay involved in 
the collective effort. 
Commitment Work is completed as part of 
the regular job responsibilities 
conducted within the 
individual organization. 
Interests of the individual 
organization remain 
paramount. 
Colleagues may encourage 
each other to work with 
personnel in other 
organizations. 
A supervisory administrative 
body actively encourages 
organizations to work together. 
Linkages between 
organizations are recognized 
when benefits are perceived to 
outweigh the costs. 
Members are committed to 
intra- and inter-organizational 
partners; collective interests 
must constantly be balanced 
with self-interests. 
Participation is justified by 
perceptions that the collective 
interest serves each 
organization's interests. 
Mutual commitment expands 






independence in establishing 
the rules, roles and 
responsibilities, and policies to 
govern the organization. 
An organization's standard 
operating procedures are not 
modified. 
Leaders explore modifications 
to standard operating 
procedures when supporting 
operational goals aligned with 
individual organizational 
missions. 
Partner organizations mutually 
adjust to the rules, roles and 
responsibilities, and policies 
collectively established to 
govern the collective unit. 
Changes to an organization's 
standard operating procedures 
are considered when needed to 




Trust relationships are not 
required, but can develop when 
organizations consistently 
share honest information. 
Organizations do not generally 
engage in risk taking behavior. 
Characterized by low levels of 
risk. 
Leaders work closely to create 
relationships based on trust. 
Some interdependencies may 
be formed based on resource 
needs. 
Characterized by moderate 
levels of risk. 
Trust between organizations is 
necessary. 
Partners reinforce trust in each 
other by sharing information 
through open communication. 
A history of supportive 
interactions sustains and 
legitimizes relationships. 
Integrated approaches develop 
and create dependency. 
Adherence to shared policies 
may require organizations to 
depart from normal behavior. 
Characterized by high levels of 
risk. 
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In cooperative interactions, incentives to interact are based on recognizing 
opportunities for synergistic benefits (Thomas, 1997). Cooperative behavior may be 
triggered by changes in external factors and an organization's desire to identify common 
ground in hopes of avoiding negative impacts (Ospina & Yaroni, 2003). When engaging 
in cooperative interaction, organizations do not need to make any changes to their current 
operations or missions (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Since interests of the individual 
organizations remain paramount, the collective effort is aligned with each organization's 
standard operating procedures. Organizations maintain complete independence in 
establishing the rules, roles and responsibilities, and policies that govern their 
involvement with the collective action (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Trust 
relationships are not required, but can develop when organizations consistently share 
honest information (Ospina & Yaroni, 2003). Since organizational policies and 
operations remain independent, cooperative relationships are considered to have low 
levels of risk (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). 
In coordinated interaction, incentives to participate in the collective action can 
come from two sources. First, statutory provisions may provide funding incentives to 
support the collective effort (Jennings, 1994). Provisions within a grant contract may 
designate an interorganizational liaison and require organizations to work together to 
implement the goals of the grant (Schlossberg, 2004). Second, leaders within the 
hierarchical structure may identify a benefit in working together and communicate the 
importance of coordination to their subordinates (Jennings, 1994; Schlossberg, 2004). In 
Jennings (1994), 70% of administrators indicate that leaders play an important role in 
establishing commitment to coordination. The importance placed on support from 
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leadership is significantly higher than the importance placed on financial sanctions, 
interpersonal relations, or interagency recognition. Therefore, an organization's 
supervisory level must be actively involved to encourage coordination. 
Organizations are committed to the relationship provided that their interests 
outweigh the costs. Partnerships between member organizations are formalized to ensure 
clear role definition (Jennings, 1994). Although individual organizations retain authority 
over decision making, joint planning and information- sharing does occur (Keast, Brown, 
& Mandell, 2007). As a result of these processes, modifications to an individual 
organization's standard operating procedures may be explored when it is in support of its 
mission. An emphasis is placed on developing trust among the leaders in charge of the 
individual organizations (Jennings & Krane, 1994). Since interdependencies can form on 
the basis of resource exchange, coordinated relationships are considered to have moderate 
levels of risk (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). 
In a collaborative interaction, incentives are provided by the collective and 
individual organizations to encourage individuals to stay involved with the collaborative 
effort (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). Organizations and individuals 
should be rewarded for their participation in the collaborative effort (Imperial, 2005; 
Gray, 1985). Imperial's (2005) research on collaboration within watershed programs 
indicates that the presence of rewards provides incentives for organizations to continue to 
work together. The effects of the incentives must be monitored to ensure they motivate 
members as intended (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). 
Power imbalances and competing organizational interests may create tension and 
conflict among members of the collaborative arrangement (Mandell & Steelman, 2003; 
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Thomson & Perry, 2006). It is important to recognize each participant's struggle to meet 
the commitments of the interorganizational unit while also supporting the potentially 
conflicting interests of their individual organizations (Keast et al., 2004; Mandell, 1994; 
Mandell & Steelman, 2003; O'Leary & Bingham, 2007a; Thomson & Perry, 2006). The 
term "program rationale" is used to describe the mindset toward the collective 
arrangement as a legitimate influence over individual behavior (Mandell, 1994). While 
this commitment to the collective arrangement plays an important role in facilitating joint 
agreements (Mandell, 1994), it does not decrease members' commitments to their 
individual organizations (Keast et al., 2004). Despite potentially different interests, 
collaboration typically occurs when stakeholders work together to resolve inherently 
complex problems without giving up any of their own interests (Thomson & Perry, 2006; 
Wood & Gray, 1991). The extent to which individual organizational interests are met will 
determine an organization's willingness to support and commit to the collective endeavor 
(Imperial, 2001; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). Participation is justified 
based on a perception that the collective interest also serves an organization's individual 
interests (Thomson & Perry, 2006). 
In order for a collaborative arrangement to accomplish the desired objective, two 
or more organizations must mutually adjust to collective policies and procedures 
(Mandell, 1999). Partner organizations become interdependent as integrated policies and 
operations are established (Imperial, 2000; 2005). Changes to an organization's standard 
operating procedures are made when needed to align with those jointly developed by the 
organizations within the collective unit. It can be challenging to establish policies and 
procedures for the entire group to follow, because group membership is comprised of 
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many different organizations with different views (Mandell & Steelman, 2003). When 
members are unable to accommodate other organizations, a collaborative arrangement 
will not be established (Mandell & Steelman, 2003). The history of interactions between 
organizations will affect the extent to which organizations are willing to change (Mandell 
& Steelman, 2003). As participants gain a broader view of their relationships with other 
organizations, some of the bureaucratic boundaries preventing change may dissolve 
(Keast et al., 2004). It is through this process that a new value set can be established to 
change the views of individual participants (Keast et al., 2004). 
The likelihood that collective action will occur increases when members have a 
reputation for trustworthiness (Huxham, 2003; Keast et al., 2004; Thomson & Perry, 
2006). It is important for organizations within the arrangement to believe that partners are 
committed to the collective objective, will act within the established rules, and honestly 
negotiations with other organizations. This trust is also referred to as an "ethic of 
collaboration" (Thomson & Perry, 2006, p. 25). While trust is a critical component of 
collaborations, it takes time and resources to develop and sustain (Bryson, Crosby, & 
Stone, 2006; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Prior relationships and open communications may 
help partners develop mutual understanding and reduce vulnerability (Bryson, Crosby, & 
Stone, 2006; Huxham, 2003; Mandell, 1999; Mandell & Steelman, 2003). Trust 
facilitates sustained relationships between partners as an emphasis on formal 
organizational roles and contractual arrangements diminish (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 
2006; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Collaborative arrangements involve high levels of risk 
(Keast et al., 2004). As partner organizations develop integrated policies and operations, 
dependency between organizations is created (Imperial, 2000; 2005). 
Summary 
Increased levels of interaction are not inherently more desirable, and a specific 
interaction will not be effective in all settings (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Keast et 
al., 2004; Mandell & Steelman, 2003; Thatcher, 2007). Costs, challenges, and risks 
increase as interactions proceed along the continuum (Agranoff, 2006; Nylen, 2007; 
Schlossberg, 2004; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Since there are several types of interactions 
to consider, the appropriate interaction for a particular situation must be carefully chosen. 
This study uses the Multiorganizational Implementation Model to explore the 
types of interactions used in multiorganizational arrangements. This model distinguishes 
between interaction terms and aligns operationalizations with the policy implementation 
and interorganizational theory literatures. The operationalizations of these variables are 
critical to placing multiorganizational relationships on the continuum of interaction. 
Application of the MIM allows for empirical testing of operationalizations. Its use in a 
policy implementation setting will help determine the extent to which the model can be 
used to explain interactions between organizations. In addition, a potential for informal 
interactions between organizations is acknowledged by assuming that variables within 
each of the four constructs simultaneously impact the continuum of interaction. The MIM 




General Approach to Research 
This chapter presents the research approach used in this study and includes 
discussion pertaining to selection of the setting, research design, data collection, variable 
definitions, data analysis techniques, and limitations. The purpose of this inquiry is to 
examine the helpfulness of the Multiorganizational Implementation Model (MIM) in 
exploring interactions between organizations, the use of different types of interactions 
during public policy implementation, and the ways in which these interactions are 
initiated. 
The model presented in this study uses the policy implementation and 
interorganizational theory literatures to explore cooperation, coordination, and 
collaboration through the constructs of interorganizational policy objective, 
interorganizational infrastructure, interorganizational procedures, and organizational 
management. Data collected from semistructured interviews and a review of 
organizational documents provides the information needed to examine the helpfulness of 
the MIM in exploring interactions between organizations implementing the Virginia 
Seaside Heritage Program, the use of different types of interactions during 
implementation, and the ways in which multiorganizational interactions are initiated 
between government and nongovernmental organizations. 
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Selection of the Setting 
The Coastal Zone Management (VCZM) Program, and more specifically their 
Virginia Seaside Heritage Program, provides the setting for this case study. When 
focusing research on a single case, selection of the case requires careful consideration 
(Stake, 1995; 2000; Yin, 2003). It is important that there are opportunities, within the 
selected case, for the researcher to observe the phenomena of interest (Stake, 2000). 
The VCZM Program was selected as the setting for this research through criterion 
purposeful sampling. This type of sampling strategy is used when it is important that the 
site meet particular criteria (Patton, 2002). Therefore, the following criteria guide case 
selection: (1) the program is mandated to implement policy via the Coastal Zone 
Management Act; (2) the program is comprised of a network of organizations which 
frequently interact to implement policy; (3) no organization within the network has 
formal authority to direct a particular type of interaction with other organizations; and 
(4) a variety of interactions potentially occur within the program's multiorganizational 
arrangement involving federal and state agencies, local governments, and 
nongovernmental organizations. The VCZM Program represents a critical case which is 
examined to advance understanding of interactions during multiorganizational 
implementation and the applicability of the MIM in a policy setting. The interactions that 
occur between organizations involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage 
Program are the target of this exploratory research. 
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Research Design 
This single case study research design allows for exploration of interactions 
during multiorganizational implementation of the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. 
This type of design is particularly useful for refining theory or identifying complexities 
worthy of further research (Stake, 2000). A qualitative methodology is used to enhance 
understanding of particular phenomena, acknowledge the complexity of the situation, 
recognize the importance of context, and allow for exploration of new ideas (Marshall & 
Rossman, 1999; Stake, 1995). In this study, interactions between organizations during 
program implementation are the unit of analysis and are explored through the perceptions 
of administrators and organizational documents. Relationships between organizations are 
used as the unit of analysis in previous implementation research (see, for example, 
Menzel, 1987). 
More specifically, interactions between organizations implementing the Virginia 
Seaside Heritage Program are of particular interest to this study. In order to examine fully 
the nature of these interactions, textual data are collected from semistructured interviews 
and organizational documents. Different data sources are used to corroborate findings and 
enhance authenticity (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2003). Due to the unit of analysis 
employed in this case study design, the use of different data sources is especially 
important. Although interactions between organizations are the unit of analysis, 
individuals are interviewed to collect data pertaining to these interactions. In order to 
collect data and draw conclusions from an organizational perspective, interviews should 
not provide the sole source of data. This situation can create conflict within the design if 
unintended changes are made to the unit of analysis (Yin, 2003). To maintain a consistent 
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unit of analysis, document review is also utilized. Conclusions pertaining to interactions 
during multiorganizational implementation require individual and organizational sources 
of information. 
Content analysis allows the researcher to categorize data collected through 
interviews and document review. The researcher uses categories from a prestructured 
coding scheme to guide a deductive approach to data analysis. In addition, a purposeful 
attempt is made to identify factors that impact interactions during multiorganizational 
implementation but are not accounted for in the model. For textual data that does not fit 
into these prestructured categories, the researcher uses an inductive approach to identify 
emerging patterns that can be used to revise the MIM. 
A qualitative methodology suits this research because it emphasizes the need to 
explore and describe particular phenomena (Creswell, 2003). This method allows for 
exploration of the multiorganizational interactions that occur during policy 
implementation. Within the policy implementation literature, scholars acknowledge the 
existence of a cases-variables problem particular to case study research (see, for example, 
Goggin, 1986; O'Toole, 2000; 1986). When the number of variables significantly 
overwhelms the number of cases, the data may incorrectly appear to support inferences 
because too much information is being used to explain a small number of cases (Goggin, 
1986). The explanatory power of each variable diminishes while research becomes 
increasingly complicated and impractical. Quantitative methods fail to resolve the 
conflicts inherent to the top-down/bottom-up approaches. The use of qualitative methods 
allows the researcher to thoroughly explore complex interactions between organizations 
in a way that cannot be done through quantitative methods. 
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Pilot Study 
A pilot study is conducted prior to conducting interviews with participants 
involved in the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. This pilot study provides 
opportunities to refine the content and procedures of the interview protocol (Yin, 2003). 
Participants for the pilot study are selected based on their involvement with the VCZM 
Program's Dragon Run Watershed. For this project, government and nongovernmental 
organizations work together to address issues of economic development, habitat 
restoration, and natural resource preservation pertaining to this pristine waterway located 
in Virginia's Middle Peninsula. This setting is selected for the pilot study because it 
meets the criteria used to select the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program as the setting for 
the case study. Upon completion of each pilot interview, a report is compiled detailing 
lessons learned (Yin, 2003). Revisions are made to the interview protocol, and the final 
draft is included in Appendix A. Availability of the interview protocol enhances 
replication of this qualitative case study in different settings (Creswell, 2003). 
Data Collection 
Data are collected in two ways: (1) semistructured interviews with individuals 
implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program, and (2) a review of documents 
related to the Coastal Zone Management Act, implementation of the program, or 
interactions with other organizations. These data collection strategies are common to 
qualitative methodology and employed simultaneously (Yin, 2003). Interviews are 
frequently used to collect data on cooperative, coordinative, or collaborative interactions 
(see, for example, Imperial, 2001; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Kuska, 2005). In 
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addition, document review is common to data collection pertaining to multiorganizational 
implementation (see, for example, Hall & O'Toole, 2004; O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984). 
Data are collected from May through June 2008. Table 3.1 summarizes the relationship 
between the study's research questions and data collection strategies. 
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Table 3.1 
Research Questions, Data Collection Strategies, and Information Collected 
Research Questions Data 
Collection 
Strategy 
Collection & Analysis of Information 
Does the revised 
Multiorganizational 
Implementation Model 
(MIM) help explain 
interactions in a policy 
implementation setting? 
How do administrators 
















Semi- Develop interview protocol aligned with broad, open-ended questions that 
structured speak to the four constructs of the MIM. Determine the extent to which 
Interviews the MIM is applicable to a policy setting by using content analysis to see 
how patterns from the textual data provided during interviews match 
patterns within the operationalizations of the MIM. If factors other than 
those outlined in the model emerge, this information can be used to build 
theory and further revise the MIM. 
Document Documents that speak to relationships between organizations during 
Review policy implementation are reviewed and content analysis is used to 
determine the extent to which operationalizations in the MIM are 
supported. If factors other than those outlined in the MIM emerge, this 
information can be used to build theory and further revise the model. 
Probe responses to broad, open-ended questions with more specific 
questions. Content analysis is used to analyze responses to these probes. 
Textual data are organized into the categories of the pre-structured coding 
scheme. The researcher uses the coding scheme to identify patterns and 
determine which of the three interaction terms best describes the 
relationship of interest. 
Documents that speak to relationships between organizations during 
policy implementation are reviewed and content analysis is used to 
analyze the text within the documents. Textual data are organized into the 
categories of the pre-structured coding scheme. The researcher uses the 
coding scheme to identify patterns and determine which of the three 
interaction terms best describes the relationship of interest. This 
information may or may not corroborate the perceptions expressed by 
administrators during interviews. 
Semi- Focus on the impetus for collective action variable within the 
structured interorganizational policy objective construct and the formality of the 
Interviews agreement variable within the interorganizational infrastructure construct 
of the MIM. If interviewees do not initially offer information pertaining to 
these variables, probing questions are used to guide inquiry. Content 
analysis is used to analyze responses. Textual data are organized into the 
categories of the pre-structured coding scheme pertaining to the 
applicable variables. The researcher uses the coding scheme to identify 
patterns and explore how multiorganizational interactions are initiated. 
Interactions are likely to be initiated in three ways: (1) formally initiated 
through legislative mandates or agency rulemaking; (2) informally 
initiated through street-level experience or common interests; or (3) a 
combination of both. 
Document Organizational and legislative documents are reviewed to collect 
Review additional information on the ways in which multiorganizational 
interactions are initiated. Particular areas of interest include the context in 
which multiorganizational activities occur and the ways in which they are 
supported by individual organizations and the collective arrangements. 
Content analysis is used to analyze responses. Textual data are organized 




Interviews provide an important source of data in case study research and allow 
researchers to explore the views of multiple people (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003). Qualitative 
interviews may be described as "a conversation with a purpose" because of the tendency 
for in-depth discussion to arise (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 108). A semistructured 
interview, or focused interview, is particularly useful in this research because it allows 
the researcher to guide inquiry by focusing on specific questions while also allowing for 
conversation through open-ended questions (Yin, 2003). 
In this study, semistructured interviews are conducted to gather in-depth 
information from administrators representing a variety of organizations within the 
network implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. Interviews are an 
appropriate data collection strategy for this research because they facilitate exploration of 
multiple views. It is through the information-rich data gathered from interviews that the 
researcher explores the research questions. 
As is common in qualitative research, the researcher becomes highly involved as 
the instrument for data collection (Creswell, 2003; Rossman & Marshall, 1999). An 
interview protocol guides conversations between the researcher and participants in the 
study (Yin, 2003). The predetermined wording and sequence of questions enhances 
comparability of responses and limits interviewer influence (Patton, 2002). In addition, 
standardized interview questions focus the interview on sensitizing concepts aligned with 
the variables in the MIM and guide data analysis (Stake, 1995). According to Creswell 
(2003), the following components are included in the interview protocol: (1) a heading, 
(2) instructions for the interviewer, (3) the research questions guiding the study, (4) 
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follow-up questions, (5) space for interviewers to write comments, and (6) space for the 
interviewer to record additional notes. 
A prestructured coding scheme, based on sensitizing themes, helps link the textual 
data collected to operationalizations of the MIM. Three types of questions are included in 
the interview process: (1) background questions, (2) broad open-ended questions, and 
(3) more specific probing questions. First, participants are asked to fill out a preinterview 
questionnaire which contains a series of background questions. These background 
questions also request some demographic information. It is through these questions that 
the researcher gains a better understanding of each participant's history in implementing 
the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. The preinterview questionnaire is included in 
Appendix B. 
Second, the interview protocol includes open-ended questions that generally 
speak to the four constructs of the MIM. These questions are written broadly so as not to 
bias participant responses or lead them to provide answers that align with the model's 
operationalizations. The data collected from these questions help the researcher 
determine if the MIM is helpful in explaining multiorganizational interactions during 
implementation of the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. In addition, open-ended 
questioning provides an opportunity for the researcher to identify patterns within 
participant responses that are not accounted for by the revised model. 
Third, more specific probing questions are used to seek additional information or 
clarify previous responses (Merriam, 1998). While these questions are also open-ended, 
they are phrased to guide inquiry more specifically to the operationalizations of the 
model's constructs. The textual data gathered from these responses helps the researcher 
80 
explore participants' perceptions regarding the use of cooperation, coordination, or 
collaboration during implementation and the way in which interactions are initiated in 
this setting. 
Throughout discussions with interviewees, the interviewer has flexibility to use 
informal conversational interview techniques. There are three benefits to this technique. 
First, the interviewer has the opportunity to pursue questions that emerge during the 
course of the standardized interview conversation (Patton, 2002). This allows the 
researcher to clarify responses with follow-up questions. Second, the interview can be 
tailored to the experiences and positions of the interviewee. Third, there are opportunities 
for interviewees to provide unsolicited feedback. Data gathered from these questions 
provides information-rich support and clarification to discussions pertaining to 
standardized interview questions. 
Sampling in qualitative research tends to involve a relatively small group of 
people, be purposive in nature, and evolve with the study (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
These characteristics also appear in this case study. The sampling frame consists of 
participants representing the organizations involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside 
Heritage Program. Interview participants are selected using snowball sampling. This 
sampling strategy is used to identify information-rich participants and allow 
knowledgeable informants to emerge as interviews progress (Yin, 2003; Marshall & 
Rossman, 1999; Miles & Huberman, 1994). A chain forms as additional participants are 
identified and interviewed based on the recommendations of previous interviewees 
(Patton, 2002). It is through this involvement that participants become informants (Yin, 
2003). Although overdependence on knowledgeable informants is not recommended, 
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they provide critical insights into the case study and access to relevant personnel. While it 
is important to interview people directly involved in the case study, insight can also be 
gained by interviewing those who operate at the peripheries (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Interviewing begins with members of the Coastal Policy Team who are involved in 
implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. 
The researcher calls potential participants, as they are identified, to explain the 
purpose of the research and ask for an interview. The researcher begins each interview 
with an introductory statement. This statement introduces the researcher to the 
interviewee, explains the purpose of collecting the information asked, and identifies the 
intended use for the information. In addition, the statement explains interviewee 
confidentiality and provides information regarding the protection of interviewee identity. 
A letter of informed consent is presented to interviewees for their signature; this letter is 
included in Appendix C. Lastly, the researcher seeks permission from each participant to 
record the interview (Yin, 2003). Although the researcher takes field notes throughout the 
interview process, audio recordings allow the researcher to fully concentrate on 
interviewee responses and probe for clarification when needed. The researcher uses audio 
recordings in postinterview reviews to ensure accuracy of data and recreate exact 
quotations and insights. Upon completion of each interview, the researcher transcribes 
each interview verbatim (Creswell, 2003). These verbatim transcriptions provide the raw 
data needed for data analysis (Patton, 2002). Transcriptions are emailed to interviewees 
to provide them with an opportunity to make revisions to the document. 
Advantages associated with using interviews as a data collection strategy include 
allowing the researcher to control inquiry, gaining participants' perspectives on particular 
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topics of interest, and the potential to gather a variety of information (Marshall & 
Rossman, 1999; Creswell, 2003). The disadvantages associated with using interviews as a 
data collection strategy include the possibility that interview participants and the 
interviewer may unintentionally filter data during the interview process to create bias 
(Creswell, 2003). In addition, participants may not have equal skills or abilities when it 
comes to articulating their perceptions (Creswell, 2003). 
Document Review 
Organizational documents are another important source of data because they help 
the researcher understand the contextual setting of the research and the participants 
involved (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). Analysis of organizational documents is a 
particularly useful data collection strategy based on its potential to corroborate data 
gathered from other sources (Yin, 2003). As previously mentioned, data source 
triangulation is especially important in this case study. Although the interactions between 
organizations during program implementation are the unit of analysis, they are explored 
through the perceptions of the individuals interviewed. In order to collect data and draw 
conclusions from an organizational perspective, interviews should not provide the sole 
source of data. 
There are several additional advantages to using document review as a data 
collection strategy. First, document review allows the researcher to gain an organizational 
perspective that cannot be solely provided by interviewees (Yin, 2003). Second, this type 
of data collection is particularly useful because it allows the researcher to gather 
secondary information in an unobtrusive manner (Creswell, 2003). This additional 
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information may be pertinent to the context of the research or the participants involved 
(Marshall & Rossman, 1999). More specifically, memoranda of understanding between 
organizations, policy mandates, meeting minutes, memos, program evaluations, or other 
archival data are reviewed (Marshall & Rossman, 1999; Yin, 2003). The documents 
listed in Appendix D are reviewed in order to provide further insight into the 
multiorganizational interactions used during implementation of the Virginia Seaside 
Heritage Program. These documents are particularly useful for exploring the context in 
which interactions occur, the history of interactions between organizations, and the 
formality in which interactions are initiated. 
Although there are many advantages associated with document review, it is 
important to remember that these documents are developed for a purpose other than this 
research (Yin, 2003). Therefore, the researcher must judge the applicability of each 
document to the study's research questions (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). In addition, the 
accuracy and authenticity of the information contained in the documents must be 
considered (Creswell, 2003; Merriam, 1998). 
Definition of Terms 
Analytic categories are needed to describe and analyze interactions between 
organizations involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). These analytic categories include the interaction terms, constructs, and 
variables within the MIM. They are defined in this section. When considering the 
proposed definitions, keep in mind the ambiguity of the operationalizations in the original 
model. While construct operationalizations are transformed for this study, the exact 
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points along the continuum in which one interaction crosses the threshold to another 
interaction are still unclear and are not addressed in the public administration, 
interorganizational theory, policy implementation, or education literatures. Findings may 
clarify placement of each interaction's threshold along the continuum. 
Interaction Terms 
1. Cooperation - An interaction between independent organizations that can 
individually accomplish the task at hand but voluntarily and informally work 
together, within existing organizational structures and policies, to build capacity 
or serve individual interests in pursuit of simple, short-term goals (Keast, Brown, 
& Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; O'Leary & 
Bingham, 2007b). Cooperation is further characterized as an interaction in which 
autonomous organizations independently maintain authority, missions, resources, 
infrastructure, and procedures (Intriligator, 1994; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & 
Monsey, 2001). Cooperation may take place without involving the leaders of the 
organizations involved (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). 
2. Coordination - An interaction between organizations requiring some assistance to 
accomplish individual missions in which linkages are mobilized voluntarily or by 
mandate in pursuit of multifaceted, longer-term goals that support common 
objectives (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, and 
Monsey, 2001). Coordination is further characterized as an interaction in which 
formal relationships, hierarchical structure, and centralized control are used to 
link resources, infrastructure, or procedures in ways that are compatible with the 
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semiautonomous organizations whose leaders retain authority over decision 
making (Intriligator, 1994; Jennings & Ewalt, 1998; Mandell, 1994). 
3. Collaboration - An interaction between organizations with collective 
responsibility for interconnected tasks who work together voluntarily or by 
mandate in pursuit of complex goals which cannot be accomplished by a single 
organization and are based on shared interests (Gray, 1989; Keast, Brown, & 
Mandell, 2007; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 
2006). Collaboration is further characterized as an interaction in which individual 
organizations relinquish some autonomy to a new program arrangement by 
mutually adjusting to collective decisions regarding mission, resource 
distribution, infrastructure, and shared procedures to reduce conflict and support 
shared interests (Intriligator, 1994; Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; 
Mandell, 1994; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Although commitments to individual 
organizations remain important, these relationships require partner organizations 
to reciprocate commitment to collective activities through the allocation of 
resources, staff, and funding (Agranoff, 2006; Imperial, 2001; Mattessich, 
Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). 
Interorganizational Policy Objective Construct and Variables 
1. Interorganizational Policy Objective - The policy goal that organizations work 
together to achieve. Four variables are used to operationalize this construct: time, 
difficulty, role of single organization, and the impetus for collective action 
(Thatcher, 2007). 
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2. Time - The length of time that the multiorganizational arrangement is expected to 
work together to accomplish the policy objective (Intriligator, 1994). 
3. Difficulty - The complexity of the tasks that the multiorganizational arrangement 
undertakes to accomplish the policy objective. 
4. Role of Single Organization - The roles individual organizations assume to 
accomplish the policy objective. 
5. Impetus for Collective Action - The reason for developing the multiorganizational 
arrangement and the way in which it was developed (Thatcher, 2007). 
Interorganizational Infrastructure Construct and Variables 
1. Interorganizational Infrastructure - The way in which an organization structures 
and formalizes its relationships with other organizations in the 
multiorganizational arrangement (Thatcher, 2007). Five variables are used to 
operationalize this construct: design, the formality of the agreement, 
organizational autonomy, policy authority, and key personnel. 
2. Design - The administrative structure used to support the multiorganizational 
arrangement (Thatcher, 2007). 
3. Formality of the Agreement - The way in which individual organizations agree on 
their roles and responsibilities within the multiorganizational arrangement 
(Thatcher, 2007). 
4. Organizational Autonomy - The degree in which each partnering organization 
independently operates, and the extent that their operating procedures and policies 
are adapted by the multiorganizational arrangement (Thatcher, 2007). 
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5. Policy Authority - The authority given to the multiorganizational arrangement to 
develop policies that guide operations in pursuit of the collective objective 
(Thatcher, 2007). 
6. Key Personnel - Personnel who are responsible for bringing together the 
multiorganizational arrangement (Thatcher, 2007). 
Interorganizational Procedures Construct and Variables 
1. Interorganizational Procedures - The processes developed to support operations 
or sustain relationships within the multiorganizational arrangement in pursuit of 
the policy objective (Thatcher, 2007). Five variables are used to operationalize 
this construct: information sharing, decision making, resolution of turf issues, 
resource allocation, and systems thinking. 
2. Information Sharing - The ways in which personnel within the 
multiorganizational arrangement use information and communication processes to 
attain the policy objective (Thatcher, 2007). 
3. Decision Making - The ways in which the organizations within the 
multiorganizational arrangement make implementation decisions pertaining to the 
policy objective. 
4. Resolution of Turf Issues - The process used for solving conflicts between 
organizations within the arrangement (Thatcher, 2007). 
5. Resource Allocation - The contributions allocated by individual organizations to 
the multiorganizational arrangement in support of the policy objective (Thatcher, 
2007). 
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6. Systems Thinking - The extent to which individual organizational systems are 
expanded and integrated to attain the policy objective (Thatcher, 2007). 
Organizational Management Construct and Variables 
1. Organizational Management - The level of support generated within and between 
organizations to support the multiorganizational arrangement. Five variables are 
used to operationalize this construct: incentives, commitment, willingness to 
change, trust, and risk taking. 
2. Incentives - The intrinsic and extrinsic rewards provided to individuals and 
participating organizations to encourage support for the multiorganizational 
arrangement (Thatcher, 2007). 
3. Commitment - The dedication of individuals and participating organizations to 
implement the policy objective (Thatcher, 2007). 
4. Trust - The extent to which trustworthy relationships between organizations 
within the multiorganizational arrangement are built. 
5. Risk Taking - The extent to which the multiorganizational arrangement functions 
in ways that deviate from standards within the member organizations in order to 
achieve the collective objective (Thatcher, 2007). 
6. Willingness to Change - The extent to which member organizations are willing to 
alter their standard operating procedures in support of the multiorganizational 
arrangement (Thatcher, 2007). 
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Data Analysis Techniques 
Consistent with qualitative methods, this study simultaneously conducts data 
collection and analysis (Creswell, 2003; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002). 
Ongoing analysis focuses data collection while accounting for emerging patterns. Content 
analysis, a form of data reduction, describes the data collected by identifying "the 
mention of specific items" (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 117). It allows the researcher 
to identify meanings and summarize patterns within textual data (Creswell, 2003; Miles 
& Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002). "Data reduction is a form of analysis that sharpens, 
sorts, focuses, discards, and organizes data in such a way that "final" conclusions can be 
drawn and verified" (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 11). As data are collected through 
interviews and document review, the researcher uses content analysis to reduce data into 
the categories of a prestructured coding scheme and identify emerging patterns. 
First, the researcher reviews all textual data and focuses analysis on patterns that 
align with categories of the prestructured coding scheme (Patton, 2002). 
Operationalizations of the MIM's constructs provide the basis for the coding scheme. 
Therefore, data analysis initially occurs through a deductive approach in which an 
existing framework is used to verify theory and assess linkages with qualitative data 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003). Coding labels are used to identify 
each variable in the model and each type of interaction. These short-hand designations 
are used to assign meaning to data and guide analysis by linking data with the study's 
research questions (Merriam, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Stake, 1995). 
Once textual data are coded, the data are numerically aggregated or left in textual 
form. For numerical aggregation, the researcher uses quantification to identify the 
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number of times a particular phenomenon emerges within the content of the interviews or 
organizational documents (Merriam, 1998). As patterns emerge, the data are reduced and 
numerically aggregated into the interaction categories of cooperation, coordination, or 
collaboration. While numerical aggregation allows the researcher to get a feel for patterns 
within the data, the meaning within the text is essential to qualitative research (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). It is also important to analyze textual data in nonnumerical form. 
Exact comments from interviewees provide context to the research that may be lost 
during numerical aggregation (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This context is especially 
important in qualitative research because close examination of individual responses 
allows the researcher to identify meaningful information (Stake, 1995). Emerging 
patterns from this textual data are also mapped to the categories within the predetermined 
coding scheme to enrich numerical aggregation. A deductive approach to data analysis is 
appropriate for this research because operationalizations of the theoretical constructs help 
the researcher better understand the data. 
Second, content analysis allows the researcher to identify emerging data patterns 
that do not fit into the predetermined categories of the coding scheme. Inquiry is sensitive 
to recurring patterns that provide alternative explanations to initial insights (Marshall & 
Rossman, 1999; Patton, 2002). Through an inductive approach, efforts are made to 
identify data that do not align with the theoretical model's operationalizations. The 
researcher interprets these patterns to attach meaning and further refine theory (Marshall 
& Rossman, 1999). 
Content analysis provides insight into the study's research questions. Congruence 
between textual data and variable operationalizations helps the research verify and refine 
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the operationalizations introduced within the Multiorganizational Implementation Model. 
This type of analysis is appropriate for this study because it allows the researcher to 
explore the helpfulness of the theoretical model in explaining interactions in a policy 
implementation setting, administrators' perceptions regarding the use of interactions 
during policy implementation, and the ways in which multiorganizational interactions are 
initiated. 
Strategies for Enhancing Authenticity, Confirmability, and Transferability 
Four strategies are used to enhance the authenticity, transferability, and 
confirmability of findings: data source corroboration, review of transcripts by interview 
participants, specificity, and the use of rich descriptions. First, corroboration of 
complementary data sources enhances the authenticity of this study's findings (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002). It is through triangulation that researchers clarify 
meaning and prevent misinterpretation (Stake, 2000). Triangulation of data sources is 
established by comparing data gathered from documents with data gathered from 
interviews. Data collected from both sources are compared to address inconsistencies, 
corroborate findings, and illuminate different approaches to the same phenomena (Patton, 
2002). Both data sources are used to explore multiorganizational interactions. 
Second, authenticity is enhanced when interview participants have the opportunity 
to review the verbatim transcript of the interview (Patton, 2002). An audit of textual data 
is created through this review process (Miles & Huberman, 1994). More specifically, 
reactions from this review give the researcher an idea as to how participants perceive the 
accuracy of the transcript (Patton, 2002). 
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Third, all aspects of the research design are specifically described to enhance the 
conflrmability and dependability of data collection and analysis (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). Sampling strategies, the preinterview questionnaire, and the interview protocol are 
presented and accurately document the researcher's actions throughout data collection 
and analysis. Data collection strategies are predetermined and systematically followed by 
the researcher to minimize error and bias. Interviews are recorded and reviewed to ensure 
accuracy. 
Fourth, rich descriptions enhance the transferability of findings (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). Characteristics of the sample and setting are fully described to allow 
comparisons with other research (Miles & Huberman, 1994). In addition, the researcher 
uses the participants' own language when possible to preserve their perspectives and 
provide context to the research. 
Summary 
The purpose of this inquiry is to explore the helpfulness of the 
Multiorganizational Implementation Model in explaining interactions between 
organizations when working together to implement policy, the perceived use of different 
types of interactions, and the ways in which multiorganizational interactions are initiated 
during implementation of the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. The proposed case 
study research design explores these areas of interest by collecting data through 
semistructured interviews and a review of organizational documents. In addition to 
presenting the overall research design, this chapter discusses data collection strategies, 




Overview of Analysis 
This chapter presents the analysis of data collected through semistructured 
interviews and a review of documents. In total, 34 interview transcriptions and eight 
documents are reviewed to explore interactions during multiorganizational policy 
implementation. Textual data from these interviews and documents are analyzed using a 
predetermined coding scheme aligned with the operationalizations of the 
Multiorganizational Implementation Model (MIM). Upon completion of coding, the 
researcher organizes the data based on each element of the model. Data are numerically 
summarized using the table identified in Appendix E. Data left in textual form are also 
linked to the elements in this table to enhance meaning and context. Results of analysis 
are organized by the study's research questions and are presented throughout this chapter. 
Discussion of Sample 
Participants for this study are selected using a snowball sampling strategy. By 
asking each interviewee the following question the researcher identifies individuals 
representing organizations within the implementation network: "Who do you work with 
on a regular basis to implement the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program (VSHP)?" Based 
on responses to this question, participants representing 15 organizations are involved in 
this study. A breakdown of participants based on organizational sector affiliation is 
presented in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 
Participants Interviewed based on Organizational Sector Affiliation 
Organizational Affiliation Number of Participants Interviewed 
Federal Agencies 







Total Number or Participants 34 
Organizations representing these sectors, within the implementation network, are 
identified in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 
Network of Organizations in the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program 





U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
National Wildlife Refuge 
Eastern Shore 
Secretariat of Natural Resources 
Department of Environmental Quality 
Coastal Zone Management Program 
Marine Resources Commission 
Habitat Management 
Oyster Conservation 
Department of Conservation & Recreation 
Planning & Recreation Division 
Natural Heritage Division 
Department of Game & Inland Fisheries 




Soil & Water Conservation District 
Northampton County 
Accomack-Northampton Planning District 
Commission 




College of William & Marya 
Institute of Marine Science8 
Center for Conservation Biologya 
University of Virginia" 
' Although these academic institutions are state sponsored, they operate autonomously as individual organizations. 
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Analysis of the Multiorganizational Implementation Model 
The constructs of the theoretical model are analyzed to address the following 
research question: Does the Multiorganizational Implementation Model (MIM) help 
explain interactions in a policy implementation setting? As data are collected through 
interviews and document review, the researcher uses content analysis to analyze the data. 
The tables presented in this section are based on the combined data collected through 
interviews and document review. Data are organized into categories of the predetermined 
coding scheme aligned with the operationalizations of the theoretical model. 
The utility of the MIM to help explain interactions in a policy implementation 
setting is explored by identifying patterns within the textual data that speak to the 
following four constructs: interorganizational policy objective, interorganizational 
infrastructure, interorganizational procedures, and organizational management. Elements 
within all four constructs are present in the coding of interviews and documents. The 
percentages of elements within each construct are identified in Table 4.3. Congruence 
between the textual data gathered and the operationalizations of the model's constructs 
are of particular interest. Pattern matching is used to determine the extent to which the 
data's empirical patterns match the model's theoretical patterns (Yin, 2003). 
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Table 4.3 
Percentage of Elements Explained by Construct - Interviews and Documents 
Cooperation Coordination Collaboration Total % for 
Construct 
Interorganizational 33(8%) 112(27%) 264(65%) 409 29% 
Policy Objective 
Interorganzational 61(23%) 82(30%) 129(47%) 272 19% 
Infrastructure 









Analysis of the Interorganizational Policy Objective Construct 
For the VSHP, the interorganizational policy objective represents the program 
goals the organizations are working together to achieve. More specifically, the program 
goals focus on the preservation and management of natural resources on Virginia's 
Eastern Shore. In the MIM, the interorganizational policy objective construct is 
characterized by four variables: time, difficulty, role of single organization, and the 
impetus for collective action. Data, gathered through interviews and documents, are 
coded based on the operationalizations of each variable. Twenty-nine percent of the 
elements identified in this study are within the policy objective construct, and the number 
of times each element is identified in the data is displayed in Table 4.4. Data left in 
textual form are also presented to provide context for the numbers displayed. 
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Table 4.4 
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liaison or boundary 
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In terms of the utility of the interorganizational policy objective construct within 
the MIM, the data gathered through this study suggests that the time, difficulty, role of 
single organizations, and impetus for collective action variables help to explain 
interactions between organizations. Of these four variables, the impetus for collective 
action appears most important for this construct. This variable accounts for 60% of the 
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elements mentioned during interviews or within organizational documents. In the VSHP, 
the ways in which the multiorganizational arrangement develops is mentioned more than 
4 times as often as the other variables within this construct. 
There seems to be two driving forces for the development of the 
multiorganizational arrangement within this study. First, organizations work together 
because it helps them achieve their individual or mutual goals. These two elements 
account for 36% of the impetus for collective action variable. Discussion during an 
interview reveals the importance placed on these elements. "It behooves us to work with 
the Coastal Zone Management Program because the whole is greater than the sum of the 
parts. So working together helps us achieve what we need to do as an organization." 
Second, organizations work together based on the presence of a legislative 
mandate/grant contract or a convener. These two elements account for another 42% of the 
impetus for collective action variable. The Virginia Coastal Zone Management (VCZM) 
Program convenes the VSHP, and its staff plays a particularly important role in this 
study. It is mentioned in an interview that the VCZM Program staff "d[oes] a good job of 
bringing the right people in and helping them understand that creating this regional 
coalition was not only possible but beneficial to everyone." In addition, the presence of a 
stable funding stream helps lure organizations to the table. The VCZM Program 
distributes one half of a million dollars annually to organizations within the program. An 
interviewee suggests that the VCZM Program draws attention from organizations because 
of the grant money available. The money that the VCZM Program brings to the table 
enables personnel to make their projects a reality without having to spend time "chasing 
funding." Other interviewees agree by saying, "Longevity of funding is critical," and 
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"The money enables the work to move forward." Another interviewee provides a reason 
for the criticality of funding, "Virginia spends less than 1% of its budget on natural 
resources. The environment is the underdog in the state budget and in the national budget 
when it comes down to it." In conjunction with the presence of a convener, the benefits 
associated with a source of funding should not be underestimated. 
There are elements associated with this construct that are not mentioned or are 
only mentioned one time throughout interviews and documents. In terms of the time 
variable, the "short-term" and "longer-term" elements are only mentioned one time or not 
at all respectively. Absence of these elements may be attributed to the inherently long 
time frame associated with environmental work. In terms of the difficulty variable, the 
"simple task" element is only mentioned one time. Although the literature suggests that 
organizations work together to pursue relatively simple tasks (see, for example, Keast, 
Brown, & Mandell, 2007; O'Leary & Bingham, 2007b), it is not the case for 
organizations in this study. While almost one quarter of interview participants indicate 
that some tasks could be considered relatively simple, their responses are framed in a 
larger context indicating that the number of people involved in the program, tremendous 
diversity of tasks associated with the goals of the program, and interdependencies 
between tasks make the situation increasingly more complex. While not relevant in this 
study, these elements may occur more frequently in a different policy arena and should 
be further explored in other settings before they are removed from the model. 
Another element that is seemingly not found in the coding of the interviews and 
documents is "changes in external factors trigger organizations to search for new 
solutions." Changes in external factors such as rising sea level, increases in population, 
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and pressures to develop land are discussed. However, these situations are discussed in 
the sense that they are so complicated that organizations have to work together because 
no organization can address these problems individually. Therefore, these references are 
coded under the element of "situations of crisis" or "cannot achieve the desired goal 
without working together." Changes in external factors seem to generate collaborative 
arrangements because organizations cannot achieve the desired goal without working 
together. The findings from this study do not align with the literature, which suggests that 
cooperative arrangements may be triggered by external factors and the desire to avoid 
negative impacts associated with these factors (see, for example, Osparina & Yaroni, 
2003). As a result of this research, the "changes in external factors" element is removed 
from the impetus for collective action variable under cooperation and acknowledged as a 
supporting statement for the existing elements within the same variable in collaboration. 
Analysis of the Interoganizational Infrastructure Construct 
The interorganizational infrastructure construct focuses on the ways in which 
relationships within the multiorganizational arrangement are generated and structured. 
Five variables characterize the construct of interorganizational infrastructure: design, 
formality of the agreement, organizational autonomy, policy authority, and key 
personnel. Data, gathered through interviews and document review, is coded based on the 
operationalizations of each variable. Nineteen percent of the elements identified in this 
study are within the interorganizational infrastructure construct, and the number of times 
each element is identified in the data is displayed in Table 4.5. In addition, textual data 
are linked to the numerically aggregated data to provide meaning and context. 
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Table 4.5 
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In terms of the utility of the interorganizational infrastructure construct within the 
MIM, data gathered through this study suggests that the design, formality of the 
agreement, organizational autonomy, policy authority, and key personnel variables help 
to explain interactions between organizations. Of these four variables, the elements 
pertaining to the formality of the agreement variable are most emphasized. This variable 
accounts for 32% of the elements within the infrastructure construct. In the VSHP, it 
appears that there are two prominent ways in which organizations agree on their roles and 
responsibilities within the arrangement. First, the "contracts or nonfinancial agreements 
formalize relationships" element accounts for more than one third of the number of times 
elements within the formality of the agreement variable are mentioned. In their research 
on the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Program, Jennings & Krane (1994) find that 
contractual or nonfinancial agreements are used to generate relationships between 
organizations. Their finding is consistent with this study. Within the VSHP, grant 
contracts are also used to establish and sustain relationships between organizations. 
For example, the Accomack-Northampton Planning District Commission (PDC) 
receives a technical assistance grant from the VCZM Program annually. This grant 
requires a minimum standard of interaction between the PDC and the local governments. 
An interviewee describes the importance placed on grant contracts in formalizing 
relationships, "The grant contract provides the conduit for the flow of information from 
the state through the planning district commission to the localities. And just as 
importantly, from the localities back up to the state." In addition, an organization may 
receive grant funding from the VCZM Program and subcontract with another 
organization to complete a particular project. This can be seen in the building of an 
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observation platform in the town of Willis Wharf. The Virginia Department of Game and 
Inland Fisheries (DGIF) receives grant funding from the VCZM Program to design and 
build the observation platform. While DGIF completes the design of the platform, they 
subcontract with Northampton County to construct it. In this instance, the original grant 
and subsequent contracts define each organization's role and responsibilities. Much like 
the research conducted by Jennings and Krane (1994), contractual arrangements between 
agencies outline roles and responsibilities. In this study, over 40% of interviewees 
mention the uses of grant contracts or nonfmancial agreements to formalize relationships. 
Second, organizations informally work together to achieve individual goals. This 
element accounts for another quarter of the times elements within this variable are 
mentioned. Informal interactions are prevalent among the participants involved in the 
VSHP, and relationships go well beyond the stipulations in grant contracts. There appear 
to be two explanations to support these informal interactions. First, there are long-
standing relationships between this group of people, and they work with each other on a 
variety of projects outside of the VSHP. An interviewee describes these long-standing 
relationships, "There are a lot of people who have been on the Coastal Policy Team for 
the last 20 years. It's the continuity of the relationships that have been really helpful." 
This point is supported in another interview, "So there [is] a core group that has gotten 
really good at working together over the last 15 years. When different things come up, we 
know to call each other. . . . Having those long standing relationships really helps in 
terms of pulling the partners together." Comments made by this interviewee convey the 
evolutionary nature of relationships in the implementation network. As the specifics of a 
situation emerge, organizations with expertise in the necessary areas are brought together. 
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In addition, geographic proximity lends itself to informal interactions. An 
interviewee explains how opportunities for informal interactions are created among 
personnel involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program, 
There is a physical opportunity for people that live on Virginia's Eastern Shore. 
There are only two counties and there is really only one highway. And that helps. 
There are only 50,000 people on the Virginia portion of the Eastern Shore. So you 
see people at church and the grocery store. 
Almost 50% of the participants in the VSHP live and work on the Eastern Shore. This 
proximity is an important factor to acknowledge within the multiorganizational 
arrangement. 
There are elements associated with this construct that are not mentioned or are 
only mentioned one time throughout interviews and documents. In terms of design, the 
"interagency staff is unnecessary" element is not mentioned. One reason that this element 
may not be mentioned is because it seems closely related to the "organizations work 
within their existing organizational structures" element within the cooperative design. 
After additional review, it may be too difficult to decipher between these two elements. 
The literature suggests that cooperative interactions occur informally, and limited 
connections can be established through existing organizational structures (see, for 
example, Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Reilly, 2001). Since this type of interaction 
typically occurs between personnel at the lower levels of organizations (Keast, Brown, & 
Mandell, 2007), it is implied that an interagency staff is not necessary. This study 
supports this assumption. As a result, the "interagency staff is unnecessary" element is 
removed from the design variable within the model. 
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In addition, the "centralization may involve program reorganization or 
consolidation" element within the design variable is not mentioned in this study. It is 
interesting that formalized mechanisms, such as contractual or nonfinancial agreements, 
account for more than 10% of the elements present from this construct. However, 
centralization is rarely mentioned. Therefore, the formalization within this program 
comes from grant contracts rather than a hierarchical design. Despite what is said in the 
literature (see, for example, Boston, 1992; Jennings, 1994), a hierarchical structure is not 
used in this study to enhance centralization based on a desire to reorganize or minimize 
duplication. Instead, the presence of a formalized structure is associated with the 
distribution of money. Since the absence of this element may also be attributed to the 
network design of the program, this element should be further explored in other settings 
before it is taken out of the model. 
The "organizations maintain individual authority over the policies that govern 
their respective organizations" element is only identified once in the interviews and 
documents. This may be due to the presence of the Coastal Policy Team (CPT), which is 
comprised of resource administrators and managers from each of the state agencies 
involved in the VSHP. As the literature suggests, the policies that govern individual 
organizations are maintained (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Each agency operates 
under specific regulatory authorities and legal policies. However, this authority does not 
appear in the forefront of the data collected. Instead, interviewees place emphasis on the 
discretion given to the resource administrators and managers representing the CPT. 
Within the boundaries of their regulatory authorities, representatives make governing 
decisions to guide their divisions and the collective group. An interviewee explains the 
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relationship between individual agency authorities and collective governing in the 
following manner, 
The CPT determines what the focal area is going to be and what is going to be 
done within that focal area. How particular projects are implemented comes under 
the regulatory functions of the agencies involved. But the program itself, the way 
it [i]s set up and the goals identified, that [i]s decided by the CPT. 
This presence of discretion in collaborative interactions is supported by the literature 
(see, for example, Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). An interview participant 
explains how this discretion is used, "By creating a Coastal Policy Team, you do have 
upper level administrators involved, but they are the administrators focused on the 
resources issues. So we issue good judgment as to where the resources need to be 
applied." 
Discretion allows managers to work across organizational boundaries to jointly 
develop policies. Despite the literature coupling hierarchical authority with bureaucratic 
organizations, implementation of the VSHP does not require significant time 
commitments from upper level personnel. Instead, resource administrators have 
discretion to make collective decisions with partners. Several interviewees attribute this 
presence of discretion to the success of the VSHP. Discretion may be given more freely 
when programs are successful. Since collaborative decisions require discretion, 
sustaining these interactions may also require a certain amount of success. Although the 
element of "organizations maintain individual authority over the policies that govern their 
respective organizations" is not prevalent in this study, it may be important in a different 
setting. This element remains in the model for further exploration. 
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Analysis of the Interorganizational Procedures Construct 
The interorganizational procedures construct focuses on the processes developed 
to support operations or sustain relationships within the multiorganizational arrangement. 
Five variables characterize the construct of interorganizational procedures: information 
sharing, decision making, resolution of turf issues, resource allocation, and systems 
thinking. Data, gathered through interviews and documents, are coded based on the 
operationalizations of each variable. Thirty percent of the elements identified in this 
study are within the interorganizational procedures construct, and the number of times 
each element is identified in the data is displayed in Table 4.6. Textual data is also 
presented to convey meaning and contextual support for the aggregated numbers. 
In terms of the utility of the interorganizational procedures construct within the 
MIM, data gathered through this study suggests that the information sharing, decision 
making, resolution of turf issues, resource allocation, and systems thinking variables help 
explain interactions between organizations. Of these four variables, elements pertaining 
to the information sharing and resource allocation variables are most prevalent. The 
information sharing variable accounts for 34% of the elements within the 
interorganizational procedures construct. In the VSHP, there are three ways in which the 
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First, dialogue is maintained through informal relationships. This element 
accounts for almost one third of the number of times elements are mentioned within the 
information sharing variable. Its presence is consistent with the literature, which indicates 
that informal communication channels are used to maintain dialogue and share 
information among participants (see, for example, Ospina & Yaroni, 2003). Personnel 
implementing the VSHP often communicate through channels such as email, adhoc 
working groups, or by seeing each other in the field. An interviewee suggests that 
visibility between field workers is important for communication. "I'll see partners on the 
dock or on the water or in the coffee shop. And we talk about what is going on with 
different projects." 
Second, personnel frequently communicate to support operations or sustain 
relationships within the interorganizational arrangement. This element accounts for 
almost one fifth of the number of times elements are mentioned within this variable. The 
presence of this element aligns with the literature, which emphasizes how open 
communication can reduce information asymmetries (see, for example, Thomson & 
Perry, 2006). An interview participant explains communication among partners in the 
following manner, "We are always talking to each other and bringing each other in on 
different projects. . . . We come to the table on a regular basis. So it keeps that 
partnership and the relationships going." 
Third, understanding between organizations is enhanced by a willingness to share 
information about organizations, which may include what can or cannot be offered to the 
collective group. This element accounts for more than one fifth of the number of times 
elements are mentioned within this variable. Its presence within the study aligns with the 
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literature and emphasizes the need for organizations to share information in order to 
create a base of common knowledge and promote understanding (see, for example, Keast, 
Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Imperial, 2001). An interviewee acknowledges a high level of 
understanding among organizations, "We've gotten to be extremely good coworkers even 
though we are in different agencies. We know what each other can do, we know what 
talents we can bring to the table, we know the expertise that we each have, and we know 
when we can work together on what things." 
In the interorganizational procedures construct, there are elements that are not 
mentioned or are only mentioned one time throughout interviews and document review. 
In terms of decision making, the "centralized" element is not mentioned. The absence of 
this element may be due to the way in which natural resource agencies are structured in 
Virginia. This structure is discussed during an interview, "In Virginia, we don't have a 
single resource agency. We have a number of agencies within a secretariat of natural 
resources but each has their own agency head, their own budgets, and their own specific 
missions." Virginia's natural resource agencies have equal representation on the CPT. 
Since distinct legal authorities guide each agency, no organization has the authority to tell 
another organization what to do. Therefore, decision making is not structured to be a 
centralized process. In addition, the very nature of environmental sustainability does not 
lend itself to centralized solutions. An interviewee suggests that nonregulatory 
environmental issues, such as sustainability, do not lend themselves to command and 
control decisions. "Other environmental issues like water quality monitoring, are much 
more command and control. It is the land-based, nonpoint source sustainable ecosystem 
stuff that does not have that sort of command and control." Since the absence of this 
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element may be specific to this case study, it should be further explored before it is 
removed from the model. 
In addition, the "resources allocated by balancing needs of group and individual 
organizations" element within the resource allocation variable is only mentioned one time 
in this study. When looking at the other elements within collaborative resource allocation, 
this element may not be mentioned for two reasons. First, participants may assume that 
they balance these needs when referring to the "pooled resources" element within this 
variable. As organizations determine what resources they can contribute to the collective 
unit, they likely balance their organization's needs with those of the larger group. Second, 
a high degree of alignment between organizational missions may make a balancing of 
needs unnecessary. An interviewee describes mission alignment in the following way, 
"Most of the projects we are working on are related directly to our agency's mission." In 
this study, each organization's interests align nicely with the program's broader goals of 
habitat conservation and restoration. Therefore, a balancing of needs is unnecessary 
because both sets of needs are simultaneously fulfilled. This element is combined with 
the "pooled resources" element within this variable in the final version of the MIM. 
Analysis of the Organizational Management Construct 
The organizational management construct focuses on the way in which behaviors 
within and between member organizations support the interorganizational arrangement. 
Five variables characterize the construct of organizational management: incentives, 
commitment, trust, risk taking, and willingness to change. Data, gathered through 
interviews and documents, are coded based on the operationalizations of each variable. 
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Twenty-two percent of the elements identified in this study are within the organizational 
management construct, and the number of times each element is identified in the data is 
displayed in Table 4.7. Textual data are linked to the aggregated numbers to maintain the 
meaning and context of the words. 
In terms of the utility of the organizational management construct within the 
MIM, the data gathered through this study suggests that the incentives, commitment, 
trust, risk taking, and willingness to change variables help to explain interactions between 
organizations. Of these five variables, elements pertaining to the commitment variable 
are most emphasized within this construct; they account for 31% of the elements 
identified. In the VSHP, there are three prominent ways in which support for the 
interorganizational arrangement is generated within and between organizations. 
First, a history of supportive behavior or long-standing relationships generates 
support for the interorganizational arrangement. This element accounts for almost 90% of 
the number of times elements are identified within the trust variable, and it accounts for 
more than 40% of the number of times elements are identified within the entire construct. 
In addition, this element is mentioned by more than 80% of participants during 
interviews. Findings are consistent with the literature, which indicates that a history of 
interactions between organizations enhances trust between organizations (see, for 
example, Mandell & Steelman, 2003). An interviewee describes the history between 
organizations involved in implementing the VSHP in the following manner, "The secret 
of success [is] the continuity of the personnel over time. And that is not something that 
you can really control, that is just luck. And I think the fact that we have known each 
other for about 20 years now and we know what we are each about." 
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Second, funding provided through statutes or grant contracts generates support for 
the multiorganizational arrangement. In terms of the VSHP, funding incentives come 
from grant contracts. Although the literature identifies the potential for these incentives to 
occur through statutory provisions (see, for example, Jennings, 1994), that is not the case 
in this study. In fact, an interviewee specifically mentions that unfunded mandates often 
promulgate requirements pertaining to environmental sustainability. "The state gives the 
local governments the authority to do something, but they don't provide funding to 
support those initiatives." Due to the lack of funding from statutes, this element is revised 
to say "grant contracts may provide funding" in the final MIM. 
Third, support for the multiorganizational arrangement is generated when the 
collective interest serves the individual interests of the organizations involved. This 
element accounts for more than one fifth of the number of times elements are identified 
within this variable. Its presence within the study aligns with the literature, which 
recognizes that commitments to the collective arrangement do not diminish commitments 
to individual organizations (see, for example, Keast et al., 2004). Discussion during an 
interview indicates that the collective interest is attained through individual 
organizational interests, "We are meeting our agency's objectives but we are also 
furthering the whole effort." The findings from this study also align with the literature by 
acknowledging that the extent to which the collective interest serves the interests of 
individual organizations determines the extent to which they are willing to support 
collective endeavors (see, for example, Imperial, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006). 
Interactions within the collective group not only enable organizations to meet their 
objectives, but they also enable the collective group to surpass the level to which they 
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would meet these objectives when working individually. An interviewee explains how 
multiorganizational interactions create opportunities for individual organizations, "This 
program gives us the opportunity to do work that we otherwise would not be able to do 
and achieve a part of our mission that would otherwise not be possible. It is an 
opportunity to be successful in a way that would be impossible otherwise." 
Within the organizational management construct, there are elements not 
mentioned or only mentioned one time throughout interviews and documents. In terms of 
the commitment variable, the "encouraged by supervisory administrative body" element 
is only mentioned one time. Jennings' (1994) research suggests that 70% of the 
administrators involved in the study indicate that leaders play an important role in 
encouraging coordination. In the VSHP, interviewees and documents do not suggest this 
same level of importance. The absence of this element may be attributed to the degree in 
which participants want to protect the resource and the program's success. An interview 
participant expresses the multiorganizational arrangement's commitment, 
All the people within these organizations care so deeply about the place—every 
one of them. I can't think of one person in th[e] VSHP partnership that I would 
say is not just deeply and personally committed to saving this place and making it 
better. 
This finding suggests that if there is a high degree of personal commitment within 
organizations then encouragement from a supervisory body may be less necessary. 
In addition, the absence of involvement from top management may be attributed 
to the success of the program. An interviewee suggests that successful projects, coupled 
with zero complications, do not require great involvement from top leadership. "Trust is 
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built through successful accomplishment of various projects that we work on and positive 
reinforcement." Discussion during another interview also reveals a relationship between 
program success and managerial trust. "People above us see and hear about the success of 
the program. And as long as they are hearing that, they aren't going to get involved. 
They'll say good job, keep doing it." Absence of this element could be specific to this 
study because individuals may commit more easily to environmental issues. Before this 
element is removed from the model, it is worth further exploration in a different setting. 
In terms of the trust variable, the "leaders work closely to create relationships 
based on trust" element is only mentioned one time and the "trust relationships are not 
required but can develop" element is not mentioned at all. The irrelevance of these 
elements may be due to high levels of trust that permeate organizational boundaries. 
When personnel work together for great lengths of time, as they have in this study, 
leaders may not need to facilitate relationships based on trust. The literature's emphasis 
on organizational leaders developing trust amongst each other (see, for example, Jennings 
& Krane, 1994) is simply not found in this study. Since these results may be particular to 
the history of long-standing relationships between participants of the VSHP, these 
elements are left in the model for further study. 
Within the risk taking variable, six of the seven elements are only mentioned one 
time or not at all during interviews or document review. The only repeated element 
within this variable is "low levels of risk." As the literature suggests, partner 
organizations undoubtedly generate dependencies as integrated policies and operations 
form (see, for example, Imperial, 2005). However, this study does not support the 
assertion that collaborative arrangements involve high levels of risk (see, for example, 
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Keast et al, 2004). In fact, not one interviewee suggests that there are high levels of risk 
associated with working together. On the contrary, an interviewee emphasizes low levels 
of risk within the multiorganizational arrangement, "The risk is fairly low. And the trust 
is fairly high." This sediment is echoed throughout many interviews. The literature fails 
to acknowledge that the risk associated with dependencies can be minimized through 
high levels of trust and long-standing relationships. The emphasis that this study places 
on low levels of risk mitigates the presence of all other elements within this variable. 
Regardless of the type of interaction, it seems that personnel will work together if 
it benefits their own organization to some degree. Findings from this study suggest that 
low levels of risk are associated with each type of interaction. If the interaction is too 
risky, the organization is not likely to become involved. Although cooperative 
interactions are typically associated with not engaging in risk taking behavior (see, for 
example, Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007), higher levels of risk associated with 
coordinative and collaborative interactions may be mitigated by other factors. Therefore, 
the risk taking variable is eliminated from the final version of the MIM. 
Summary of Findings and Analysis 
While ambiguities within the original model make it difficult to distinguish 
between the elements associated with the three types of interactions, the findings from 
this study eliminate ambiguities while furthering interorganizational theory in two ways: 
(1) the MIM helps explain interactions between organizations in this policy 
implementation setting; and (2) a finalized version of the MIM is presented. Data from 
this study suggests that the MIM is helpful in explaining interactions in 
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multiorganizational arrangements. After a review of the public administration and 
interorganizational theory literatures, 107 elements are developed to operationalize 19 
variables within the four constructs of the MIM. Of these elements, only eight are not 
identified in this study's interview transcriptions and documents. Therefore, more than 
92% of the elements put forth within the revised model are identified in this study. 
Of the eight elements not identified, the following suggestions are made 
throughout this section of the chapter to change four of the elements in the model: (1) the 
"change in external factors" element is removed from the impetus for collective action 
variable under cooperation and acknowledged as a supporting statement for collaborative 
elements within the same variable; (2) the "interagency staff is unnecessary" element is 
removed from the model because it is too difficult to decipher from the "organizations 
work within their existing organizational structures" element; (3) the "depart from normal 
behavior" element is removed from the model because the risk taking variable is 
eliminated; and (4) the "high levels of risk" element is removed with the elimination of 
the risk taking variable. While these elements may be relevant in other settings, the data 
gathered from this research strongly suggests their removal from the model. The 
following four elements are left in the model for further research: (1) the "longer-term" 
element within the time variable; (2) the "centralization may involve program 
reorganization or consolidation" element within the design variable; (3) the "centralized" 
element within the decision making variable; and (4) the "trust relationships are not 
required but can develop" element within the trust variable. 
In applying the policy implementation and interorganizational theory literatures to 
revise the model's operationalizations, clear distinctions between the three interaction 
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terms significantly improve the theoretical model. In addition, these distinctions may 
enhance the model's transferability. Other researchers may now subject this model to 
empirical testing in settings outside of policy implementation. 
The findings suggest that the MIM can be used to enhance theoretical consistency 
and improve communication within the interorganizational theory literature. An example 
of how this model enhances theoretical consistency can be seen within the coordination 
literature. Terms such as "mobilization coordination" (Van de Ven & Walker, 1984), 
"contingent coordination" (Kettl, 2003), and "intermittent coordination" (Mandell & 
Steelman, 2003) are used to describe less formal coordination in which ad hoc 
relationships evolve based on the specifics of a given project. Throughout interviews 
from this study, elements associated with these descriptions never once align within the 
model's operationalizations of coordination. Instead, informal and ad hoc relationships 
are better represented by the operationalizations of cooperation while the evolutionary 
nature of the network is better represented by the operationalizations of collaboration. 
This suggests that the ways in which researchers identify informal views of coordination 
are actually not coordination at all. Instead, a different form of interaction better explains 
these views. In using the interorganizational theory literature to clearly distinguish 
between each type of interaction within the model, the application of the MIM in turn 
fosters theoretical consistency within the literature. 
Findings from this analysis also enhance the authenticity of the MIM. In this 
study, the researcher does not identify any patterns that do not fit into the categories of 
the predetermined coding scheme. Interviewees are given an opportunity to identify other 
factors by asking them the following question: "Are there any other factors that would 
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help me understand the interactions between organizations when implementing the 
VSHP?" Typically, participants use this opportunity to reiterate a point previously made 
during the interview. In no instance does a participant mention factors that are not already 
captured within the theoretical model. The final draft of the MIM is presented in Tables 
4.8 through 4.11. 
121 
Table 4.8 
Final Variable Operationalizations: Inter organizational Policy Objective Construct 






Multifaceted tasks, repeatable 
Long-term, evolutionary nature 
Complex tasks that are highly 
varied and diverse; or 
situations of crisis 





Organizations are independent; 
it is possible for them to 
accomplish the task 
individually. 
Typically voluntary, 
organizations initiate collective 
action because it is helpful to 
their world of work and it 
builds capacity that serves the 
individual organization. 
Organizations require some 
assistance from other 
organizations to accomplish 
individual goals/missions. 
Voluntary or mandated, 
linkages are mobilized because 
compatible mission areas 
mutually increase abilities to 
achieve individual goals. 
An interagency liaison or 
boundary spanner may forge 
these relationships to meet 
resource needs or shared 
interests. 
Legislative mandate or grant 
contracts may enhance 




organization is one element of 
the larger system. 
Voluntary or mandated, 
organizations with mutual or 
complementary interests come 
together because they cannot 
achieve the desired goal or 
address the identified problem 
without working together. 
Organizations share 
responsibility for tasks that are 
interconnected or cannot be 
accomplished individually. 
A lead agency or convening 
organization brings relevant 
stakeholders together and 
legitimizes collective action. 
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Table 4.9 
Final Variable Operationalizations: Inter organizational Infrastructure Construct 
Variable Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 
Design Individuals work independently 
within existing organizational 
structures. 
Each organization's hierarchical 
structure is used to centrally 
manage specialized roles and 
responsibilities. 
Partner organizations jointly 
develop shared power 
arrangements to support 
mutually beneficial interests. 
Centralization may involve 
reorganization or consolidation 
of programs/activities. 
New program structures are 
developed based on the needs of 
a specific policy/goal. 
An administrative staff element 





informally agree to work 
together to achieve individual 
goals. 
Mechanisms, such as 




Agreements, clearly identifying 
each organization's roles and 
responsibilities, are often 
developed and/or reviewed by a 
higher authority. 
Key stakeholders jointly draft a 
shared purpose and develop a 
course of action based on 
mutually agreed upon roles and 








organizations require some 
assistance from other 
organizations to achieve goals. 
Organizations are not 
autonomous; operations within 
organizations are intertwined. 
Policy No interorganizational policy 
Authority decisions are made. 
Preexisting policies, established 
by the individual organizations, 
are followed. 
Organizations maintain 
individual authority over the 
policies that govern their 
respective organizations. 
Policies pertaining to 
coordinated efforts may be 
developed, but they are 
compatible with the policies 
already established within the 
individual organizations. 
Partner organizations jointly 
develop policies and procedures 
that govern the collective group. 
Interorganizational policies and 
procedures include working 
rules that specify which 
stakeholders can make 
decisions, who will guide 
collective actions, and the 
distribution of costs/benefits. 
Key Personnel Organizational leadership is not 
involved in decisions to work 
together. 
There is a distinction between 
leaders and managers; leaders 
within each organization make 
decisions while managers 
implement and administer these 
decisions. 
A facilitator may be identified 
to coordinate actions at the local 
level. 
Although no one is typically in 
charge, a lead organization may 
propose policies/rules to which 
the collective group must 
mutually agree to implement. 
Membership, role definitions, 
and responsibilities adapt to the 
task at hand. 




Final Variable Operationalizations: Interorganizational Procedures Construct 











Dialogue is maintained through Formal and informal 
informal relationships between 
participants. 
Basic information is initially 
shared. Continuous dialogue 
creates opportunities for 
discussing a wider range of 
topics. 
Decisions are made 
independently; rules that guide 
collective decision making are 
not necessary. 
Turf issues between 
participating organizations are 
avoided based on 
organizational tendencies to 
function independently 
Discretionary funds may be 
used in the pursuit of 
individual goals. 
Resources are not pooled. 
Units of exchange are 
determined at the lowest 
possible level. 
Organizational systems remain 
unchanged. 
communication channels are 
used to link vertical and 
horizontal organizational 
levels. 
Emphasize open and frequent 
communications between 
partners to reduce information 
asymmetries. 
Formal and informal channels 
are used to widely disseminate 
information concerning the 
collective group. 
Understanding enhanced by a 
willingness to share 
information about individual 
organizations and what 
can/cannot be offered to the 
collective group. 
Centralized decision making is Participative decision making 
practiced; a lead 
organization(s) dominates the 
decision making process. 
A neutral facilitator, outside 
convener, or full-time 
coordinator is employed to 
resolve turf issues. 
Organizations exchange 
resources to increase each 
organization's abilities to 
achieve individual goals. 
Mandates or grant 
arrangements may provide 
resources. 
Resource needs may be 
satisfied by a preexisting 
program within an individual 
organization 
Compatible information 
systems can enhance 
coordination. 
based on consensus and 
compromise; generates rules to 
govern activities and 
relationships between 
organizations. 
Representatives have latitude 
to negotiate rules and 
deliberate agreements to 
identify common ground. 
Conflicting roles based on 
incongruent demands from 
individual organization and 
group. 
Consider adjusting policies and 
procedures to reduce conflict 
while maximizing common 
ground. 
Pooled resources; allocation is 
based on balancing evolving 
needs of the collective group 
with individual constraints. 
Individual organizations have 
resources, skills, or knowledge 
needed to achieve collective 
goal. 
Organizational resources are 
allocated to support the 
activities of the collective unit. 
Databases are integrated to 
create linkages and share 
information between multiple 
layers of partner organizations. 
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Table 4.11 
Final Variable Operationalizations: Organizational Management Construct 
Variable Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 
Incentives Opportunities for synergistic 
benefits are realized based on 
the desire to avoid negative 
impacts resulting from changes 
in external factors. 
Commitment Work is completed as part of 
the regular job responsibilities 
conducted within the 
individual organization. 
Interests of the individual 
organization remain 
paramount. 
Colleagues may encourage 
each other to work with 
personnel in other 
organizations. 
Grant contracts may provide 
funding or resource incentives 
to support the collective effort. 
Leaders identify benefits in 
working together and 
emphasize the importance of 
these benefits to subordinates. 
A supervisory administrative 
body actively encourages 
organizations to work together. 
Linkages between 
organizations are recognized 
when benefits are perceived to 
outweigh the costs. 
Incentives are provided by the 
collective group and individual 
organizations to encourage 
individuals to stay involved in 
the collective effort. 
Members are committed to 
intra- and inter-organizational 
partners; collective interests 
must constantly be balanced 
with self-interests. 
Participation is justified by 
perceptions that the collective 
interest serves each 
organization's interests. 
Mutual commitment expands 






independence in establishing 
the rules, roles and 
responsibilities, and policies 
that govern the organization. 
An organization's standard 
operating procedures remain 
unchanged by collective 
efforts. 
Leaders explore modifications 
to standard operating 
procedures when supporting 
operational goals aligned with 
individual organizational 
missions. 
Partner organizations mutually 
adjust to the rules, roles and 
responsibilities, and policies 
collectively established to 
govern the collaborative unit. 
Changes to an organization's 
standard operating procedures 
are considered when needed to 
align with those of the 
collective unit. 
Trust Trust relationships are not 
required, but can develop when 
organizations consistently 
share honest information. 
Leaders work closely to create 
relationships based on trust. 
Trust between organizations is 
necessary. 
Partners reinforce trust in each 
other by sharing information 
through open communication. 
A history of supportive 
interactions sustains and 
legitimizes relationships. 
Analysis of Interactions during Policy Implementation 
The three types of interactions within the MIM are analyzed to address the 
following research question: How do administrators perceive the use of cooperation, 
coordination, or collaboration when working in a multiorganizational arrangement to 
implement policy? The researcher uses content analysis to analyze the data collected 
through interviews and documents. Therefore, textual data are reduced into the categories 
of the predetermined coding scheme. This section of the chapter compares the 
distribution of data from different sources and explores the perceived use of interactions 
throughout the constructs of the MIM. 
The Distribution of Interactions in Different Data Sources 
The number and percentage of elements recognized within each type of 
interaction are identified in Table 4.12. Elements are separated based on recognition 
during interviews vice recognition during a review of documents. Interactions are 
perceived to be highly collaborative in both the interviews and documents. The 
prevalence of this type of interaction in documents is especially interesting when 
considering that one half of the documents reviewed are policy mandates, grant contract 
requirements, or a memorandum of understanding (MOU). Despite the presence of a 
mandate that requires organizations to work together on coastal zone issues and the 
presence of documents intending to formalize relationships between organizations, 65% 
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When comparing the presence of cooperative and coordinative elements within 
interviews and documents, differences are evident. During interviews, cooperative and 
coordinative elements are mentioned in a balanced way; slightly more than one fifth of 
the elements mentioned during interviews are associated with each of the two types of 
interactions. However, this pattern is not found in the documents reviewed. Instead, 
emphasis on cooperative and coordinative elements is unbalanced. While elements 
associated with coordinative interactions account for more than one quarter of the 
elements mentioned in documents, elements associated with cooperative interactions are 
hardly mentioned at all. The cooperative interactions that administrators perceive to occur 
at operational levels are simply not captured in this study's organizational documents. 
Throughout implementation of the VSHP, cooperative interactions occur more 
often than documents suggest. In terms of the top-down/bottom-up debate, this suggests 
that scholars must look beyond organizational documents to capture fully the interactions 
that occur between organizations at operational levels. Contrary to what is assumed by 
much of the top-down implementation literature, a policy mandate alone cannot convey 
the operational patterns used to implement policy in this multiorganizational setting. 
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In order to explore how administrators perceive the use of cooperation, 
coordination, and collaboration among the organizations involved in implementing the 
VSHP, each interview and document is coded individually by interaction. Table 4.13 
displays the distribution of elements along the continuum of interaction for documents 
reviewed. A majority of the documents operate at the collaborative end of the interaction 
continuum. Two trends are evident when looking at the distribution of data. 
Table 4.13 
Distribution of Coding by Inter action for each Document Reviewed 
Name of Document Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 
Evaluation Findings for the VCMP -
November 1999 through July 2003 
Evaluation Findings for the VCMP - August 
2003 through May 2006 
Executive Order Number 21 - Continuing 
the VCMP 
MOU for the Southern Tip Partnership 
PDC Technical Assistance Grant Minimum 
Standards 
Virginia's Eastern Shore Seaside 
Management Plan Draft 
Virginia Seaside Heritage Program 









Total 5 43 100 
First, five of the eight documents reviewed are intended to formalize relationships 
between organizations involved in implementing the VSHP. These documents are the 
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) of 1972, Executive Order Number 21, MOU for 
the Southern Tip Partnership, PDC Technical Assistance Grant Requirements, and 
Virginia's Eastern Shore Seaside Management Plan Draft. Of these documents, 
administrators directly involved in the CPT and the VSHP developed the MOU and 
Virginia's Eastern Shore Seaside Management Plan Draft. It is interesting that of the five 
documents intending to formalize relationships between organizations, these two 
documents are the only ones that operate at the collaborative end of the continuum. 
Variation of interaction types within organizational documents suggests that 
implementation of the VSHP embraces the combined strengths of the top-down and 
bottom-up approaches. Since the CZMA of 1972 and Executive Order Number 21 are 
explicitly coordinative, a purely top-down approach would prematurely limit interactions 
to the descriptions in these documents while ignoring factors in the local policy 
environment. Since the documents developed by administrators directly involved in the 
CPT and VSHP are collaborative in nature, they obviously see benefits in operating 
outside of command-and-control authorities. On the other hand, a purely bottom-up 
approach would fail to acknowledge the benefits associated with accountability 
mechanisms provided by formalized documents. An interviewee suggests that the VCZM 
Program staff developed the PDC Technical Assistance Grant Requirements to hold the 
PDCs to specific performance standards. The utility of both approaches within this 
research supports the study's assertion that mutliorganizational implementation theory 
utilizes the top-down and bottom-up approaches. 
Second, independent evaluations conducted by the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) support this study's finding that interactions 
among organizations involved in implementing the VSHP are collaborative. After a 
review of both documents, NOAA evaluators perceive collaborative interactions to occur 
between organizations. A majority of the elements mentioned in both evaluations are 
aligned with elements associated with collaborative interactions. 
Despite the presence of documents intending to formalize arrangements between 
organizations, administrators in this study perceive interactions to operate beyond these 
mechanisms at an overwhelmingly collaborative level. Almost 70% of interviewees 
perceive interactions between organizations involved in implementing the VSHP to be 
collaborative in nature. The distribution of elements along the continuum of interaction is 
displayed for each interview participant in Table 4.14. Each participant is identified 
numerically to maintain anonymity. 
The distribution of interview data is especially noteworthy given that the public 
administration literature typically associates government organizations with highly 
centralized and hierarchical structures; government organizations represent 60% of the 
organizations involved in this study. Of the government employees participating in this 
study, almost 90% perceive interactions to occur at a collaborative level. This suggests 
that government employees involved in implementing the VSHP transcend hierarchical 
structures within their individual organizations. In this study, the vertical linkages within 
individual organizations seem to be less important to the implementation network than 
the horizontal linkages occurring between organizations. 
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Table 4.14 
Distribution of Coding by Interaction for each Interview Participant 
Organizational Sector 




















































































































































The distribution of data in documents reviewed and interviews leans heavily 
towards the collaborative end of the continuum. The tables presented throughout the rest 
of this section are based on the combined totals from interviews and documents. This 
decision is made because the data gathered through interviews and documents 
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collectively speak to administrators' perceptions regarding the use of each type of 
interaction within the VSHP. 
An Overview of Perceived Interactions 
The way in which administrators perceive interactions between organizations 
involved in the VSHP is explored by identifying patterns within the textual data that 
speak to cooperation, coordination, or collaboration. Elements associated with each of the 
three interaction terms are present in the coding of interviews and documents. The 
number and percentage of elements within each interaction are identified in Table 4.15. 
In aggregate, elements associated with the collaborative end of the continuum are 
mentioned twice as often as elements associated with the cooperative or coordinative 
areas on the continuum. 
Table 4.15 
Percentage of Elements Explained by Type of Interaction - Interviews and Documents 
Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 
Interorganizational 33(12%) 112(33%) 264(33%) 
Policy Objective 
Interorganzational 61(22%) 82(24%) 129(16%) 
Infrastructure 
Interorganizational 96(35%) 86(26%) 240(30%) 
Procedures 
Organizational 83(31%) 56(17%) 171(21%) 
Management 
Total within 273 336 804 1413 
Interaction 
% of Combined 19% 24% 57% 100% 
Interaction 
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In order to explore the perceived use of cooperation, coordination, and 
collaboration among organizations within the VSHP, analysis focuses on each variable 
within the four constructs of the MIM. Interview and document data are combined. 
Within each construct, a determination is made as to where each variable falls along the 
continuum of interaction. From this information, an overall determination of interaction 
is made for each construct. 
The Continuum and Interorganizational Policy Objective 
The objective of the VSHP is to preserve and manage natural resources on 
Virginia's Eastern Shore. The policy objective is categorized as cooperative, 
coordinative, or collaborative based on the perceptions of administrators regarding the 
variables of time, difficulty, role of single organizations, and the impetus for collective 
action. Data collected from interviews and documents are used to place each variable 
along the continuum of interaction. For this study, each variable within the construct is 
placed at the collaborative end of the continuum of interaction and is presented in Table 
4.16. As a result, the interorganizational policy objective construct is collaborative in 
nature. The four variables that characterize the interorganizational policy objective are 
described in more detail in this section. 
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Table 4.16 
Inter organizational Policy Objective - Variable Placement on Interaction Continuum 
Total Elements for 
Variable Cooperation Coordination Collaboration Construct 
(% for construct) 
Time 
Difficulty 














Total Hits for 
Interaction 
(% for Interaction) 
33 (8%) 112(27%) i d 1 (fii"ii) 409(100%) 
The data suggests that the policy objective of the VSHP is located toward the 
collaborative end of the continuum in terms of time. More than one half of the elements 
identified within this variable are for the long-term nature of the policy objective. The 
environmental goals of the VSHP, such as habitat restoration and land preservation on the 
seaside of the Eastern Shore, require long-term commitments from the organizations 
involved. Although the VSHP was established six years ago, many of the partners began 
working together well before the program's creation. For example, four of the 
organizations involved in the VSHP own land on the Eastern Shore. An interviewee 
describes this commitment to land management in the following way, "Because we are 
owners and managers of land, our commitment is in perpetuity." It seems likely that these 
organizations will continue to work together, beyond the scope of the VSHP, for as long 
as they own land. In many instances, these organizations work together to plan the 
purchase and management of these properties. 
In addition to the objectives of the program being described as long-term, 
interviewees suggest that building the relationships necessary to achieve these objectives 
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take a great deal of time. This is especially important on the Eastern Shore because 
agencies owning adjacent properties must collectively discuss the management of these 
properties. An interviewee makes this point by expressing, "It took 10 years of talking 
and consensus to come up with a way to view the whole ecosystem together." As the 
literature suggests, the building of these relationships generates interdependencies 
between organizations (see, for example, Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Keast, Brown, 
& Mandell, 2007). The creation of interdependencies further supports long-term 
relationships. This assertion is supported by an interviewee who explains, "My 
perception is that people don't just show up to work on one project and then leave. 
People are pretty vested in it." 
Another one half of the elements identified within the time variable are associated 
with the evolutionary nature of the program's objectives. As the literature suggests, 
relationships between organizations involved in implementing the VSHP evolve (see, for 
example, Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006). 
Organizations assume different roles depending on the project that needs to be completed 
and the expertise available among the participating organizations. Much like the literature 
suggests (see, for example, Mandell & Steelman, 2003), interactions within the 
implementation network are reshaped based on group dynamics and the specific task at 
hand. An interviewee explains the importance of this evolution within the group in the 
following way, "The timeline and evolution of the process is really what is important. 
You couldn't just go out and take the final working relationships we all have and say that 
this is how this group functions and plug that in somewhere else. It really [i]s an 
evolution." Throughout the discussion, the participant explains that someone facilitates 
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the group's evolution by initiating the program, involving stakeholders, and helping the 
group build trust. This description aligns with the roles of a convening organization (see, 
for example, McNamara, Leavitt, & Morris, 2008; Wood & Gray, 1991). 
In addition to the presence of a convener, the group evolves because participants 
individually and collectively grow throughout the duration of the project. An interview 
participant explains this evolution, 
I think anytime you first start a project like this it will be a little rough because 
there is distrust.... But with time everyone learns to adjust to each other and 
understand each other and learn to live with each other. So I think the partnership 
evolve[s] positively over time. 
Several interviewees suggest that the CPT initially focuses the group on easier projects, 
and they work their way into the projects that are more difficult. Due to the evolutionary 
nature of the program, participants have time to grow together. A sense of sustainability 
is expressed in an interview, "When September rolls around, the funding for this focal 
area will end, but the need for partnership does not. The need to manage the resources in 
a collaborative way will not end." As a result, participants are always looking for ways in 
which they can work with their partners on projects that grow from those directly 
supported by the VSHP. Another interviewee mentions that partners work within a 
flexible framework of dynamic processes because projects do not always work out as 
intended; this flexibility allows the collective arrangement to make changes as needed. 
Based on participants' descriptions of the VSHP objectives, the data suggest that 
the policy objective is located toward the collaborative end of the continuum in terms of 
difficulty. More than 60% of the elements identified within this variable are for the 
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complexity of tasks associated with the program's objectives. According to an interview 
discussion, the organizations within the VSHP use an "ecosystem mentality" when 
focusing on land management and habitat restoration on the Eastern Shore. As a result, 
many people and organizational entities are involved in this regional approach. Of the 
participants interviewed, more than 67% indicate that the objectives of the program are 
highly complex. Many attribute this complexity to the nature and scale in which the 
program is trying to resolve environmental issues. A high level of difficulty can be seen 
when looking at a technique the Division of Natural Heritage uses to map Phragmites on 
the Eastern Shore. Phragmites is an invasive plant species that disrupts the natural 
landscape. This technique is explained during an interview, 
We've mapped the entire seaside of the Eastern Shore. For example, we've 
developed a technique using low elevation flights with helicopters and global 
positioning systems to map Phragmites at a really high scale - a high resolution 
with a lot of precision and accuracy with this mapping. We are mapping tiny 
patches of Phragmites and essentially doing a census of all the Phragmites on the 
seaside of the Eastern Shore. This technique didn't exist before. 
Projects encompass highly varied tasks that involve different stakeholders, raise different 
issues, and focus on different goals. Some of the projects include shellfish restoration, 
shore bird habitat protection, Phragmites control, and the development of ecotourism. As 
suggested by the literature (see, for example, Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007), 
collaborative interactions are used in the VSHP to address highly complex problems. 
Another 30% of the elements identified within the difficulty variable are 
associated with the program's objectives addressing a situation of crisis. With great focus 
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placed on the Chesapeake Bay, the Eastern Shore historically receives little attention. A 
common theme among interviewees is that the seaside of the Eastern Shore is forgotten. 
This point is explicitly expressed by an interviewee in the following manner, "The 
Seaside is always forgotten because of the Chesapeake Bay. It is one area that is so rich 
in natural resources but it can fall through the cracks." In and of itself, a lack of attention 
may not be grounds for crisis. However, the seaside of the Eastern Shore is a critically 
important environmental area. An interviewee describes the area as "one of the world's 
most important biospheres." Another participant agrees, "The Eastern Shore is a jewel. 
You have a suite of wildlife resources found on the Eastern Shore that are not only 
valuable from a scientific and conservation standpoint but are [also valuable as] major 
economic and recreational resources." Grounds for crisis arise because there is an 
environmentally significant area faces severe development pressures compounded by 
economic stress and a lack of attention. 
Based on the textual data collected through interviews and documents, the policy 
objective is located toward the collaborative end of the continuum in terms of the roles 
single organizations play. About one half of the elements identified within this variable 
are associated with interdependencies between organizations. It is important to recognize 
the way in which interdependence applies to interactions in this study. The literature 
suggests that collaborative interactions occur when single organizations cannot resolve a 
problem individually (see, for example, Wood & Gray, 1991) and each organization 
becomes one piece of a larger system (see, for example, Mandell, 1994). While interview 
responses indicate that participants perceive their organizations to be interdependent with 
those of a larger system, this study does not necessarily support the literature's nuances. 
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In this study, organizations are not perceived to be unable to function 
independently. To the contrary, interviewees suggest that their organizations can operate 
individually to make some differences on the Eastern Shore. An interviewee explains that 
each organization independently makes technical recommendations, assumes 
management roles, and exerts legal authorities. Interdependence comes into play when 
interviewees discuss the magnitude, scope, and successes of what they accomplish when 
working together. An interviewee clarifies this distinction of interdependence in 
collaborative interactions, 
Even though each agency can do its own piece fairly well on its own, the 
objectives of the VSHP are certainly much broader than any one of the agencies. 
Even if we are able to work mostly independently on our little piece of it, it is just 
a piece. 
Resource administrators and operational personnel alike indicate that they look to find 
ways to tie their organizations and research together because they are able to accomplish 
more by doing so. This finding is supported in research conducted by Keast, Brown, and 
Mandell (2007). Based on data collected in interviews and focus groups with policy 
makers and practitioners in the service arena, their research indicates that collaborative 
interactions are employed when organizations search for ways to "achieve greater 
efficiencies of scale and outcome" (p. 18). 
The data suggest that the policy objective of the VSHP is located toward the 
collaborative end of the continuum in terms of impetus for collective action. More than 
one half of the elements identified within this variable indicate that a convener brings 
organizations together, they have complementary interests, or they can better achieve the 
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desired goal when working together. First, organizations come together to implement the 
VSHP because the VCZM Program plays an important role in convening the group. As 
is suggested by the literature (see, for example, Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; 
McNamara, Leavitt, & Morris, 2008), the VCZM Program serves as a mechanism to 
encourage interactions between organizations and establish the collective arrangement. 
The importance of identifying a mechanism to bring organizations together is 
acknowledged during an interview, "The key is having something to bring these 
organizations together. Otherwise they will work together where it benefits them." 
Another interviewee suggests that the convening role of the VCZM Program is 
especially important because each organization is individually busy and involved in many 
other projects. Due to their expertise in facilitating relationships, the VCZM Program 
staff has high levels of credibility with their partners. This credibility is frequently 
mentioned in interviews and documents. The literature indicates that credibility is an 
essential component in influencing the organizations to work together in an arena where 
formal authority is nonexistent (see, for example, Wood & Gray, 1991). 
Second, organizations come together because they identify complementary 
interests. An interviewee expresses this point during an interview, "Our objectives are 
clearly a subset of the overall VSHP. The VSHP covers a lot of bases well beyond the 
narrow mission of our division. But it is quite aligned." The VCZM Program also plays 
an important role in helping organizations recognize when they have complementary 
interests that can be better served by working together rather than alone. An interviewee 
explains the involvement of the VCZM Program as follows: 
The interests of those agencies have significant overlap in those areas that are 
particularly ecologically important. In their daily work they often don't think 
about that overlap, they only think about what they are doing. My perception is 
that when they get together under the auspices of the Coastal Zone Management 
Program they tend to look more at how they can work together. 
Interviewees indicate that they perceive their own organizational goals to be furthered by 
establishing partnerships with other organizations on the Eastern Shore. This desire to 
serve individual organizational interests while also meeting collective interests is 
supported by the literature (see, for example, Thomson & Perry, 2006). 
Third, organizations work together to implement the VSHP because personnel 
perceive that they can better achieve the desired goal. Funding concerns appear to drive 
this perception as interviewees frequently mention a lack of resources and tight budgets. 
Like many public organizations, those involved with the VSHP have fewer resources to 
face increasingly complex problems. An interviewee suggests that scarce resources bring 
organizations together. "We have a huge mandate and little resources to accomplish it 
with. So we have a vested interest to work together." Leveraging resources and money 
help organizations achieve their goals. The need to leverage resources is described by an 
interviewee as follows: 
The job that needs to be done is bigger than any one agency. And things like the 
Virginia Seaside Heritage Program give you a vehicle for everyone to work 
together . . . to get in the same car and to get to the same place with somebody 
else providing the fuel—[the Virginia Coastal Zone Management Program]. 
The need to leverage funds is also mentioned in tandem with the matching requirement 
on funding distributed by the VCZM Program. An interviewee suggests that 
multiorganizational interactions are a necessity for implementing the VSHP, 
Even if we ha[ve] all the expertise in the world we could never afford to take on 
the entire program because we couldn't come up with the match money to do it. 
VIMS [Virginia Institute of Marine Science] could come up with the match 
money to do it but they probably wouldn't have all the resources in place to say 
that they could do it. And by resources I mean personnel, background, and 
physical plant resources such as boats, labs, and computer space to do the entire 
job. So it is a program that needs to be done as a partnership. 
The Continuum and Interorganizational Infrastructure 
The VSHP is comprised of a network of organizations that work together to 
preserve and manage natural resources on Virginia's Eastern Shore. The infrastructure is 
categorized as cooperative, coordinative, or collaborative based on the perceptions of 
administrators regarding the variables of design, formality of the agreement, 
organizational autonomy, policy authority, and key personnel. Data collected from 
interviews and documents are used to place each variable along the continuum of 
interaction. Variables within this construct are placed in different areas along the 
continuum and are presented in Table 4.17. Despite this variation, the interorganizational 
infrastructure construct is collaborative based on the elements emphasized throughout 
interviews and documents. The five variables that characterize this construct are 
described in more detail in this section. 
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Based on participants' descriptions on the ways in which the mutliorganizational 
arrangement is generated and structured, the data suggests that the infrastructure is 
located toward the collaborative end of the continuum in terms of design. Over 40% of 
the elements identified within this variable are associated with the new program structure 
used to implement the VSHP. The creation of a new program structure is consistent with 
the literature (see, for example, Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001) and 
suggests that participants identify with the horizontal linkages used to implement the 
VSHP. 
Two types of horizontal structures are used to establish linkages within the 
multiorganizational arrangement. The CPT is one type of horizontal structure used to 
implement the VSHP. Many interviewees describe this group as providing the leadership 
and structure needed to bring the network of participants together. An interviewee 
explains the role of the CPT, "Each time you look at a project, it is a collection of 
partners that have all come together. And I don't know if those partners would have 
necessarily worked as well together if there hadn't been a structure to bring them 
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together." This governing body is comprised of representatives from state and local 
governments. Participants of this group make programmatic decisions to guide the overall 
direction of the VCZM Program. In addition, they make decisions regarding the 
distribution of grant funds. 
The executive steering committee is a second type of horizontal structure used to 
implement the VSHP. This group is comprised of operational personnel who have field 
level expertise and are responsible for managing projects on the Eastern Shore. Their 
expertise is widely acknowledged by interviewees holding positions on the CPT. During 
interviews, many CPT members recognize that personnel at the operational levels have 
20 to 30 years of experience in studying these ecosystems, and this knowledge helps 
them make sound decisions in terms of project operations. 
These findings indicate that multiorganizational implementation requires the 
development of horizontal connections between organizations in addition to vertical 
connections within organizations. The use of the CPT and executive steering committee 
facilitates the involvement of two levels of personnel from each state agency—resource 
administrators and operational project leaders. Representatives on the CPT typically 
supervise the project leaders on the executive steering committee. In addition, 
multiorganizational arrangements may benefit from horizontal connections at more than 
one organizational level. Operations within the VSHP appear to run smoothly because 
resource administrators are horizontally linked with one another while operational 
personnel from the same agencies are also horizontally linked with one another. It is 
through these linkages that resource administrators and operational personnel become 
aware of the expertise within their own organizations and in other organizations. 
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Textual data suggests that the interorganizational infrastructure construct is 
located in the coordinative area of the continuum based on the formality of the agreement 
between organizations involved in the VSHP. More than one third of the elements 
identified within this variable are attributed towards contractual agreements formalizing 
relationships. This is not surprising considering that the VCZM Program awards one half 
of a million dollars in grant funds annually to partners involved in the VSHP. As a result, 
roles and responsibilities are largely determined by stipulations within the grant. An 
interviewee describes the formality of agreements between organizations as "partly grant 
driven." Another interviewee says, "[Roles] are usually based on our specific mandates 
for regulatory initiatives or controls." Grant contracts are used to identify projects 
suitable for collective action and formalize relationships between participants 
implementing the VSHP. Contracts are used in a similar manner in the research 
conducted by Jennings and Krane (1994). In collaborative interactions, hierarchical forms 
of accountability are nonexistent because participants are considered to have equal status. 
Therefore, situations involving the distribution of funds require the presence of formal 
accountability mechanisms. Since these mechanisms are not inherently present in 
collaborative arrangements, grant contracts serve this purpose. 
Based on analysis of interview transcriptions and documents, the infrastructure of 
the VSHP is located toward the collaborative end of the continuum in terms of 
organizational autonomy. More than one half of the elements identified within this 
variable are attributed to organizations not being autonomous. A common theme in the 
data is that organizations can function independently in their day-to-day operations, but 
overall operations are inherently intertwined with those of other organizations 
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implementing the VSHP. An interview participant suggests that organizations benefit by 
working together, "Everyone could do their job on their own. They are able to do a much 
better job by working together." Interviewees recognize that an ecosystem approach to 
managing resources on the Eastern Shore requires them to work with other organizations 
in order to better meet the program's diverse objectives. Discussion during an interview 
reveals why organizations are not autonomous when implementing the VSHP, 
The goals of the program are pretty broad so no one agency can do it themselves. 
You have to have that mix of expertise and disciplines to cover the bases of all the 
different resources that are on the Eastern Shore. . . . [T]here is so much to do that 
you need a lot of different hands and you need a lot of different expertise because 
of the fact that no one organization has sufficient capabilities and expertise in all 
the different disciplines to address the broad range of resource issues that present 
themselves on a place like the Seaside. 
Recognition that collective efforts are needed to accomplish the totality of the task aligns 
with the research (see, for example, Mandell, 1994). Interdependencies are captured 
during an interview, 
Certainly at the state level we rely on each other quite a bit because everyone has 
their own piece of it and if somebody's piece doesn't get done than that has a 
major impact on the total objective of the VSHP. It requires all organizations that 
are involved to finish the elements they agree to. So the success of the total 
project is dependent on each of the elements. 
Multiple interviewees convey that each organization addresses one piece of the Eastern 
Shore's larger ecosystem, and each piece impacts the larger system. 
Interviewees emphasize that their organizations are individual pieces of a larger 
ecosystem; this emphasis suggests that collaboration between organizations involved in 
implementing the VSHP occurs in a specialized way. Other research on collaboration in 
the environmental arena supports this theme (see, for example, McNamara, Leavitt, & 
Morris, 2008). Organizations utilize specialized expertise while working on various 
projects pertaining to natural resources on the Eastern Shore. It likely takes great 
understanding of each organization to align these independent specializations in ways 
that meet the goals of the VSHP. The role of the VCZM Program staff in aligning 
organizational specializations is described by an interviewee, "It's like being a conductor 
of a symphony. You have your different instruments and you know what their specialties 
are. So you figure out the right time to bring them in and hopefully it comes together in 
one nice piece of music." In this sense, collaborative interactions are purposive to the 
extent that the convener brings together a group of organizations with the specializations 
needed to carry out the program's objectives. 
The data suggests that infrastructure is located toward the cooperative and 
collaborative ends of the continuum in terms of policy authority. There is only a one 
point difference between the elements identified as cooperative and those identified as 
collaborative. In addition, almost one half of the elements identified within this variable 
are associated with each of these two interactions. This is important to recognize because 
in this study the variable operates at both ends of the continuum. Although the data may 
appear contradictory, these seemingly dichotomous views may be attributed to 
participants focusing on different levels of policy decision making when answering the 
interview question, the sectors involved in the program, and the design of the CPT. 
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In the VSHP, local governments and federal/state agencies largely represent the 
public sector. These organizations have responsibilities mandated through specific legal 
authorities. Personnel representing these organizations may recognize a resource that 
would benefit from the development of enforceable policies and gather data to support a 
particular policy change, but policy decisions ultimately occur through a political 
process. This emphasis on organizations independently following preexisting policies is 
aligned with the cooperation literature which suggests that organizations retain separate 
identifies and control resources individually when working together (see, for example, 
Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). An interviewee expresses a need for each agency to 
follow its legal authorities, "For the Eastern Shore group, each agency has to be very 
clear in voicing their concerns and their legal authorities or restrictions... . There may be 
certain things that an organization just cannot do." 
On the other hand, these same participants also indicate that the CPT can make 
operational policy changes within the scope of each agency's legal authorities. Two types 
of decisions are made by the personnel on this team. First, programmatic decisions occur 
at the operational level. An interviewee mentions, "Agencies do develop collective 
policies to guide operations." It is through the CPT that decisions are made regarding 
commitments to projects and allocation of resources. Another interviewee indicates that 
the partners work together to identify the program's focal areas. "We all work together as 
a team and we make decisions as a team as to where the focal area will be." 
Second, decisions are made regarding the focus of future research. These 
decisions are typically guided by a desire to provide state policymakers and citizens with 
the information needed to make sound policy decisions regarding land-use on the Eastern 
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Shore. In situations where participants of the VSHP desire policy changes that occur 
outside their programmatic boundaries, interviewees emphasize that they can influence 
the political process through research and the communication of findings. The potential 
to influence this process is explained during an interview, 
The policies that we develop are probably one of two things. First, deciding as a 
group what area we should go in for enforceable policies. . . . Most of the other 
policy development has been in terms of seeing a policy need and developing the 
information behind it and a recommendation on what policy should be and 
presenting that to the appropriate agencies for them to take it to the appropriate 
channels. 
Although these efforts do not directly change policy, it is through this information 
process that interviewees believe they indirectly impact enforceable policies. 
This distinction between programmatic policy authorities and more general policy 
authorities are not necessarily clear in the literature. The literature suggests that 
organizations jointly develop rules and procedures to guide the collective unit (see, for 
example, Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006). Although this assertion is supported by the 
findings in this study, it is important to consider that these developments occur within the 
context of the programmatic level. This may provide a more realistic application of the 
policy authority variable during collaborative interactions between public organizations 
who are guided by specific legal authorities. 
Based on the data collected, the infrastructure of the VSHP is located toward the 
collaborative end of the interaction continuum in terms of key personnel. Almost 20% of 
the elements within this variable speak to the involvement of the convening organization 
in proposing policies and rules for the collective group to consider. An interviewee 
describes the role of the convener by saying, "Money brought everyone to the table and 
good leadership brought everyone together." The VCZM Program represents the staff 
element involved in all operations of the collaborative group; the presence of a staff 
element is also identified in Agranoff s (2006) research on public management networks. 
The findings from this study align nicely with the literature's discussion on 
champions and sponsors (see, for example, Agranoff, 2006; Mandell & Steelman, 2003). 
In terms of implementing the VSHP, NOAA acts as a sponsor by providing the authority 
and resources to legitimize the implementation network. The VCZM Program staff acts 
as the champions for the implementation network because they sustain interactions with 
their needed expertise. This theme emerges throughout numerous interviews. An 
interviewee reveals the presence of a champion within the multiorganizational 
arrangement, "[T]he Coastal Zone Management Program has been a champion and really 
got the project going and got people involved." Another interviewee suggests, "From day 
one, it was always put forth that the reason this is possible is because it is a regional 
approach. We have to all be working together." The results from this study align with 
Agranoff s (2006) research on public management networks. In both cases, champions 
play a significant role in encouraging organizations to support the collective arrangement. 
In addition, more than 15% of the elements within the key personnel variable 
speak to the adaptability of membership, roles, and responsibilities. An interview 
participant explains why organizations change roles, "Certain groups are involved in 
specific projects depending on their expertise." For example, the Virginia Institute of 
Marine Science and the Virginia Marine Resources Commission are primarily involved 
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in oyster restoration. The Nature Conservancy and the Center for Conservation Biology 
are primarily involved in avian research. On the other hand, the Department of 
Conservation and Recreation is focused on Phragmites control and providing 
opportunities for ecotourism. 
Although these examples only represent a fraction of the organizations involved 
in the VSHP, a broader look reveals a similar pattern—each organization has a niche 
within the bigger group. An interviewee suggests that flexibility is needed to work on the 
diverse tasks associated with the VSHP. "You need some flexibility because nothing ever 
works completely as planned. You want to be able to retool and regroup in order to have 
a dynamic process." Despite a need for the group to adapt to the task at hand, dynamics 
within this implementation network stabilize through the specialized nature in which the 
organizations come together. Although different tasks require the expertise of different 
organizations, it seems that particular subgroups repeatedly work together. 
The Continuum and Interorganizational Procedures 
Participants within the VSHP indicate that processes within the arrangement 
support and sustain relationships. Procedures are categorized as cooperative, 
coordinative, or collaborative based on the perceptions of administrators regarding the 
variables of information sharing, decision making, resolution of turf issues, resource 
allocation, and systems thinking. Data collected from interviews and documents are used 
to place each variable along the continuum of interaction. Each variable within the 
construct is placed at the collaborative end of the continuum and is presented in Table 
4.18. As a result, the interorganizational procedures construct is collaborative in nature. 
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The five variables that characterize interorganizational procedures are described in more 
detail in this section. 
Table 4.18 
Interorganizational Procedures - Variable Placement on Interaction Continuum 
Total Elements for 
Variable Cooperation Coordination Collaboration Construct 
(% for construct) 
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The data suggests that interorganizational procedures are located toward the 
collaborative end of the continuum in terms of information sharing. More than 40% of 
the elements identified within this variable are attributed to open and frequent 
communication and the willingness to share information. Regular meetings among 
individuals involved in implementing the VSHP and routine communication among 
personnel working at the operational level facilitate collaborative interactions between 
organizations. The benefits of communication are described by an interviewee in the 
following manner, 
I've been in Virginia doing this now for just over 10 years and this certainly 
enable [s] me to learn who many of the other players are in the coastal area 
working in natural resources. I've learned a lot about who they are, how they 
operate, who I can count on, and who not to count on. 
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It is through regular meetings of the CPT that partners openly communicate with one 
another as they discuss the direction of the VSHP, identify what their organization can 
provide to the collective group, and learn more about the other organizations involved in 
the program. 
In addition, it is common for personnel representing the partnering organizations 
to communicate in the course of their daily operations. An interviewee describes daily 
communications among organizations implementing the VSHP, "There is so much 
routine contact here that when it comes time for all the partners to come together the only 
hard part is figuring out a date." These communication linkages are further strengthened 
by long standing relationships and geographic proximity among partners on the Eastern 
Shore. Another interviewee suggests, "It is completely common to pull up to a boat ramp 
and see several partners. And you stop and talk." As is consistent with the literature (see, 
for example, Thomson & Perry, 2006), open and frequent communications between 
partners involved in implementing the VSHP reduce information asymmetries. 
Furthermore, a willingness to share information between organizations facilitates 
collaborative interactions between partners implementing the VSHP. As organizations 
enhance their understanding of one another, they become increasingly willing to share 
information. During interviews, a participant suggests that this willingness to share 
information with one another "helps create a real scientific community rather than a 
group of scientists." In sharing information on restoring coastal habitats, replenishing 
aquatic resources, and promoting sustainable economic activities on the seaside of the 
Eastern Shore, the collective group is better able to employ an ecosystem approach. A 
sense of understanding within the network is described during an interview, "Now 
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everybody understands each others work so completely that they realize that none of their 
projects is more important than any others. And they are looking for opportunities to find 
ways to help others." As organizations focus on projects that address one piece of the 
larger ecosystem, a willingness to share information allows them to become more 
knowledgeable in areas that address interrelated pieces of the ecosystem. Developing a 
knowledge base through information sharing and understanding is supported by the 
literature (see, for example, Imperial, 2001; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). 
Stability among partners involved in the VSHP contributes to this willingness to 
share information. An interviewee describes the development of stability within the 
multiorganizational arrangement, "It is the same group of organizations that come 
together on a regular basis to identify what the resources needs are, to see what people 
and money each organization has, and to pool the resources to conduct conservation." In 
many instances, the VCZM Program staff encourages organizations to share information. 
This point is further explained during an interview, "The VSHP provides platforms for 
people to talk in ways and at levels of intimacy that averts problems more than it creates 
them." 
Interorganizational procedures are located at the collaborative end of the 
continuum in terms of decision making. Elements within collaborative decision making 
are identified twelve times more often than the elements within cooperation or 
coordination. More than 80% of the elements identified within this variable are attributed 
to participative decision making based on consensus and compromise. This process is 
described by an interview participant, "Decision making is a collegial process. There are 
a lot of prioritizations to be made. It is an open, roundtable discussion. And we try to 
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come to consensus on what the priorities will be." Another interviewee agrees, "The 
discussion happens with all the partners sitting at the table." Much like the literature 
suggests (see, for example, Agranoff, 2006; Mandell & Steelman, 2003), consensus and 
compromise are an important part of the process. It is common for interview participants 
to describe the process as an open discussion. Based on the following statement from an 
interviewee, participants perceive themselves to have great input into decisions: 
The whole group discusses and decides the priorities. Once the group as a whole 
sets the priorities, the partners most applicable to that project talk amongst 
themselves about how to carry it out. Small groups form around particular 
projects. All the [needed] partners [are] at the table. 
It is clear during interviews that participants consider themselves equal stakeholders 
when it comes to making decisions. 
Interorganizational procedures are located at the collaborative end of the 
continuum in terms of resolving turf issues. More than one half of the elements within 
this variable are associated with maximizing common ground and recognizing 
incongruent demands between individual organizations and the collective group. 
Therefore, turf issues are resolved in two ways. 
First, participants within the VSHP focus on maximizing common ground in order 
to minimize turf issues. Although each organization may have a different interest in 
protecting the seaside of Virginia's Eastern Shore, interview responses suggest that 
organizations maximize common ground by focusing on the needs of the resource. An 
interviewee expresses recognition of this common ground, "It's all different roads leading 
to the same destination." A common goal unites the organizations implementing the 
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VSHP. This unity is explained in an interview, "When the bottom line is the protection of 
the resource, and this is what you are focused on, I think it is easier to resolve these 
issues." As personnel from different organizations agree on the need to protect the 
resource, interviews also realize no organization can accomplish the goal individually. 
An interviewee acknowledges the necessity for organizations to work together, "In a lot 
of cases, we've realized that we need each other. And nobody has the resources we used 
to have so we can't afford to fight with each other." 
Second, participants within the VSHP minimize turf issues by recognizing that 
there is potential for incongruent demands between individual organizations and the 
collective group. The potential for incongruent demands is also recognized in the 
research conducted by Thomson and Perry (2006). The need to balance competing 
demands is acknowledged by an interview participant, 
There is a balancing act between the interests of the individual organization and 
those of the collective group. And the collective has to recognize the mandates 
and the limitations of the individual partners. You strive to identify the things that 
everyone can support and then you continue the hard work with some of the 
tougher issues. These can be addressed, it just takes longer. 
In balancing the interests of individual organizations and the collective arrangement, turf 
issues do not impact the network of organizations involved in the VSHP. This finding 
aligns with Agranoff s (2006) research on collaborative networks involving federal, state, 
and local governments. The literature indicates that conflicts between organizations may 
be resolved by adjusting policies and procedures (see, for example, Mattessich, Murray-
Close, & Monsey, 2001). In this study, resolution of turf issues does not appear to come 
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from policy or procedural changes. Instead, findings suggest that there are two other 
explanations for the lack of turf issues between the organizations involved in 
implementing the VSHP. 
First, interview responses indicate that organizations within the implementation 
network focus on understanding the different perspectives and concerns of other 
participating organizations. "It is not enough to accurately hear what other [people are] 
saying, you actually have to understand why they are saying it, what their perspective[s] 
[are], and what they really need." Interviewees indicate that they spend great amounts of 
time discussing what programs to pursue and how to implement them. When problems 
arise, they also spend a great deal of time resolving them. Significant emphasis is placed 
on identifying common opportunities that involve projects deemed valuable by a majority 
of organizations. 
Second, interview responses suggest that a lack of turf issues may be somewhat 
predetermined based on the organizations identified to implement the VSHP. The 
organizations involved in the VSHP generally have specialized roles based on distinct 
mission areas. These organizations are brought to the table because their mission areas 
are tangentially related and focus on the seaside of the Eastern Shore. However, mission 
specializations help minimize conflicts among partners because the allocation of grant 
money and determination of project involvement are often based on the need for a 
particular expertise. Therefore, conflict is minimal because organizations do not need to 
compete for the same funds or project involvement. This finding suggests that turf issues 
can be avoided to some extent based on the organizations brought to the table. Conveners 
should give considerable thought to identifying the specializations needed to implement a 
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particular objective prior to bringing the organizations together. As a result, the outcome 
of collaborative interactions may be related to how well the convener accomplishes this 
task. 
Interorganizational procedures are located at the collaborative end of the 
continuum in terms of resource allocation. The number of times that elements within this 
variable are mentioned increase along the continuum of interaction in a linear fashion 
from cooperation to collaboration. Almost 30% of the elements within this variable are 
associated with resources provided through grant contracts. This element aligns with 
coordinative resource allocation and is mentioned more often than any other element. An 
interviewee explains the criticality of a stable funding stream in sustaining partnerships 
within the VSHP, 
When you have money, you can do some things that you could never do. And you 
can get people to work with you in ways that they would have never worked with 
you before. If you can start paying for things then people start chipping in their 
time. The matching aspect a lot of organizations are capable of but if there isn't a 
funding source to drive the whole thing then [interaction] is harder to come by. 
That has been the story of this program. 
A majority of interviewees suggest that the success of the VSHP is possible because of 
the funding stream provided by the VCZM Program. An interviewee discusses the impact 
of funding, "The funding and the possibilities that the funding creates for action is what 
makes the progress possible." Interviewees, employed by public organizations, indicate 
that these additional funds directly contribute to the scope of the work they are able to 
accomplish. 
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The structure of the grant process generates opportunities for organizations to 
pool resources around the funding stream. Through a pooling of resources, organizations 
implementing the VSHP move toward the collaborative end of the continuum in terms of 
resource allocation. An interview participant explains that much of the grant money 
distributed by the VCZM Program requires organizations to have a one-to-one match 
with nonfederal monies, "The match requirement lends itself nicely to pooling resources. 
Often, the money is matched with time and personnel." It is through the matching 
requirement that organizations identify opportunities to leverage resources. An 
interviewee mentions, "We go out to other organizations and line up funds that will 
benefit the Seaside." Leveraging resources enhances the power of the implementation 
network. An interview participant makes this point during discussion by expressing, 
"Leveraging people's resources is really the best power of the VSHP. They are asking for 
a one-to-one dollar match so you have to have funding from elsewhere." 
When elements within the resource allocation variable are aggregated by 
interaction, it is clear that resource allocation occurs at a collaborative level. Although 
this pooling of resources occurs, it may occur in a different way than the literature 
suggests. An interviewee explains the applicability of pooled resources to the VSHP, 
They are pooled to the extent that everybody contributes. They are not pooled to 
the extent that you donate a certain amount of time and somebody else decides 
how that time is spent.... [I] f I am going to commit my time or my staffs time to 
a specific task, than it [has to be] within our mission and my responsibility. 
In some instances, organizations leverage resources because their individual projects 
align with the goals of the VSHP. Several interviewees describe this process as 
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"piggybacking." In these instances, the VSHP benefits from the completion of additional 
projects while individual organizations benefit from additional funds. 
Other times, the pooling of resources occurs because organizations have access to 
funds that other VSHP participants do not have access to. As these funds are identified by 
organizations involved in the VSHP, they often apply them to projects that align with the 
initiatives of the multiorganizational arrangement. It is mentioned during an interview 
that the cost of land on the Eastern Shore often requires organizations to pool various 
funding sources in order to purchase a piece of property. 
The most recent acquisition project involved a piece of land contiguous to the 
Fish and Wildlife refuge at the Southern Tip. We came together as a group to 
figure out what pots of money might be available to buy that piece of land. . . . 
The money is coming from all different pots because no one source has enough 
cash to pay for it all. 
In these situations, resources are generally pooled in the sense that one group may be able 
to push an initiative forward in a way that another organization may not be able to. For 
example, a nonprofit like The Nature Conservancy (TNC) does not face the same budget 
constraints that government organizations face, and they are able to use their money in 
ways that public organizations cannot. Therefore, TNC often spearheads land acquisition 
on the southern tip of the Eastern Shore because the organization can quickly allocate the 
funds and purchase the desired property. Due to the bureaucracy within public 
organizations, they are unable to operate at the same speed. As a result, TNC often 
purchases land initially and then works with various federal/state agencies to determine 
who will repurchase and manage it. 
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Furthermore, nonfinancial resources are pooled in a specialized way. Interviewees 
frequently mention that their organizations have resources needed to achieve the program 
objectives and that these resources are allocated to the collective group. For example, 
TNC has access to volunteers and great expertise in terms of land acquisition and bird 
habitat management. The Eastern Shorekeeper provides informal enforcement to ensure 
restored areas remain undisturbed. Academic institutions, such as The College of William 
and Mary and the University of Virginia, provide data that is used to advocate specific 
management decisions. The VCZM Program staff members are experts in grant 
management and environmental facilitation. These are just a few examples of the ways 
nonfinancial resources are pooled in a specialized way. While Agranoff s (2006) research 
suggests that government managers contribute resources to collective groups, this study 
suggests that the pooling of resources occurs in a specialized way in which each 
organization retains control of the resources they provide to the collective group. 
Interorganizational procedures are located at the collaborative end of the 
continuum in terms of systems thinking. Two-thirds of the elements within this variable 
are associated with integrating information systems to foster linkages between 
organizations. Much like Imperial's (2005) research, organizations within the VSHP use 
interagency databases to make information widely accessible to all participants. The 
coastal geospatial and educational mapping system (GEMS) is funded by the VCZM 
Program and often cited by interviewees as a useful web-based tool. An interviewee 
explains this tool, "Information is housed in one site-the Coastal GEMS program. This 
helps keep the organizations aware of what is going on so we know what the other 
organizations are doing." Organizations can view land use and resource management 
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information through this program. In some instances, the VCZM Program requires 
organizations receiving grant funds to produce a data layer to add into Coastal GEMS. 
Several interviewees explain that this approach encourages organizations to support the 
database and increases organizations' willingness to share information. In addition to 
developing and maintaining Coastal GEMS, the VCZM Program helps organizations 
identify common needs and see the importance in sharing information. 
The Continuum and Organizational Management 
Participants within the VSHP indicate that behaviors within and between member 
organizations support the multiorganizational arrangement. Organizational management 
is categorized as cooperative, coordinative, or collaborative based on the perceptions of 
administrators regarding the variables of incentives, commitment, trust, risk taking, and 
willingness to change. Data collected from interviews and documents are used to place 
each variable along the continuum of interaction. Variables within this construct are 
placed in different areas along the continuum and are presented in Table 4.19. Despite 
this variation, the organizational management construct operates at a collaborative level 
based on the aggregation of elements mentioned. The five variables that characterize 
organizational management are described in more detail in this section. 
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Organizational management is located in the coordinative area of the continuum 
in terms of incentives. More than one third of the elements identified within this variable 
are attributed to the provision of funds through grant contracts. An interview participant 
suggests that money is the carrot that initially brings people to the table. 
The VSHP [i]s an effort to get all the researchers in a particular region working 
together and to fund them to a level so they c[an] achieve significant success in a 
relatively short amount of time and not have to spend all their time chasing 
money. 
Contrary to Jennings' (1994) research, incentives attached to financial provisions are 
emphasized twice as often as incentives linked to leadership support. Incentives based on 
funding are discussed during an interview, 
Having sufficient funding allowfs] us to work better together because we d[o]n't 
have to fight each other. At the end of the day we [a]re able to look at our 
priorities and look at our projects, and since we [ajren't needing to compete for 
the money, we [a]re able to work better together. 
An emphasis on funding rather than leadership support may be explained by the 
independence afforded operational personnel and discretion to determine their 
involvement in the implementation network. In some instances, interviewees seem 
largely removed from the bureaucracy typically associated with government agencies. 
While not emphasized as an incentive for participation, findings from this study 
acknowledge the time and resources middle level organizational leaders commit to the 
VSHP through their involvement on the CPT. Perhaps participants are given increased 
levels of independence and discretion because of support from leaders behind the scenes. 
Organizational management is located at the collaborative end of the continuum 
in terms of commitment. More than one half of the elements identified within this 
variable are attributed to the need to balance individual and collective interests, the 
collective interest serving the organization's individual interests, and the extent to which 
relationships are reciprocated throughout the arrangement. As indicated in the literature 
(see, for example, Mandell & Steelman, 2003; Thomson & Perry, 2006), interviewees 
suggest that there is a need to balance individual and collective interests. While 
organizations involved in implementing the VSHP are committed to the Eastern Shore, 
they are also committed to their individual organizations. An interviewee suggests that 
interactions occur when these interests intersect, "When we see our missions cross, we 
work together. But, we also work independently." Another interviewee adds, "Each 
agency participates within the lines of their mission. So if they don't feel a direct 
connection with their mission it would not be worth their time to continue to participate." 
The literature also suggests that competing interests between the individual organization 
and collective group may create tension (see, for example, Mandell & Steelman, 2003; 
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Thomson & Perry, 2006). High levels of tension are unfounded in this study, and this 
may be because the convener brought specific organizations to the table based on an 
identified need for particular expertise. When convening the group, the VCZM Program 
staff takes into account a need to balance organizational interests. 
In addition, this study indicates that commitment within the VSHP is located at 
the collaborative end of the continuum because the missions of individual organizations 
advance through the collective group. As the literature acknowledges (see, for example, 
Keast et al., 2004; Thomson & Perry, 2006), collaboration occurs between partners 
implementing the VSHP because they can resolve complex environmental problems 
without diminishing their commitments to individual organizations. Interviewees indicate 
that their organizational interests are met while working together. These efforts are 
described by an interview participant, "We are meeting our objectives for resource 
management and land conservation but we are also furthering the whole effort." An 
interviewee acknowledges that individual organizations benefit by working together. 
Beyond the funding opportunities, it gives us the opportunity to do work that we 
otherwise would not be able to do and achieve a part of our mission that would 
otherwise not be possible. It is an opportunity to be successful in a way that would 
be impossible otherwise. It creates opportunities to work with other agencies in a 
way where the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. The benefits transcend 
your first expectations because of the ideas that are generated. 
The VCZM Program staff gives much thought to convening a group of organizations 
whose individual interests are served by the collective interest. In addition, they ensure 
organizations understand how these interests align. 
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Furthermore, relationships between organizations are largely reciprocated within 
the implementation network of the VSHP. High levels of reciprocation are seemingly 
enhanced by personal commitments from the people involved in implementing the 
VSHP. It is evident during interviews that participants feel personally connected to the 
work they do. An interviewee explains this connection, "All the people within these 
organizations care so deeply about the place—every one of them. I can't think of one 
person in that VSHP partnership that I would say is not just deeply and personally 
committed to saving this place and making it better." 
Organizational management is located at the cooperative and collaborative ends 
of the continuum in terms of willingness to change. There is only a one-point difference 
between the elements within cooperation and those within collaboration, and more than 
one third of the elements identified within this variable align with both types of 
interactions. This is important to recognize because in this study the variable operates at 
both ends of the continuum. Perhaps these seemingly dichotomous views can be 
attributed to the extent to which the government sector is involved in the program and the 
design of the CPT. A presence of cooperative elements may be explained when 
considering that more than 70% of interview participants are government employees. 
Government agencies are mandated by specific legal authorities and responsibilities; 
interviewees recognize that their organizational policies are independently established 
and must remain unchanged by the collective arrangement. This independence is 
acknowledged, "[Organizations] have [their] own internal guidelines and state code." If 
changes are in opposition to legal authorities or regulations, organizations are not able to 
make changes. Therefore, the cooperative element within the willingness to change 
variable may be attributed to the strong presence of government organizations and the 
separate legal authorities that guide each organization. 
On the other hand, collaborative elements within the willingness to change 
variable may be attributed to the presence of the CPT. Interviewees indicate that their 
organizations are willing to consider changes to the policies or procedures that govern 
project operations within the field. For example, interviewees mention that changes to 
comprehensive plans, master plans, and research agendas are made as a result of 
activities within the collective arrangement. According to an interview participant, "As 
long as it [i]s something that we have control over as an agency, that isn't mandated from 
somewhere above the agency, and it is reasonable we w[ill] try to work with the Coastal 
Zone Management Program and the Coastal Policy Team to change policies or 
procedures." Another interviewee indicates that his division is always looking for "the 
innovative way of doing something." Discussions during interviews indicate that the 
research being conducted on the seaside of the Eastern Shore can lead to more informed 
management and resource practices. Therefore, organizations are willing to make 
changes to improve operations provided that it is within the boundaries of their legal 
authorities and regulations. 
Organizational management is located at the collaborative end of the continuum 
in terms of trust. More than 85% of the elements identified within this variable indicate 
that there is a history of supportive behavior and long-standing relationships between the 
organizations involved in the VSHP. "A history of supportive interactions sustains and 
legitimizes relationships" element is mentioned more often than any other within the 
entire model. An interviewee explains that many of the players currently involved in 
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implementing the VSHP started working together almost 20 years ago to protect the 
midatlantic migration corridor--a piece of property on the southern tip of the Eastern 
Shore which is an important stopover for migratory songbirds traveling from South and 
Central America to Canada. Another interviewee adds that many of the organizations 
have "worked together long before the VSHP came along." Twenty years later, the 
organizations and people representing these organizations still interact with the VCZM 
Program in significant ways. Discussions during interviews suggest that many personnel 
spend their entire careers on the Eastern Shore. "The secret of success [is] the continuity 
of the personnel over time." Another participant expresses agreement, "And it [is] a very 
stable group. The partners that were in it from the beginning are largely still in it." As a 
result, these organizations seem to have a deep understanding of the resource and other 
organizations involved. 
In addition, a common theme among interviewees is that trust within the 
multiorganizational arrangement operates at the collaborative end of the continuum 
because organizations work together in a variety of ways. Discussion during an interview 
reveals that organizations often interact for purposes outside the program's boundaries. 
Most of the folks working on the VSHP know each other from other things in the 
past and will continue to work together in other venues as well. These are 
overlapping organizations and groups that work together for different reasons. So 
[the VSHP] is one thing that pulls them together but it is not the only thing that 
pulls certain people to the tables. 
For example, the Southern Tip Partnership is comprised of a subset of organizations 
involved in implementing the VSHP. This group focuses on acquiring and preserving 
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land on the southern tip of the Eastern Shore. Other subgroups include the Birding and 
Wildlife Festival Committee, the Coastal Virginia Wildlilfe Observatory, the Eastern 
Shore Environmental Council, the Watershed Network, and the Avian Partnership. In this 
study, many of the same partners work together in different capacities and have done so 
for a number of years. 
The findings suggest that high levels of trust play an important role in creating 
and sustaining collaborative interactions for two reasons. First, participants indicate that 
they feel comfortable with other members of the group because they know their partners 
will help them achieve the project's deliverables. Building this level of comfort is 
described during an interview, 
Trust is built through successful accomplishment of various projects that we work 
on and positive reinforcement. We build because we are at a point where we 
know the person will be there and they will follow through. Actions speak louder 
than words when working together. 
As a result, trust allows organizations to rely on one another. This reliance is especially 
important in collaborative interactions because partners cannot individually achieve the 
same goals. An interview participant explains this reliance among researchers, 
In order to relate projects and do ecosystem wide research, you have to believe 
that other projects have value and that the research is trustworthy and that the 
people doing it know what they are doing. You can't go back and pick through the 
nitty gritty of their whole project, because you have to focus on yours. So that 
level of trust is vital to this system-wide approach. 
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These findings suggest that organizations involved in implementing the VSHP employ 
the "ethic of collaboration" discussed by Thomson and Perry (2006, p. 25). Interviewees 
indicate that they believe their partners are committed to the collective arrangement and 
will work in good faith with other organizations. 
Second, trust plays an important role in creating and sustaining collaborative 
interactions because people become involved on a personal level. An interviewee 
discusses this personal involvement, "It is the fact that you see these folks all the time. 
The fact that it is a small landscape, very stable staff—people are here for a long time." As 
people learn more about one another, they know whom to call when they need help. 
Another interviewee attributes the development of personal relationships to the longevity 
of the network. "After years of working with one another, you are no longer just working 
with an organizational face, but with a specific individual. The partnership evolves from 
an organizational relationship into a more personal relationship. You know who you need 
to call about certain things." 
In addition to perceiving high levels of trust among partners within the network, 
interviewees suggest that they also feel high levels of trust with the VCZM Program. An 
interviewee explains this relationship, "The Coastal Zone Management Program has a 
long history on the Eastern Shore so this [i]s building upon or a reinvestment on past 
investments." Although sometimes outside the scope of the VSHP, the staff of the VCZM 
Program spends a great deal of time working with these same organizations. This 
suggests that high levels of trust between partnering organizations and the convening 
organization are needed to sustain collaborative interactions. As is suggested in the 
literature (see, for example, Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006), high levels of trust are 
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generated when organizations work together for long periods of time. For the VSHP, 
these organizations have worked together for 20 years to develop this high level of trust. 
Organizational management is located at the cooperative end of the continuum in 
terms of risk taking. More than 85% of the elements identified within this variable 
suggest that there are low levels of risk associated with working together. An interviewee 
makes the following point pertaining to risk within the VSHP, 
There isn't really a risk involved. Each of us has the same objectives and goals. 
We are in the same arena. What the agency is really trying to accomplish works 
well for all of us. . . . It behooves us to jump in and work together and help 
everyone. It is a benefit. It is another means to get where we need to be. 
Another interviewee suggests, "[Risk] is minimal. Working together is helpful." High 
levels of risk based on dependency between organizations may be mitigated by long-
standing relationships and a history that develops over a great deal of time. 
The presence of these mitigating factors may explain this study's emphasis on low 
levels of risk. The relationship between risk and trust is described during an interview, 
"The risk is fairly low. And the trust is fairly high." Although the literature indicates that 
collaborative interactions involve high levels of risk (see, for example, Keast et al., 
2004), this assertion is unfounded in this study. Long-standing relationships and high 
levels of trust are prerequisites for sustaining collaborative interactions. Despite the 
creation of dependencies between organizations, the likelihood of entering into a risky 
relationship seems far-fetched. An interviewee reveals how risk is minimized within the 
multiorganizational arrangement, "There are hard decisions to make, but the hesitancy is 
less when there are 20 other organizations standing with you saying that they agree and 
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this needs to be done. And we show up for each other." These findings further support the 
removal of the risk taking variable from the final version of the MIM. 
Summary of Findings and Analysis 
Based on the data collected through interviews and documents, administrators 
perceive interactions between organizations involved in the VSHP to be collaborative in 
nature. In this study, the interorganizational policy objective, interorganizational 
infrastructure, interorganizational procedures, and the organizational management 
constructs of the MIM are all found to operate at the collaborative end of the continuum 
of interaction. Outcomes from this research are used to analyze the implementation 
network, movement of multiorganizational relationships on the continuum of interaction, 
reconciliation of the top-down/bottom-up approaches to implementation, 
multiorganizational implementation strategies, and the application of collaborative 
interactions during policy implementation. 
The Implementation Network 
Outcomes from this study are used to analyze interactions between organizations 
implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. These interactions are explored by 
asking each interviewee the following question: "What organizations do you most closely 
work with to implement the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program?" When applicable, 
interview responses are corroborated with information in documents. An interview 
participant describes the multiorganizational arrangement as "a smorgasbord of 

































































































































































































In the diagram of the VSHP implementation network, circles are used to represent 
participating organizations. In some instances, organizations are represented by more 
than one circle. This determination was based on an organization fulfilling one of the 
following factors: (1) multiple divisions within one organization are highly involved in 
the VSHP; (2) multiple divisions within one organization are represented separately on 
the Coastal Policy Team (CPT); or (3) multiple divisions within one organization are 
located in distinctly different geographic locations. Two types of arrows are used to 
convey interactions. Thick arrows represent interactions between the VCZM Program 
and organizations represented on the CPT. Thin arrows represent interactions between the 
VCZM Program and organizations not represented on the CPT. Thin arrows are also used 
to represent interactions between organizations that do not include the VCZM Program. 
Interviewees suggest that the strength of these interactions lie in their equality. When 
organizations interact to implement the VSHP administrators perceive these relationships 
to be of equal importance. These perceptions further emphasize that personnel involved 
in the VSHP see themselves as working among partners of equal status. 
Mapping multiorganizational interactions is important because it helps identify 
organizations that play central roles during implementation of the VSHP. Although the 
diagram of the implementation network is not spatially oriented, organizations that play 
central roles are identified by looking at the number of connections they have with other 
organizations in the network. The organizations more central to the program's 
implementation are those with more arrows connecting them to other organizations. 
The relative centrality of organizations within the implementation network is 
determined by comparing the number of organizational connections. Figure 4.2 is a 
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spatial diagram that illustrates the results of this comparison. Organizations most central 
to the implementation network are the Department of Environmental Quality, Virginia 
Marine Resource Commission, Eastern Shorekeeper, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 
Department of Conservation and Recreation, The Nature Conservancy, College of 
William and Mary, and Department of Game and Inland Fisheries. Federal/state agencies 
and nonprofit organizations comprise the majority of organizations within the core of the 
implementation network. Private organizations and local governments comprise the 
majority of organizations within the periphery. 
Figure 4.2 
Relative Centrality of Organizations in the Implementation Network 
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Perhaps the centrality of these organizations can be better understood when 
looking at the missions of the organizations involved. The centrality of federal/state 
agencies is not surprising given that they are required by executive order to participate in 
the VCZM Program in some capacity (Kaine, 2006). Evidence that this network operates 
beyond command-and-control authority comes from the centrality of nonprofit 
organizations. It is not a coincidence that the missions of The Nature Conservancy and 
Eastern Shorekeeper align holistically with the goals of the VSHP. Centralized roles 
within the implementation network are occupied by organizations whose missions most 
align with the goals of the program or policy. This finding suggests that collaborative 
interactions require mission alignment among organizations operating within the core of 
the implementation network. In addition, a common theme among interviewees is that 
nonprofit organizations play an important role in implementing the VSHP because they 
can operate in ways, and at speeds, that public organizations are unable to achieve. The 
presence of nonprofit organizations within the core of the network may be essential in 
developing and sustaining collaborative interactions. 
Movement on the Continuum of Interaction 
Data from this study are used to explore empirically the movement of 
multiorganizational relationships on the continuum of interaction. The following themes 
regarding the movement of these interactions emerge during analysis: (1) organizations 
appear to operate in some degree along all points of the continuum; (2) placement along 
the continuum may vary based on organizational function; and (3) relationships between 
organizations do not necessarily progress in a linear manner along the continuum. 
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First, data from this study does not support the assumption within the education 
literature that effective interactions between organizations are those in which the type of 
interaction is aligned throughout all aspects of the arrangement (see, for example, 
Thatcher, 2007). Although the aggregated presence of elements indicates that the 
implementation network operates at the collaborative end of the continuum for all four of 
the model's constructs, this pattern does not hold throughout the analysis of each 
interview and document. This suggests that organizations do not operate consistently 
within one type of interaction to the exclusion of all others. In fact, all three types of 
interactions are identified in 88% of interviews conducted for this study. 
This also suggests that different organizations within the collective arrangement 
may use different types of interactions when working together. Of all the interactions 
between organizations, more than one quarter of them are between organizations that do 
not reciprocate the same type of interaction. Therefore, organizations may work together 
to implement policy but they may rely on different types of interactions to do so. For 
example, almost 90% of interviewees represent federal/state agencies and perceive 
collaborative interactions between organizations involved in implementing the VSHP. 
Data from this study indicates that 70% of federal/state agencies implementing the VSHP 
interact with local governments or nongovernmental organizations. However, only 25% 
of interviewees representing local governments and a little less than 50% of interviewees 
representing nongovernmental organizations perceive collaborative interactions between 
the organizations involved in implementing the VSHP. In this study, each local 
government and nongovernmental organization works with at least one federal/state 
agency during implementation. 
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Interactions that are not reciprocated may be explained when considering the 
centrality of organizations within the implementation network. Interactions between 
organizations with centralized roles seem to be reciprocated as collaborative in nature. In 
many instances interactions are not reciprocated when organizations with centralized 
roles work with organizations that do not have centralized roles. In these instances, 
organizations central to the network seem to interact at a collaborative level while 
organizations less central to the network do not. This finding suggests that organizations 
central to the implementation network are more likely to perceive interactions to operate 
at the collaborative end of the continuum. 
Second, data from this study suggests that the placement of an organization's 
interactions on the continuum may vary by function. For example, an interviewee 
explains that a particular organization's placement on the continuum of interaction is 
perceived to be in the coordinative area for administrative matters such as the exchange 
of money or the arrangement of meetings. However, this same organization is perceived 
to operate toward the collaborative end of the continuum when making decisions 
pertaining to the VSHP. While not always stated explicitly, this pattern emerges 
throughout other interviews. Participants directly involved with projects funded through 
grant money are more likely to mention elements associated with the coordinative area of 
the continuum. On the other hand, participants involved in the collective decision making 
process of the CPT are more likely to mention elements associated with the collaborative 
end of the continuum. This finding suggests that personnel representing the same 
organization may perceive interactions differently depending on the functions they are 
involved in. 
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Third, data from this study suggests that relationships between organizations do 
not necessarily progress in a linear manner along the continuum. In 38% of the 
interviews, there is a nonlinear distribution of interactions along the continuum. These 
instances occur in the following two scenarios: (1) the number of elements associated 
with cooperative and collaborative interactions is higher than the number of elements 
associated with coordinative interactions; or (2) the number of elements associated with 
coordinative interactions is higher than the number of elements associated with 
cooperative or collaborative interactions. When aggregating the mention of elements in 
the interorganizational procedures and organizational management constructs of the 
MIM, the number of elements associated with cooperative and collaborative interactions 
are higher than the number of elements associated with coordinative interactions. In these 
constructs, more elements are linked to both ends of the continuum rather than creating a 
linear progression along the continuum. 
The nonlinearity of these relationships may be explained when considering the 
maturity of relationships between organizations involved in the VSHP. It seems 
reasonable to suggest that a more linear progression along the continuum may occur in 
the beginning stages of the relationship as organizations become increasingly more 
interdependent. These findings suggest that once a relationship matures, 
multiorganizational relationships may move on the continuum to ensure operations align 
with the type of interaction needed to achieve the program's goals. Due to the amount of 
time and resources associated with collaboration, this type of interaction does not 
continue unless it is needed. 
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Reconciling Approaches to Implementation 
This study supports the use of multiorganizational arrangements during policy 
implementation. Since administrators indicate that they continue to face resource 
shortages and complex problems, it is likely that multiorganizational arrangements will 
continue to be used in implementation. Therefore, the findings suggest that theorists may 
move beyond the top-down/bottom-up debate while acknowledging the strengths of each 
approach in two ways: (1) by focusing on the interactions within multiorganizational 
arrangements; and (2) by recognizing that multiorganizational implementation action 
occurs by linking organizations through middle level personnel. 
First, the two approaches historically used to approach implementation may be 
reconciled by focusing on multiorganizational interactions. The reason for this is that the 
variables within the MIM move along the continuum of interaction without being 
inhibited by the set of assumptions that guide either approach to implementation. Since 
the MIM considers both approaches to be equally relevant in exploring interactions 
between organizations, competition between the two approaches is unnecessary. For 
example, the impetus for collective action variable within the policy objective construct 
of the MIM has elements associated with the top-down and bottom-up approaches, but 
these elements are placed along different points of the continuum. At the cooperative end 
of the continuum, organizations initiate collective action because it helps build capacity 
within their world of work. Since these actions are typically initiated at the lower levels 
of the organization, this element may be associated with the bottom-up approach to 
implementation. As this variable moves along the continuum of interaction, more 
emphasis is placed on the top-down approach. Within the coordinative areas of the 
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continuum, collective action is typically initiated through legislative mandates or grant 
contracts. An emphasis on policy mandates may be associated with the top-down 
approach to implementation. Despite this variable containing elements associated with 
competing implementation approaches, neither is assumed to be more important because 
each aligns with a different type of interaction. 
This point is further conveyed as the variable moves toward the collaborative end 
of the continuum where collective action is initiated because no single organization can 
accomplish the task individually. At this point in the continuum, the top-down/bottom-up 
debate does not seem applicable. Regardless of the controls administered from the top or 
the dynamics occurring at the bottom of single organizations, interactions between 
organizations are needed to accomplish the task. Therefore, the top down/bottom-up 
debate becomes less important as interactions move toward the collaborative end of the 
continuum. 
Second, data from this study suggest that the top-down and bottom-up approaches 
to implementation may be reconciled by recognizing that multiorganizational 
implementation action occurs by horizontally linking organizations through middle level 
personnel. Findings from this study support this assertion. Multiorganizational 
implementation within the VSHP emphasizes linking organizations through a horizontal 
structure in which all representatives are partners of equal status. Even though 
hierarchically structured government organizations represent 60% of the organizations 
participating in this implementation network, interactions between organizations involved 
in the VSHP are overwhelmingly collaborative. This finding suggests that participants 
involved in the VSHP transcend the hierarchical structures within their individual 
181 
organizations and associate themselves with the horizontal structures of the collective 
arrangement. Two types of horizontal structures are used to establish linkages within the 
multiorganizational arrangement. 
One type of horizontal structure within the VSHP comes from the CPT. 
Representatives from state and local governments participate in this group and make 
programmatic decisions to guide the program's overall direction. State agency 
representatives, who make up 83% of the CPT members involved in the VSHP, are 
resource administrators or mangers selected to participate by the head of their agency. 
Pooling field level expertise through the creation of an executive steering 
committee creates a second type of horizontal structure in the VSHP. The people 
involved in this committee occupy operational positions and often spearhead projects 
associated with the VSHP. Their expertise is widely acknowledged by interviewees who 
hold positions on the CPT. These interviewees indicate that personnel making decisions 
at operational levels have 20 to 30 years experience in studying the ecosystems on the 
Eastern Shore. The use of the CPT and executive steering committee facilitates the 
involvement of two levels of personnel from each state agency - resource administrators 
and operational project leaders. Representatives on the CPT typically supervise the 
project leaders on the executive steering committee. Both levels of personnel operate 
within the middle levels of their organizations. Neither the resource administrators nor 
the project leaders are at the very top or very bottom of their organizational structures. 
These findings suggest that multiorganizational implementation requires the development 
of horizontal connections within the collective arrangement in addition to the vertical 
connections within individual organizations. Furthermore, multiorganizational 
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implementation may be optimal when horizontal connections are established at more than 
one level and when these connections are made between personnel occupying positions at 
the middle levels of organizations. 
Multiorganizational implementation within the VSHP also emphasizes the 
involvement of middle level personnel when it comes to making decisions. Based on the 
self-description from an interviewee, resource administrators on the CPT are considered 
"midlevel managers" when looking at their relative placement within individual agencies. 
Participants of the CPT see themselves as the right people to be involved in the program 
because they can quickly disseminate information throughout the organization when 
needed, and they can inform agency directors when problems arise at the operational 
level. Therefore, these personnel bridge gaps between the top and bottom of their 
respective organizations. They are perfectly situated to generate implementation action 
because they are high enough to commit resources to the collective effort and low enough 
to be aware of operational issues. Several interviews explain that the strength of the 
VCZM Program is based on the involvement of personnel who have the discretion to 
direct resources from their individual agencies towards projects aligned with the VSHP. 
Interviewees who serve as members of the CPT suggest that they make programmatic 
decisions and direct organizational resources based on feedback from personnel at the 
operational level. 
Involvement of middle level managers in the implementation network is also seen 
in the distribution of financial resources. The VCZM Program Manager, who holds a 
middle level position in the Department of Environmental Quality, makes decisions 
regarding the distribution of grant funds and provides a significant source of leadership to 
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the horizontal structures within the implementation network. This suggests that 
leadership within networks may come from personnel with positions in the middle of 
their organization's structure rather than from those at the top. 
It appears that the nexus of the top-down/bottom-up approaches to 
implementation occurs because connections are made between middle level personnel 
across different organizations who couple the two approaches. They convey the policy 
mandate to those at the operational level, they ensure top management is aware of 
operational problems, and they make resource decisions that comply with the policy 
mandate while supporting operational needs. The involvement of middle level personnel 
is described by an interviewee, 
What ends up functionally occurring is that in the middle is where everything 
happens. That is true for people. The people at the top get called when something 
goes wrong or when there is political pressure. The people at the bottom don't 
necessarily have all the connections yet. So they might be good working one on 
one. But they aren't the people who ensure that the funding stays in place. [This 
occurs through] the people in the middle. 
Another interview participant associates the program's success with the involvement of 
resource administrators. ".. .one of the more effective aspects of [the program is] that the 
people directly responsible for management of resources pretty much get to decide where 
we get to provide our focus without a whole lot of political oversight." Agreement is 
expressed by another interviewee, 
The Coastal Policy Team is comprised of the right level of people. We are at the 
right level in the organization where we can quickly disseminate top-down if a 
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particular problem or program policy arises. We are able to quickly get that down 
into the organization because it is one of our primary responsibilities. But it works 
just as well the other way. If a problem or need is identified at the program level 
or a solution comes to light, we are just as easy to talk to the chief deputy or the 
director at any time. 
These findings suggest that utilizing multiorganizational implementation may be most 
conducive when the following conditions are met: (1) middle level managers are 
involved; (2) these managers have the discretion to allocate organizational resources to 
collective efforts; and (3) these managers have the expertise and time to understand 
issues at the operational level. 
Multiorganizational Implementation Strategies 
The findings from this study suggest that theoretical understanding of policy 
implementation in multiorganizational arrangements may be improved through the 
exploration of a range of interactions. Through the use of the MIM, this study is the first 
to link cooperation, coordination, and collaboration collectively to multiorganizational 
implementation. By looking at the entire continuum of interactions, researchers are better 
able to identify the conditions under which it is appropriate to use a particular type of 
interaction as an implementation strategy. These conditions may be identified by looking 
at the elements most emphasized within each type of interaction. The presence of certain 
activities, such as those described in Table 4.20, provide some of the conditions in which 
it may be appropriate to utilize a particular type of interaction. For example, if dialogue 
can be maintained through informal relationships then cooperative interactions may be an 
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appropriate implementation strategy to use. On the other hand, if legislative mandates or 
grant contracts are needed to enhance cohesion then coordinative interactions may be an 
appropriate implementation strategy to use. Furthermore, if there is a history of 
supportive behavior or long-standing relationships then collaborative interactions may be 
an appropriate implementation strategy to use. 
Table 4.20 
Implementation Strategies - Elements Most Emphasized in Each Type of Interaction 
Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 
Dialogue maintained through 
informal relationships 
Informally work together to 
achieve individual goals 
Legislative mandate or grant 
contracts enhance cohesion or 
minimize duplication 
Resources may be provided 
through mandate or grant 
arrangements 
Interest of individual organization Linkages are mobilized because 
paramount compatible mission areas 
mutually increase abilities to 
achieve individual goals 
Independent; possible to 
accomplish the task individually 
Work completed as part of 
regular job responsibilities 
Mechanisms, such as contractual 
or nonfinanical agreements, 
formalize relationships 
Statutes or grant contracts 
provide funding 
History of supportive behavior or 
long-standing relationships 
A lead agency or convener brings 
relevant stakeholders together 
Complementary interests in 
attaining mutual goals 
Participative decision making 
through consensus and 
compromise 
Understanding is enhanced by a 
willingness to share information 
about organizations which may 
include what can/cannot be 
offered to the collective group 
Collaborative Interactions during Implementation 
Findings from this study reiterate that collaboration is not appropriate for use in 
all situations. Participants stress that interactions between partners involved in 
implementing the VSHP require great amounts of time and resources to sustain. The 
conditions identified within the literature as being conducive for collaboration are 
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supported by this research. In this study, 44% of interviewees indicate that there is a 
sense of environmental crisis; 50% of interviewees recognize that their organizational 
responsibilities towards coastal management on the Eastern Shore interconnect with those 
of other organizations; and 76% of interviewees indicate that organizations have mutual 
interests. Furthermore, over 80%> of interview participants mention the importance of 
trust between partners. This suggests that the development of trust between organizations 
is another condition that may determine the extent to which a situation lends itself to 
collaborative interactions. Relationships between partners involved in implementing the 
VSHP are enhanced by 20 years of working together. Therefore, collaborative 
interactions should not be expected to develop quickly or easily because they take great 
effort from all organizations involved. Findings from this study confirm that certain 
circumstances are more conducive to collaborative interactions. 
Analysis of Initiation of Interactions 
Variables within the MIM are analyzed to address the following research 
question: How are multiorganizational interactions initiated? This research question 
guides inquiry into whether interactions are initiated formally through legislative mandate 
or agency rulemaking, informally through street-level experience or common interests, or 
a combination of both. As textual data are collected from interviews and documents, the 
researcher uses content analysis to organize the data into categories of the prestructured 
coding scheme. Elements in the impetus for collective action variable within the 
interorganizational policy objective construct and the formality of the agreement variable 
within the interorganizational infrastructure construct are explored to respond to this 
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research question. The following two questions are asked during interviews: (1) What 
brought the organizations together to implement the VSHP? (2) How are the roles and 
responsibilities for each participating organization determined? 
Analysis of Formally Initiated Interactions 
Textual data from interviews and documents suggest that organizational 
interactions are formally initiated and sustained within the VSHP. The two elements 
within the MIM that speak to the formality of interactions are identified in Table 4.21. 
Formal interactions within the VSHP are most prevalent when participants speak of grant 
contracts. As money changes hands, clear roles and responsibilities are delineated for the 
organization awarded the grant. Due to an emphasis on creating horizontal linkages and 
involving middle level personnel, the accountability mechanisms typically generated by 
bureaucratic organizations do not appear in multiorganizational arrangements. Therefore, 
these formalized interactions fill an important gap in creating accountability mechanisms 
for the grantee. 
Table 4.21 
Elements in the Multiorganizational Implementation Model - Formally Initiated 
Variable # of people/
 # r f % of people/ 
.^. ., Element of Formal documents , ^ documents 
within the
 T ... ,. , . , .._ , documents , . , ,._ , 
, , „ , Initiation who identified . , who identified MIM . . reviewed , 
element element 
Impetus for Legislative mandate or grant 
Collective contracts enhance cohesion or „„ ,„ ^,„ 
A
 +- • • • A v +- 27 42 64% 
Action minimize duplication 
Formality of Mechanisms, such as 
the contractual or nonfinancial 
Agreement agreements, formalize 
relationships 
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The prevalence of formal interactions is consistent with much of the empirical 
inquiry within the multiorganizational implementation literature (see, for example, Hall 
& O'Toole, 2004; O'Toole, 1995). However, much of this literature focuses on 
interactions initiated by policy mandate, agency rulemaking, or organizational 
procedures. More specifically, the literature focuses on the extent to which policies 
identify organizational partners, policy characteristics that induce or constrain 
interdependence, or the structures used in multiorganizational implementation (see, for 
example, Hall & O'Toole, 2004; May, 1995; Raelin, 1982). Some organizational 
documents pertaining to the VSHP identify multiorganizational partners and the presence 
of the CPT, but these documents do not make any specifications regarding the ways in 
which organizations should work together. In this study, interviewees do not perceive 
formal interactions to be initiated through the methods specified in the literature. For 
example, not one interview participant cites a policy mandate as the impetus for 
organizations working together. Instead, 64% of interview transcriptions and documents 
indicate that interactions are initiated through grant contracts. An interviewee describes 
the relationship between funding and multiorganizational interactons, "Partnering 
happens as a result of funding. It gives us something to work with." Another participant 
expresses agreement, "The money initially br[ings] all of us together." Findings from this 
study suggest that formal interactions are initiated by grant contracts rather than policy 
mandates, agency rulemaking, or organizational procedures. 
Another 43% of the interview transcriptions and documents indicate that roles are 
formalized through grant contracts. The formalization of roles is revealed during an 
interview, "Our roles for a particular project are defined by the terms of the grant. As a 
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grantee, our role is clear. We have a grant document that we agree to and we have to live 
up to those terms." Discussion during another interview reveals, "There are certain rules 
stipulated within the grant contracts." An example of this formalization of roles can be 
seen in the relationship between the VCZM Program and the PDCs. Each year, the 
VCZM Program provides a grant fund to each of the PDCs. Along with this grant money, 
the staff of the VCZM Program identifies a minimum standard for what each PDC has to 
do in return for these funds. For example, they are required to conduct quarterly meetings 
and training sessions with local government administrators. According to an interviewee, 
these requirements "provide the conduit for flow of information from the state through 
the PDC to the localities and just as importantly from the localities back up to the state." 
These findings align with the research conducted by Van de Ven and Walker (1984) and 
suggest that interdependencies generated through financial resources rely on a formal 
approach to interaction. 
Analysis of Informally Initiated Interactions 
Textual data from interviews and documents suggest that organizational 
interactions are also informally initiated and sustained within the VSHP. The two 
elements within the MIM that speak to the informality of interactions are identified in 
Table 4.22. Informal interactions within the VSHP are most prevalent when participants 
speak of working with peers to enhance their abilities to achieve organizational goals. 
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Table 4.22 
Elements within the Multiorganizational Implementation Model - Informally Initiated 
Variable # of people/
 # r f % of people/ 
... .
 xl Element of Informal documents , . documents within the
 T ... .. . . . ,._ , documents . . . .._ . 
, „ , , Initiation who identified . . who identified MIM . . reviewed , 
element element 
Impetus for Voluntarily initiate collective 
Collective action because helpful to world . .~
 1A0/ 
. . .
 r , 4 42 1U /o Action oi work 
Formality of Informally work together to 
the achieve individual goals 17 42 40% 
Agreement 
Informal interactions occur among the organizations involved in the VSHP, but 
they seem to be less prevalent than the formal interactions induced by grant contracts. 
Consistent with the research conducted by Van de Ven and Walker (1984), ad hoc 
relationships are identified in this study when partners align resources. An interviewee 
explains the presence of informal relationships, "The Coastal Zone Management Program 
officially pull[s] us all together. But we all started talking together informally long before 
we came up with the nuts and bolts of it." A common theme among discussions during 
interviews is that operational personnel become involved in the VSHP for two reasons: 
(1) they are asked by another partner; or (2) they think it will be beneficial to their world 
of work. 
First, field level personnel often work on projects associated with the VSHP 
because other partners pull them in. An interviewee describes these connections within 
the multiorganizational arrangement, "Organizations are pulled in as necessary by 
working through the Coastal Policy Team. They are contacted when needed." Another 
interviewee explains, "A partner recently called me and asked if we wanted to be 
involved in a particular project. I called the Coastal Zone Management Program and 
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asked if they wanted to jump in on this as well." Discussion during another interview 
suggests that these contacts are possible because of long-standing relationships and 
information sharing among partners. "Having those long standing relationships really 
helps in terms of pulling the partners together. The partners themselves pull in extra 
people when they need to." It is important that personnel involved in the VSHP 
understand the mission and interests of other organizations because a high level of 
understanding helps them know who to call. 
Second, operational personnel become involved in the collective arrangement 
because it is beneficial to their world of work. This theme is prevalent during interviews. 
An interview participant indicates that organizations become involved in the VSHP 
because it creates opportunities to utilize expertise and research in new ways. 
Our involvement came from us. We ha[ve] been working on Phragmites since the 
mid 1990s. For us, it seem[s] that it [i]s an opportunity to work on Phragmites in a 
place that is high priority for us and to go at it in a manner that we ha[ve] not had 
an opportunity before. 
Summary of Findings and Analysis 
The data suggests that interactions between organizations involved in 
implementing the VSHP are initiated formally and informally. The findings from this 
research are important for two reasons: (1) multiorganizational policy implementation 
occurs in part through informal relationships; and (2) a majority of interviews perceive 
formalized interactions to be initiated through grant contracts. First, this study is the first 
to acknowledge that multiorganizational policy implementation occurs in part through 
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informal relationships. Although informally initiated interactions are less prevalent 
during implementation of the VSHP, their presence is important because it suggests that 
interactions are initiated in ways other than the current body of literature explores. In 
addition, the presence of informally initiated interactions during multiorganizational 
implementation suggests that a top-down approach does not fully capture relationships 
that occur outside the boundaries of operational authority. 
Second, a majority of interviews perceive formalized interactions to be initiated 
through grant contracts. The literature emphasizes formalized interactions deliberately 
configured through policy mandates, agency rulemaking, or organizational procedures. 
Although interactions are formally initiated, the findings from this study suggest that the 
literature's approach to formalized interactions may need to be reconsidered. Interactions 
within the VSHP are not necessarily the result of policy mandates, agency rulemaking, or 
organizational procedures. Despite the presence of a policy mandate encouraging 
organizations to work together, not one interviewee cites this mandate as the impetus for 
collective action. Instead, 64% of interviews and documents indicate that interactions are 
initiated through grant contracts. 
Overview of Findings 
This chapter explores the three research questions that guide this study by 
analyzing textual data gathered through 34 interviews and the review of eight documents. 
Three conclusions are drawn from this analysis: (1) the MIM helps explain interactions in 
this policy implementation setting; (2) administrators perceive interactions within the 
multiorganizational arrangement to operate at the collaborative end of the continuum 
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when implementing policy; and (3) interactions within this multiorganizational 
arrangement are initiated formally and informally. The next chapter summarizes the 
research conducted for this study. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Overview 
This research focuses on interactions between government and nongovernmental 
organizations involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program (VSHP) 
on Virginia's Eastern Shore. The beginning of this chapter summarizes the study's 
research. This is followed by responses to the study's three research questions and a 
discussion of contributions to theoretical inquiry. Recommendations are made for future 
research and limitations are acknowledged. 
Summary of Research 
The purpose of this research is to explore interactions between organizations 
when working together to implement policy. The Multiorganizational Implementation 
Model (MIM) is presented as the theoretical basis for exploring the use of cooperation, 
coordination, and collaboration between government and nongovernmental organizations 
during implementation of the VSHP. This study is important because it marks the first 
time that a model linking the policy implementation and interorganizational theory 
literatures is used to explore empirically different types of interactions. 
The following three research questions guide exploration in this study: (1) Does 
the MIM help explain interactions in a policy implementation setting? (2) How do 
administrators perceive the use of cooperation, coordination, or collaboration when 
working in a multiorganizational arrangement to implement policy? (3) How are 
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multiorganizational interactions initiated? A single case study design is used to address 
these research questions. Therefore, interactions between organizations are explored by 
looking at the utility of the MIM, the perceived use of different types of interactions 
during policy implementation, and the ways in which these interactions are initiated. 
Data are collected in two ways: (1) semistructured interviews with individuals 
involved in implementing the VSHP; and (2) a review of organizational documents that 
provide further insight into interactions during multiorganizational policy 
implementation. Specifically, 34 semistructured interviews with individuals involved in 
implementing the VSHP and eight organizational documents are reviewed to respond to 
the study's three research questions. Interview participants are selected using a snowball 
sampling strategy; they represent 15 organizations from federal/state agencies, local 
governments, and nongovernmental organizations. Documents are selected based on their 
relation to the policy mandate, implementation of the mandate, or interactions with other 
organizations. These data collection strategies are appropriate for this research because 
interviews facilitate exploration of multiple views through information-rich data while 
document review is particularly useful for exploring the context in which interactions 
occur, the history of interactions between organizations, and the formality in which 
interactions are initiated. The use of both strategies creates opportunities to explore 
multiorganizational interactions in different ways. 
Content analysis is used to analyze the textual data collected from interviews and 
organizational documents based on a predetermined coding scheme aligned with the 
operationalizations of the theoretical model. Efforts are made to identify patterns that the 
MIM does not account for. The findings that emerge from data analysis suggest the 
following responses to the three research questions that guide this inquiry: (1) the 
Multiorganizational Implementation Model helps explain interactions between the 
organizations working together to implement the VSHP; (2) a majority of administrators 
perceive the multiorganizational arrangement to operate at the collaborative end of the 
continuum of interaction; and (3) interactions between partners involved in the VSHP are 
initiated in formal and informal ways. The findings from this study are summarized by 
research question and further discussed in this section. 
The Multiorganizational Implementation Model 
This study is guided by a research question that focuses on the helpfulness of the 
Multiorganizational Implementation Model (MIM) in explaining interactions in a policy 
implementation setting. A response to this question is formulated by organizing textual 
data into the categories of a predetermined coding scheme aligned with the model's 
operationalizations. Elements aligned with each of the following four constructs of the 
model are mentioned in interviews and documents: interorganizational policy objective, 
interorganizational infrastructure, interorganizational procedures, and organizational 
management. 
Alignment between the data's empirical patterns and the model's theoretical 
patterns suggest that the revised model is helpful in explaining interactions between 
organizations during multiorganizational implementation. Authenticity for the MIM is 
established in two ways. First, more than 92% of the elements introduced in the model 
are identified in this study. These elements operationalize the variables within the MIM 
and align with the policy implementation and interorganizational theory literatures. 
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Suggestions are made in Chapter Four to address eight elements from the model that are 
not identified in interviews or documents. One half of these elements are removed from 
the final version of the model while the other half of the elements remain for further 
research. Second, authenticity for the model is further established as all patterns 
identified in interviews and documents fit into one of the categories established in the 
predetermined coding scheme. Although an opportunity to gather competing evidence is 
given, interviewees do not mention factors that are not already captured within the MIM. 
Interactions during Multiorganizational Implementation 
This study explores a second research question pertaining to how administrators 
perceive the use of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration when working in a 
multiorganizational arrangement to implement policy. The perceived use of these 
interaction terms in this study are determined by organizing the data into the categories of 
the predetermined coding scheme aligned with the operationalizations of the MIM. 
Elements align with each of the following three types of interactions: cooperation, 
coordination, and collaboration. 
Interactions between organizations involved in implementing the VSHP are 
perceived to be highly collaborative in both interviews and documents. In this study, the 
interorganizational policy objective, interorganizational infrastructure, interorganizational 
procedures, and organizational management constructs of the MIM are all found to 
operate at the collaborative end of the continuum of interaction. Despite a policy mandate 
that requires organizations to work together on coastal zone issues and the presence of 
documents intending to formalize multiorganizational relationships, elements associated 
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with collaborative interactions are emphasized twice as often as elements associated with 
cooperation or coordination. This study supports the assertion that theorists may reconcile 
the top-down/bottom-up approaches by focusing on interactions within 
multiorganizational arrangements. Progress towards a fourth generation of 
implementation research is made by recognizing that implementation action occurs by 
linking organizations through middle level personnel. Administrators implementing the 
VSHP perceive interactions between organizations to operate beyond formalized 
mechanisms at an overwhelmingly collaborative level. This finding is especially 
interesting because government organizations represent a majority of the organizations 
involved in this study. It suggests that multiorganizational implementation requires the 
development of horizontal connections between organizations in addition to vertical 
connections within organizations. Government employees transcend highly centralized 
and hierarchical structures to create and sustain horizontal linkages between 
organizations. In this study, linkages develop across organizational boundaries through 
middle level personnel. Implementation action occurs because these personnel are 
perfectly situated to commit resources to the collective effort while being aware of 
operational issues. Multiorganizational implementation is optimal when organizations are 
horizontally linked through middle level personnel at multiple levels. 
In addition, elements associated with each of the three types of interactions are 
identified in this study. Although interactions between organizations implementing the 
VSHP are collaborative, elements associated with cooperative and coordinative 
interactions are also identified. Two themes regarding the movement of interactions 
between organizations on the continuum emerge. First, organizations appear to operate in 
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some degree along all points of the continuum. Relationships between organizations do 
not operate consistently within one type of interaction to the exclusion of all others; all 
three types of interactions are identified in a majority of the interviews. As organizations 
work together to implement policy, they rely on different types of interactions. Second, 
the perceived placement of multiorganizational interactions along the continuum may 
vary based on organizational function. Participants directly involved with projects funded 
through grant money are more likely to mention elements associated with the 
coordinative area of the continuum while participants involved in the collective decision 
making process of the Coastal Policy Team are more likely to mention elements 
associated with collaborative interactions. 
The findings from this study reiterate that collaboration is not appropriate for use 
in all situations. Participants involved in implementing the VSHP indicate that 
developing and sustaining the collaborative arrangement takes great amounts of time and 
resources. This study confirms that certain factors lend themselves to collaborative 
interactions. The presence of a sense of crisis, interconnected responsibilities, mutual 
interests, and trust may help situations become more conducive for collaborative 
interactions. 
The Initiation of Interactions 
Inquiry is guided by a third research question that examines how 
multiorganizational interactions are initiated. Textual data are organized into the 
categories of a predetermined coding scheme aligned with the operationalizations of the 
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MIM. Elements within the impetus for collective action variable and the formality of the 
agreement variable are used to explore this question. 
Interactions between organizations implementing the VSHP are initiated formally 
and informally. Although much of the literature suggests that formalized interactions are 
initiated by policy mandates, agency rulemaking, or organizational procedures, formally 
initiated interactions in the VSHP are most prevalent in grant contracts. It is through 
these formalized interactions that accountability mechanisms are created within the 
multiorganizational arrangement. Since the accountability mechanisms typically found in 
bureaucratic organizations do not appear in the implementation network, these formally 
initiated interactions fill an important gap. This finding is important because it suggests 
that interactions during multiorganizational implementation are formally initiated in ways 
other than the current body of literature suggests. In addition, formally initiated 
interactions are important in multiorganizational arrangements because they generate 
accountability mechanisms for the distribution of financial resources. 
Multiorganizational interactions are also informally initiated within this study. 
These interactions are most prevalent when participants speak of working with their peers 
to achieve organizational goals or align resources. Understanding the missions and 
interests of partnering organizations helps personnel informally develop and sustain 
relationships. This finding is important because it suggests that multiorganizational 
implementation occurs, in part, through informally initiated interactions. 
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Contributions to Interorganizational Theory 
The literature often describes interactions within multiorganizational 
arrangements as cooperative, coordinative, or collaborative. These descriptions are 
problematic because researchers use them interchangeably. Findings from this study 
support the assertion that each type of interaction is independent and different from the 
others. This study makes two contributions to interorganizational theory. 
First, a major contribution of this study to the interorganizational theory literature 
is the development of the MIM. Ambiguities within a model previously used to explore 
interactions between organizations limited its applicability. The MIM clearly 
distinguishes between the three types of interaction: cooperation, coordination, and 
collaboration. Different elements are associated with each interaction based on the policy 
implementation and interorganizational theory literatures. Distinctions between different 
types of interactions are important because theorists may now subject this model to 
empirical testing in settings outside of policy implementation. Varied application will 
benefit the model and enhance its transferability. 
In turn, improvements to the model may also generate theoretical consistency and 
improve communication within the interorganizational theory literature. Up until this 
point, theorists have not embraced a model that allows them to acknowledge different 
types of interactions between organizations collectively. Instead, they tend to focus on 
multiorganizational interactions in a singular way and assume that a specific type of 
interaction occurs. The MIM creates a foundation for comparing interaction terms 
empirically. Since a specific type of interaction will not be effective in all settings (Keast, 
Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Thomson & Perry, 2006), it is especially important to 
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understand distinctions between them. The constructs and variables within the theoretical 
model provide a needed structure for deciphering between different interaction terms. 
Second, a contribution of this study to the interorganizational theory literature 
involves clarifying the movement of interactions between organizations on the 
continuum. While some researchers describe cooperation, coordination, and collaboration 
as falling along a continuum of increased interaction (see, for example, Mattessich, 
Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006), this is the first time that the 
movements of interactions along the continuum are explored empirically. Relationships 
between organizations do not necessarily progress in a linear manner along the 
continuum. This may be a result of the maturity of the relationships between the 
organizations involved in the VSHP. A more linear progression along the continuum may 
occur in the beginning stages of relationships due to increased levels of interdependence. 
As relationships mature, they may move on the continuum to ensure operations align with 
the type of interaction necessary to achieve the program's goals. Nonlinear movements 
along the continuum of interaction support assertions within the literature that one type of 
interaction is not inherently better than the others. Findings from this study suggest that 
nonlinear movements give organizations flexibility to adjust to contextual conditions by 
moving to a different area along the continuum. 
Contributions to Policy Implementation Inquiry 
Much of the previous policy implementation research focuses on differences 
between the top-down and bottom-up approaches. This line of inquiry is problematic for 
theoretical advancement because an emphasis on synthesizing the top-down and bottom-
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up approaches fails to account for the multiorganizational arrangements frequently 
involved in policy implementation. Textual data gathered from interviews and documents 
supports the use and emphasizes the importance of multiorganizational arrangements 
during policy implementation. This study stands apart from previous research because it 
examines interactions during multiorganizational implementation empirically. By 
broadening the scope of current inquiry, this research contributes to theoretical inquiry in 
the policy implementation literature in four ways. 
First, the findings from this study may help implementation theorists move 
beyond the top-down/bottom-up debate. The literature may be guided toward a fourth 
generation of implementation research by focusing on the interactions within 
multiorganizational arrangements. The MIM embraces elements associated with 
competing implementation approaches, but neither approach is assumed to be more 
important because elements align with different types of interactions. The top 
down/bottom-up debate becomes less important as interactions move toward the 
collaborative end of the continuum. As multiorganizational arrangements become 
increasingly prevalent, implementation success may have more to do with how well 
organizations work together rather than the specificity of policy characteristics or the 
acknowledgement of environmental conditions at the local level. It is important to 
understand the linkages within a multiorganizational arrangement, and the MIM provides 
a theoretical lens to explore these linkages. 
Second, theoretical understanding of policy implementation in 
multiorganizational arrangements may be improved through the exploration of a range of 
interactions. Through the use of the MIM, this study is the first to link cooperation, 
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coordination, and collaboration collectively to multiorganizational implementation. By 
looking at the entire continuum of interactions, researchers are better able to identify the 
conditions under which it is appropriate to use a particular type of interaction as an 
implementation strategy. 
Third, the literature may be guided toward a fourth generation of implementation 
research through the realization that implementation may occur by connecting middle 
level personnel across different organizations. Although the public administration 
literature typically associates government organizations with highly centralized and 
hierarchical structures, the findings suggest that structures within individual organizations 
are far less important to the administrators implementing the VSHP than the horizontal 
structures linking organizations. It appears that the nexus of the top-down/bottom-up 
approaches to implementation occurs because middle level personnel across different 
organizations couple the two approaches. 
Fourth, theoretical understanding of policy implementation in multiorganizational 
arrangements may be expanded through the exploration of the ways interactions are 
initiated. Interactions between organizations are initiated in ways other than the literature 
suggests. The literature emphasizes formal interactions deliberately configured through 
policy mandates, agency rulemaking, or organizational procedures. However, findings 
from this study suggest that formalized interactions within the VSHP are initiated through 
grant contracts. The literature's focus on the origin of formalized interactions should be 
reconsidered. 
This study is the first to acknowledge that multiorganizational policy 
implementation occurs in part through informal relationships. Although informally 
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initiated interactions are less prevalent than formal interactions, their presence in this 
study suggests that multiorganizational implementation occurs outside the boundaries of 
operational authority. This line of inquiry is not considered in the current literature. 
Therefore, the presence of interactions informally initiated within this study's 
implementation network suggests that multiorganizational arrangements should not be 
treated as a mere extension of hierarchical organizations that abide by specifications in 
policy mandates. By focusing on formally initiated interactions as the sole source for 
action, researchers miss a piece of the larger picture. The different ways in which 
arrangements are initiated should continue to be examined empirically. This gap in 
current inquiry highlights a need for fourth generation implementation research to move 
beyond the top-down/bottom-up debate. 
Limitations of the Study 
The researcher acknowledges four limitations pertaining to this case study. First, 
this research focuses specifically on the implementation network involved in the VSHP. 
The findings from this study may be particular to this context and are not intended for 
generalizations. Different types of interactions may occur between organizations involved 
in implementing environmental policies, such as the Coastal Zone Management Act. This 
limitation is addressed by fully describing this study's sample and setting. With this 
information, other researchers can assess the study's transferability. 
Second, much of the data collected in this study is based on the interpretations of 
the interviewer and the perceptions self-reported by those interviewed (Stake, 1995). 
Subjectivity is critical to understanding the context of this research (Stake, 1995). 
However, it can bias research if textual data are unintentionally filtered (Creswell, 2003). 
This limitation is addressed by utilizing a transparent data analysis process. Each step of 
the process is revealed to prevent an unintentional filtering of data and enhance the 
study's confirmability. 
Third, this research is initially limited to the variables identified within the 
theoretical model. While it is possible that other factors could influence interactions 
between organizations implementing the VSHP, it does not appear to be a concern in this 
study. Interview participants are given an opportunity to provide additional information 
after completing the semistructured interview. A search for competing evidence is used to 
enhance the model's authenticity (Miles & Huberman, 1994). When responding to this 
opportunity, interviewees do not identify factors outside of the model. Instead, many 
participants use this opportunity to reiterate an element of the model previously 
discussed. 
Fourth, all variables within the MIM are initially assumed to influence 
interactions between organizations equally and simultaneously. Findings from this study 
suggest that some variables influence multiorganizational interactions more than others. 
This limitation is addressed through the use of qualitative methodology. In addition to 
looking for the verbal mention of elements in interviews and documents, the researcher 
uses examples and context provided by interviewees to give additional meaning to the 
perceived variation in levels of importance. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Due to the use of a single case study design, findings from this research may be 
specific to interactions between organizations implementing the VSHP. While the model 
is found to be useful in explaining multiorganizational interactions in this setting, future 
research should focus on using the MIM to explore interactions between organizations in 
other settings. The theoretical model's confirmability may be enhanced through 
additional research. For example, relationships between constructs should be further 
explored. While this research suggests that relationships between variables within the 
organizational management construct are present, relationships between variables from 
different constructs are not prevalent. 
The findings from this study suggest that the literature should continue to refocus 
its energies away from the top-down/bottom-up debate towards more fruitful lines of 
inquiry like multiorganizational interactions. As multiorganizational arrangements 
become increasingly prevalent, future research should continue to explore 
multiorganizational implementation. In these situations, implementation success may 
have more to do with how well organizations work together rather than the specificity of 
policy characteristics or the acknowledgement of environmental conditions at the local 
level. Therefore, continued exploration of linkages within multiorganizational 
arrangements is necessary. 
Informal relationships play a significant role in developing and sustaining 
relationships between organizations implementing the VSHP, and this is an area 
deserving of further inquiry. More specifically, informally initiated interactions can be 
explored through cooperative relationships. While almost 20% of the elements mentioned 
throughout interviews and documents are associated with cooperative interaction, 
empirical research for this type of interaction is visibly absent from the 
interorganizational theory literature. The potential for interactions to be informally 
initiated should be further explored through research focused on cooperative interactions. 
Theoretical understanding of policy implementation in multiorganizational arrangements 
may be improved through the exploration of the ways interactions are initiated. 
Findings from this study also indicate that coordinative interactions are most often 
associated with grant processes in which some organizational roles and responsibilities 
are formalized. As organizations work across organizational boundaries, the use of 
hierarchical controls becomes less relevant and formalized structures are often associated 
with the distribution of money. The applicability of coordinative interactions in 
multiorganizational arrangements may need to be reconsidered in order to explore the 
context of grant processes and their influence on formalized interactions. 
In addition, previous research suggests that policy mandates infrequently provide 
monetary support to the organizations designated to implement them (see, for example, 
Montjoy & O'Toole, 1979; O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984). The Coastal Zone Management 
Act is considered an "unfunded mandate." While a stable funding stream is created 
through the distribution of grant funds, the availability of funds is less likely in other 
situations. Many policy mandates do not have a state agency distributing one half of a 
million dollars to entice organizations to work together. The criticality of a stable funding 
stream in this study suggests that researchers should consider ways in which 
implementation networks can access funding streams despite the regularity of unfunded 
mandates. 
Furthermore, data from this study suggests that the convening organization plays 
a pivotal role in bringing organizations together and providing an organizational structure 
to carry out the program's operations. Although this role is acknowledged in the literature 
(see, for example, McNamara, Leavitt, & Morris, 2008), specific guidance for convening 
organizations is lacking. Additional research should further explore the roles of 
convening organizations. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this case study focuses on interactions between organizations 
during implementation of the VSHP. This study explores the helpfulness of the 
Multiorganizational Implementation Model in explaining interactions between 
organizations during policy implementation, administrators' perceptions regarding the 
use of different types of interactions, and the ways in which multiorganizational 
interactions are initiated. Interviews and documents suggest that the MIM is helpful in 
exploring interactions between organizations during multiorganizational policy 
implementation. More than 92% of the elements introduced in the model are identified in 
this study. Aligning the model's operationalizations with the policy implementation and 
interorganizational theory literatures allows theorists to clearly distinguish between 
cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. 
In addition, the findings suggest that administrators involved with the VSHP 
strongly perceive interactions to operate at the collaborative end of the continuum of 
interaction. This study supports the presence of multiorganizational arrangements during 
policy implementation. Progress towards a fourth generation of implementation research 
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is made by resolving the top-down/bottom-up approaches by focusing on interactions 
within multiorganziational arrangements and by recognizing that implementation action 
occurs by linking organizations through middle level personnel. Despite the presence of 
highly centralized and hierarchical structures within individual organizations, horizontal 
linkages between organizations are created and sustained because middle level personnel 
couple the two approaches. Multiorganizational implementation is optimal when 
horizontal connections between organizations are created at multiple levels. 
Finally, the findings suggest that multiorganizational interactions are initiated in 
formal and informal ways. Formalized interactions are initiated through grant contracts 
rather than policy mandates, agency rulemaking, or organizational procedures. Therefore, 
the literature's approach to formalized interactions should be reconsidered. This study is 
the first to acknowledge that multiorganizational policy implementation occurs in part 
through informal relationships. The presence of informally initiated interactions suggests 
that a top-down approach to implementation does not fully capture relationships that 
occur outside the boundaries of operational authority. In order to capture the full picture, 
theorists must acknowledge the presence of informally initiated interactions as well as 
those that are formally initiated. 
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Semistructured Interview Protocol 
Name: 




1. What organizations do you most closely work with to implement the Virginia Seaside 
Heritage Program? 
Interorganizational Policy Objective Construct: 
2. How would you describe your organization's involvement in working with other 
organizations on tasks associated with achieving the goals of the Virginia Seaside 
Heritage Program? 




Difficulty Simple task, routine 
Multifaceted tasks, repeatable 
Complex tasks, crisis 
Role of Single Independent 
Organizations Need some assistance 
Interdependence 
Impetus for voluntary, informal, external change 
Collective voluntary/mandated, common objectives 
Action voluntary/mandated, complementary 
How long do you anticipate working with other 
organizations to implement the VSHP? 
How would you describe the complexity of tasks 
associated with implementing the VSHP? 
To what extent could a single agency effectively 
complete tasks associated with implementing the 
VSHP? 
Why does your organization work with other 
organizations to implement the VSHP? 
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Interorganizational Infrastructure Construct: 
3. How are relationships built between organizations involved in implementing the 
Virginia Seaside Heritage Program? 
Variable Probes More Specific Interview Questions (only use if 
needed) 
Design Existing org structures; no interagency staff 
Formal relationships; central admin; hierarchically 
managed; reorganization or consolidation 
Shared power; new program structures; collective 
admin staff 
What administrative structure supports relationships 






Informal; individual focus 
Formal; contractual or nonfinancial; higher 
authority reviews agreements 
Formal bargaining and informal relationship-
building. Jointly draft shared purpose. 
Fully autonomous 
Semiautonomous; require some assistance 
Not autonomous; relinquish autonomy to collective 
unit. 
How are the roles and responsibilities for each 
participating organization determined? 
How would you describe the degree to which partnering 
organizations operate independently during 
implementation of the VSHP? 
Policy Follow pre-existing policies; no multiorganizational 
Authority policy decisions 
Each org retains authority; Policy decisions 
compatible with pre-established policies 
Collectively develop policies for policy domain 
To what extent does your organization give authority to 
the collective group to develop policies that guide 
operations pertaining to implementation of the VSHP? 
Key Personnel No leadership involved in decision to work together 
Leaders have decision making authority; managers 
implement these decisions; facilitator. 
No one in charge; lead organization; membership 
changes. 
What individuals/organizations play a key role in 
bringing organizations together to implement the 
VSHP? 
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Interorganizational Procedures Construct 
4. What processes are used to sustain relationships between organizations throughout 
implementation of the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program? 
Variable Probes More Specific Interview Questions (only use if 
needed) 
Information Informal; basic info shared 
Sharing Formal & informal 
Open & frequent communication; share what 
individual organizations can/cannot provide 
How do you communicate with other organizations 
involved in implementing the VSHP? 
What kinds of information are shared? 
Decision Independent decision making 
Making Centralized decision making; lead organization 
Participative decision making; consensus, 
negotiation, compromise 
Resolution of Turf issues avoided 
Turf Issues Neutral facilitator resolves turf issues 
Turf issues may occur; incongruent demands 
individual & collective organizations. 
Resource Resources not pooled; discretionary funds 
Allocation Resource exchange; mandate provision 
Pooled resources 
Systems Organizational systems unchanged 
Thinking Compatible information systems 
Integrated systems to link organizations 
How are decisions made in regards to implementing the 
VSHP? 
Do turf issues occur between organizations involved in 
implementing the VSHP? If so, how are these issues 
resolved? 
How are organizational resources reallocated to the 
collective group during implementation of the VSHP? 
What resources does your organization contribute? 
To what extent are organizational systems integrated 
among the group of organizations involved in 
implementing the VSHP? 
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Organizational Management Construct 
5. How do participating organizations show support for implementing the Virginia 
Seaside Heritage Program? 








Based on pre-existing job responsibilities 
Statutory provision, organizational leadership 
Collective & individual organizations 
Regular job responsibilities; interests of individual 
organization 
Supervisory administrative body; benefits outweigh 
costs 
Collective & individual organizational interests 
balanced; collective interest serves individual 
interests; reciprocity 
Complete independence, standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) are not modified 
SOPs are modified when it supports the 
organization's individual goals 
Organizations mutually adjust; establish policies 
Trust not required, but can develop 
Leaders work to build trust relationships 
Partners build trust by sharing information, open 
communication, & supportive past behavior 
Low levels of risk 
Moderate levels of risk; some interdependence 
High levels of risk; interdependence, integration 
What incentives are provided to encourage you or your 
organization to participate in implementing the VSHP? 
How would you describe your commitment and your 
organization's commitment to implementing the VSHP? 
To what extent are you and your organization willing to 
alter standard operating procedures in order to support 
implementation of the VSHP? 
How would you describe the level of trust between the 
organizations involved in implementing the VSHP? 
To what extent does working with other organizations to 
implement the VSHP require your organization to 
deviate from organizational standards? 
6. Are there any other factors that would help me understand the interactions between 




As a member of an organization involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage 
Program, your experience with this program is very valuable to the research I am 
conducting for my doctoral dissertation through Old Dominion University. The purpose 
of this research is to explore interactions between organizations when working together to 
implement policy. More specifically, this study focuses on the use of cooperation, 
coordination, and collaboration between government and nongovernmental organizations 
during implementation of the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. 
I appreciate your agreement to participate in an interview in support of this research 
effort. A series of demographic and background questions are included in this document. 
Please fill out this questionnaire and I will collect it from you during our scheduled 
interview. In my research, your identity will be kept confidential and the information you 
provide will be grouped with information from other interviewees. 
If you have any questions, please contact me. 
Thank you for your participation. 
Madeleine McNamara 
921 Edgewater Drive 
Newport News, VA 23602 
Phone: 757-880-9475 
Email: mwmcnamaral (Siverizon.net 
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1. Please fill in the following information: 
Name: 




2. How long have you been in your current position with your organization? 
3. How long have you been involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage 
Program? 
4. Have you worked for other organizations partnering with the Coastal Zone 
Management Program? 
4a. If so, what organization(s) did you work for, what positions did you hold, how long 
were you there, and were you involved with the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program 
(VSHP)? 






5. Does your organization provide training or education programs to help you develop the 
skills needed to work within a collaborative arrangement? 
5a. If so, what training or education programs are provided? 
5b. If not, how do you develop these skills? 
6. Please describe the goals of your organization. 
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7.1 would like to identify the network of organizations involved in implementing the 
Virginia Seaside Heritage Program and the involvement of specific people within these 
organizations. Who do you work with on a regular basis to implement the Virginia 
























Exploring Interactions during Multiorganizational Policy Implementation: A Case 
Study of Virginia's Coastal Zone Management Program 
As a member of an organization involved in implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage 
Program, your experience with this program is very valuable to the research I am 
conducting for my doctoral dissertation through Old Dominion University. The purpose 
of this research is to explore the types of interactions used when multiple organizations 
are involved in policy implementation. More specifically, this study focuses on the use 
of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration between government and 
nongovernmental organizations during implementation of the Virginia Seaside Heritage 
Program. Your responses in this interview will contribute to this research. 
Participation in this interview is voluntary. Your identity will be kept confidential and 
the information you provide will be grouped with responses from other interviewees. 
The interview will be audio taped and a verbatim transcript of the interview will be 
created. If you would like to review this transcript, please contact the researcher below. 
The interview was designed to gather in-depth information based on your perceptions 
pertaining to the interactions that occur between organizations during implementation of 
the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. There are two sections within the interview. 
First, you will be asked a series of structured questions pertaining to the program 
objectives, infrastructure, procedures, and management. Second, you will be given an 
opportunity to provide the researcher with additional information that was not addressed 
in the structured portion of the interview. 
Thank you for your participation. 
Madeleine McNamara 
921 Edgewater Drive 
Newport News, VA 23602 
Phone: 757-880-9475 
Email: mwmcnamaral (Sjverizon.net 
Please sign to indicate that you have read and understand this informed consent: 
Signature Date 
Appendix D 
Organizational Documents Reviewed 
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972. 16 U.S.C. 1451 
Evaluation Findings for the Virginia Coastal Management Program - November 1999 
through July 2003 
Evaluation Findings for the Virginia Coastal Zone Management Program - August 
2003 through May 2006 
Executive Order Number 21 - Continuing the Virginia Coastal Zone Management 
Program 
Memorandum of Understanding Relating to the Management of Conservation Lands 
Located on the Southern Tip of the Eastern Shore 
Planning District Commission Technical Assistance Grant Minimum Standards 
Virginia's Eastern Shore Seaside Management Plan - Draft January 22, 2008 
Virginia Seaside Heritage Program Accomplishments 2002-2008 
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Appendix E 
















































Independent; possible to 
accomplish the task 
individually 
Voluntarily initiate 
collective action because 
helpful to world of work (a) 
Build capacity to serve 
individual interests (b) 
Changes in external factors 
- search new solutions (c) 
Work within existing 
organizational structure (a) 
Interagency staff 
unnecessary (b) 
Informally work together to 
achieve individual goals 
Fully autonomous 
No multiorganizational 









Basic information is shared 
(b) 
Decisions are made 
independently 
Turf issues are avoided 
Discretionary funds are used 
to pursue individual goals 
(a) 
Resources are not pooled (b) 
Units of exchange are 
determined at the lowest 
levels (c) 
































Organizational systems are 
unchanged 
Elements 
Opportunities for synergistic 
benefits are realized based 
on the desire to avoid 
negative impacts resulting 
from changes in external 
factors 
Work completed as part of 
regular job responsibilities 
(a) 
Interests of individual 
organization paramount (b) 
Colleagues may encourage 
each other to work with 
personnel in other 
organizations (c) 
Organizations maintain 
complete independence in 
establishing rules, roles, & 
policies to govern their 
organization (a) 
An organization's standard 
operating procedures remain 
unchanged by the collective 
effort (b) 
Trust relationships are not 
required but can develop 
Do not engage in risk taking 
behavior (a) 









































Require assistance from 
other organizations to 
accomplish individual goals 
Linkages are mobilized 
because compatible mission 
areas mutually increase 
abilities to achieve 
individual goals (a) 
An interagency liaison or 
boundary spanner may forge 
relationships to meet 
resource needs or shared 
interests (b) 
Legislative mandate or grant 
contracts enhance cohesion 
or minimize duplication (c) 
Hierarchical structure is 
used to centrally manage 
roles & responsibilities (a) 
Centralization may involve 
program reorganization or 
consolidation (b) 
Mechanisms, such as 




identifying roles and 
responsibilities, are often 
developed or reviewed by a 
higher authority (b) 
Semiautonomous; require 
some assistance from other 
organizations to achieve 
goals 
Organizations maintain 
individual authority over the 
policies that govern their 
respective organizations (a) 
Policies developed for the 
collective group are 
compatible w/ policies 



















































Facilitator may coordinate 
actions at local level (c) 
Communication channels 





dominates process (b) 
Resolved through neutral 
facilitator or convener 
Exchange resources to 
improve abilities to reach 
individual goals (a) 
Resources may be provided 
through mandate or grant 
arrangements (b) 
Resource needs satisfied by 
a preexisting program 




Statutes or grant contracts 
provide funding (a) 
Leadership communicates 
importance (b) 
Encouraged by supervisory 
administrative body (a) 
Linkages recognized when 
benefits are perceived to 
outweigh costs (b) 
Leaders explore 
modifications to SOP when 
program goals align with 
individual organizational 
missions 
Leaders work closely to 
create relationships based 
on trust 
Some interdependence 
based on resource needs (a) 
Moderate levels of risk (b) 








































Complex tasks that are 
highly varied and diverse 
(a) 
Situations of crisis (b) 
Interdependent; each 
organization is one element 
of the larger system 
Complementary interests in 
attaining mutual goals (a) 
Cannot achieve the desired 
goal without working 
together (b) 
A lead agency or convener 
brings relevant 
stakeholders together (c) 
Jointly develop shared 
power arrangements to 
address collective interests 
(a) 
New program structure (b) 
An administrative element 
is present to sustain 
collective efforts (c) 
Stakeholders jointly 
develop course of action 
(a) 
Mutually agreed upon roles 
& responsibilities, rules, 





Jointly develop policies 
and procedures that govern 
the collective group (a) 
Policies & procedures 
include working rules that 
specify which stakeholders 
can make decisions, who 
will guide collective 
action, and the distribution 
of costs/benefits (b) 




























No one in charge (a) 
Lead organization proposes 
policies/rules for the 
collective group to 
consider (b) 
Membership, roles, and 
responsibilities adapt to the 
task at hand (c) 
Each role is considered 
equally important (d) 
Open and frequent 
communication (a) 
Communication channels 
are used to widely 
disseminate info related to 
the collective group (b) 
Understanding is enhanced 
by a willingness to share 
info about organizations 
which may include what 
can/cannot be offered to 
the collective group (c) 
Participative decision 
making through consensus 
and compromise (a) 
Personnel have latitude to 
negotiate rules and 
deliberate agreements to 




organization and group (a) 
Consideration given to 
adjusting 
policies/procedures to 
reduce conflict; common 
ground maximized (b) 
Pooled resources (a) 
Organizations have 
resources, skills, or 
knowledge needed to 
achieve goals (b) 
Allocate staff, time, or 
funding to support 
collective unit (c) 
Resources allocated by 
balancing needs of group 

































Integrate systems to share 
information & foster 
linkages across org 
Incentives are provided by 
the individual 
organizations to encourage 
involvement (a) 
Incentives are provided by 
the collective group to 
encourage involvement (b) 
Committed to own 
organization and the 
collective group - need to 
balance interests (a) 
Collective interest serves 
each organization's 
individual interests (b) 
Relationships are impacted 
by the extent to which 
collective action is 
reciprocated (c) 
Mutually adjust (a) 
Changes to SOPs are 
considered when needed to 
align with the group (b) 
Trust is necessary (a) 
Share information openly 
(b) 
History of supportive 
behavior or long-standing 
relationships (c) 
Integrated approaches 
create dependency (a) 
Depart from normal 
behavior (b) 
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